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have been forced to leave their homes and communities because of the 
civil war consuming Syria. The displacement, internally and externally, 
of more than half of the country’s population—one of the largest forced 
movements of people since the end of World War II—has transformed the 
region. It has also triggered a wave of political turbulence in Europe as 
hundreds of thousands have fled across the Mediterranean to seek refuge.
The Consequences of Chaos details the plight of Syria’s uprooted citizens 
and examines the long-term economic, political, and social implications 
of this massive movement of people. The humanitarian crisis has been 
overwhelming for all actors involved. Neighboring countries host almost 
five million Syrian refugees with no end in sight. European institutions 
struggle to come up with a coherent approach to the crisis. The United 
Nations appeals for increasing levels of financial support to respond to 
the demands for food, shelter, and medical care. A New Global Approach 
for Syria is needed, the authors maintain, and they propose an innovative 
system of burden sharing to respond to the humanitarian crisis in 
both the short and longer term. 
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T h e  M a r s h a l l  P a P e r s
After World War II, Brookings scholars played an instru-
mental role in helping the United States craft a concept of 
inter national order and build a set of supporting institu-
tions, including what became known as the Marshall Plan, 
in honor of Secretary of State George C. Marshall who spear-
headed the effort. Now, a generation later, the  Brookings 
 Foreign Policy program has evoked that vital  historical junc-
ture by launching The Marshall Papers, a new book series 
and part of the Order from Chaos project. These short books 
will provide accessible research on critical inter national 
questions designed to stimulate debate about how the United 
States and others should act to promote an inter national 
order that continues to foster peace,  prosperity, and justice.
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The international order is in trouble. For a quarter century, the world has experienced growing global interdepen-
dence largely characterized by the absence of geopolitical 
competition and the leadership of the United States. Now 
there are several, possibly fundamental, challenges to that 
order—in Asia, where the rapid rise of China is disrupting 
relationships across the region; in Europe, where Russia 
seeks to undo the post–Cold War settlement through ag-
gression; and in the Middle East, where the regional state 
system itself is breaking down and we have entered a phase 
of bloody regional competition and a geopolitical proxy war. 
The return of geopolitics has been accompanied by a 
return to competition between democracies and autocra-
cies. China’s rise and Russia’s recovery have generated a new 
model of “authoritarian capitalism.” This comes at a time 
when the global financial crisis has put a dent in the cred-
ibility of the Western economic model, and the disappoint-
ments and consequences of the Arab Spring have led many 
to question the value of promoting liberal democracy. It 
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also comes amid relative weakness in the Western alliance 
system, characterized by political nativism in Washington, 
double- or even triple-dip recession in Europe, and continu-
ing economic stagnation in Japan. 
Transnational and global threats also pose deepening 
challenges both to the United States and its geopolitical 
competitors. Climate change, pandemic disease, and jihad-
ist terrorism illustrate the human cost and potential risks of 
weak states in the international order. 
All told, we appear to be at one of history’s pivotal junc-
tures, and again the response of the United States will be 
critical. For all the talk of America’s relative decline, the 
United States retains more capacity than any other power to 
impact the calculations and policies of others. But America’s 
competitors are too powerful and their visions too different 
to imagine that U.S. leadership alone is a sufficient ingredi-
ent to maintain the liberal, rules-based international order 
that now feels so threatened. 
In short, the task is urgent and complicated: how to re-
invent the liberal international order in the face of so many 
centrifugal, chaotic forces so that it can provide greater sta-
bility, peace, prosperity, and freedom; and how to do it in 
ways that encourage cooperation from other world powers, 
reduce friction generated by competition with them, and if 
necessary contain or constrain their ability to undermine 
the order.
For these reasons, Foreign Policy at Brookings has 
launched a two-year project on “Order from Chaos” with 
three core purposes: to analyze the dynamics in the inter-
national system that are creating stresses, challenges, and 
a breakdown of order; to define U.S. interests in this new 
era and develop specific strategies for promoting a revital-
ized rules-based, liberal international order; and to provide 
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policy recommendations on how to develop the necessary 
tools of statecraft (military, economic, diplomatic, and 
social) and how to refashion the architecture of the inter-
national order.
At an earlier juncture in history, as the Second World 
War came to a close, Brookings played an instrumental role 
in helping the United States craft a concept of international 
order and a set of supporting institutions. The highlight of 
this was a Brookings-drafted program that was introduced 
by Secretary of State George C. Marshall and became known 
as the Marshall Plan. 
It is to recall that moment and invoke its spirit—the ap-
plication of policy research to the crafting of effective inter-
national strategy—that the Order from Chaos project has 
chosen to initiate The Marshall Papers. Their purpose is to 
provide accessible, long-form research on critical interna-
tional questions designed to stimulate debate about how the 
United States and others should act in the world to promote 
international order—an order that adapts to new realities to 
be sure, but one that continues to foster peace, prosperity, 
and justice. That is the foreign policy challenge of our time, 
and the connecting theme of these papers. 
Bruce D. Jones
Vice President, Foreign Policy
Brookings Institution
Ferris-Kirişci_Consequences of Chaos_i-xx_1-202.indd   11 3/11/16   2:51 PM




a humanitarian catastrophe—a tide of refugees fleeing Syria—is now entering its sixth year and the international 
community is still struggling to respond. The resources of 
the governments hosting the refugees, aid agencies, nongov-
ernmental organizations, and a multitude of other actors are 
being tested. In the absence of viable political solutions to 
the conflict, governments in the region and the broader in-
ternational community are all struggling to respond to the 
humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees and internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs). No final solution to the war in Syria 
appears in sight and funds to support an ever-increasing 
population of displaced persons are neither sufficient now 
nor likely to be sustainable in the future.
The Syrian situation is occurring against the background 
of a global crisis of displacement. According to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in 2014 almost 
60 million people have been forced from their homes by 
conflict, violence, and persecution. Furthermore, a large 
proportion of these people have been uprooted for a very 
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long time. Finding solutions for long-term displacement has 
long been on the global humanitarian agenda, but the in-
ternational community is failing in this task, especially in 
terms of resettling refugees and providing adequate funding 
for humanitarian assistance.
All trends point to Syria becoming yet another long-term, 
intractable displacement crisis with profound implications 
for Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, the major host countries 
for Syrian refugees, as well as the EU and the broader inter-
national community. Can something be done about it?
In any attempt to address this question it is important 
to recognize the implications of the Syrian displacement on 
the current international order. The Syrian conflict and re-
sulting displacement are clear signs that the present inter-
national system for preventing and resolving conflicts has 
been deeply challenged—at least in the Middle East. The 
Syrian displacement is also a clear indictment of the limi-
tations of the United Nations as well as regional bodies to 
prevent and resolve such crises. Ultimately, the solution to 
the Syrian IDP and refugee crisis is political and demands 
an end to the violence and destruction in Syria. Only during 
the course of the last months of 2015, as the conflict in Syria 
began to affect the international security and stability of 
Europe, have any high-level efforts been launched to address 
the root cause of displacement. Meanwhile, the challenge of 
extending humanitarian assistance and protection to dis-
placed Syrians continues to call for burden sharing and in-
ternational solidarity.
It is no secret that an interrelationship exists between 
political and diplomatic solutions to the Syrian conflict and 
remedies to the displacement crisis. It is critical that as ef-
forts geared to solve the Syrian conflict gather momentum, 
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the international community consider the effects of such 
solutions on resolving displacement. First, any political 
resolution needs to incorporate terms and provide sufficient 
funds for both physical reconstruction of the country itself 
and support Syrians who wish to voluntarily move back to 
their communities. This is likely to take years. Second, any 
remedy to the Syrian conflict will need to be accompanied 
and sustained by processes of reconciliation if returns of ref-
ugees and internally displaced persons are to be sustainable. 
In the meantime, addressing the current displacement 
crisis should be based on recognition of at least two impor-
tant realities. First, refugees themselves are actors capable of 
taking their own destiny into their hands—as demonstrated 
in their mass movement out of the region in the past year. 
While refugees and IDPs are usually depicted in Western 
media only as victims of conflict, they are survivors. 
Second, it is important to bear in mind that the burden 
of protecting and assisting refugees has largely fallen on the 
shoulders of major host countries—primarily Jordan, Leba-
non, and Turkey. The governments of these countries are 
providing a public good for the international community, 
and it is indeed disappointing that appeals by host govern-
ments and the UN system for more assistance received scant 
attention—until large numbers of Syrians began to arrive in 
Europe. Finally, as the European refugee crisis is making in-
creasingly clear, it is in the best interest of the international 
community and Europe that a new formula be found for ef-
fective burden sharing with these host countries. 
It is against such a background that in Consequences of 
Chaos we propose a New Global Approach for Syria. The de-
velopment of this approach would bring together the gov-
ernments of refugee-hosting countries, the UN and other 
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intergovernmental agencies, regional bodies, international 
nongovernmental organizations and local civil society 
actors, and donor governments to consider and adopt a 
new system of burden sharing. The focus would be centered 
around 
 ■ Reaffirming the principle that protection of refugees is 
an international responsibility; 
 ■ Supporting common legal and policy approaches to 
Syrian refugees in the region that includes access to 
livelihood opportunities; 
 ■ Reaffirming resettlement as a core component of refu-
gee protection and assistance and retooling elements 
of resettlement policy to meet the needs of especially 
the most vulnerable of refugees; 
 ■ Providing a forum for creative thinking on solutions 
for internally displaced people; 
 ■ Establishing a new relationship between humanitarian 
and development actors; 
 ■ Engaging development actors such as the World Bank 
more effectively; and 
 ■ Laying the groundwork for longer-term reconstruc-
tion and recovery efforts in Syria. 
The process of developing this New Global Approach 
for Syria could be worked out through a consultative pro-
cess with stakeholders over a six-to-twelve-month period 
jointly led by the UN secretary general and the president of 
the World Bank and could culminate in a global meeting 
in March 2017. Then, the challenge would be for executive 
bodies to actually implement these policy recommenda-
tions. The New Global Approach for Syria, if successfully im-
plemented, would offer a “win-win” outcome, foremost, for 
Syrian refugees and IDPs, but also for major host countries 
as well as the EU, not to mention the broader international 
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community. This new system combining relief and humani-
tarian assistance with a developmental approach may form 
the skeleton of a template for managing the broader global 
refugee crisis as well as help reform international humani-
tarian governance.
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C h a P T e r  1
The Context, Causes, and Consequences of 
Syrian Displacement 
T he displacement of almost 13 million Syrians —half the country’s population —is the most daunting humanitar-
ian crisis of our time. In the absence of viable political so-
lutions to the conflict, governments in the region and the 
broader international community are all struggling to re-
spond to the humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees and in-
ternally displaced people (IDPs). Political actors, unable to 
agree on how to end the violence, agree that humanitarian 
assistance is needed, but the funds are neither sufficient now 
nor likely to be sustainable in the years ahead. The conflict 
that is driving the displacement has become more complex 
over the past few years, particularly with the proliferation 
of actors involved, and solutions appear more elusive than 
ever. As starkly illustrated by the November 2015 Beirut and 
Paris attacks, Syria’s humanitarian crisis has implications 
not only for Syrian civilians but also for the course of the 
conflict, governments in the region, governments beyond 
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the region, the international humanitarian system, and 
indeed for global peace and security. 
While dozens of articles and studies have looked at the 
scale of the Syrian displacement crisis, this book takes a step 
back to look at the larger issues raised by the Syrian crisis 
and in particular its implications for global governance. 
T h e  G l o b a l  C o n T e x T :  i T ’ s  n o T  J u s T  s y r i a
At the present time, humanitarian actors are struggling to 
respond to multiple mega- crises. The number of displaced 
persons has reached levels not seen since the end of World 
War II. Worldwide, almost 60 million people have been 
forced from their homes by conflict, violence, and persecu-
tion (figure 1- 1). While Syrian displacement is the most vis-
ible manifestation of this trend, it is far from the only case. 
And the rarely acknowledged fact behind these numbers is 
that most of the world’s 60 million refugees and internally 
displaced people have been uprooted for a long time. The 
global displacement crisis is as much about the failure to 
resolve long- term displacement as about new conflicts dis-
placing millions of people. Some 60 percent of the 60 mil-
lion uprooted have been displaced for more than five years, 
and refugees, on average, have been uprooted for seventeen 
years.1 Finding solutions for long- term displacement has 
long been on the global humanitarian agenda, but the inter-
national community is failing in this task. In 2015 the fewest 
number of refugees returned to their countries than at any 
time since 1983.2 
Right now, there simply are too many simultaneous 
mega- crises: Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya in the Middle 
East; Ukraine; South Sudan, Burundi, and Central Afri-
can Republic; Afghanistan, Nepal, and the Rohingya in 
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 Myanmar. There are also displacement crises in Colom-
bia, Central America, and Mexico; still- fragile situations 
in Mali, Somalia, Eritrea, and the Sahel; lingering effects 
of the Ebola crisis in West Africa; and the continuing saga 
of deaths in the Mediterranean. Humanitarian actors are 
scrambling to respond to all of these crises. Not only is hu-
manitarian funding under pressure, but there is a shortage 
of experienced humanitarian staff and a lack of creative and 
critical thinking about the larger issues beyond the imme-
diate crises. International attention is fickle and gravitates 
to the crisis of the day, moving away from protracted crises 
even though people remain displaced and in need.
Today’s humanitarian crises are a reflection of chang-
ing patterns of violence and conflict. Overall trends indi-
cate that the world is much less violent than during the Cold 
War and its immediate aftermath. In fact, most regions of 
the world have seen reductions in levels of violence over the 
past twenty years. While data from the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program show that over 100,000 people were killed 
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in organized violence in 2014 —the highest rate of fatalities 
in twenty years —this is still much lower than the previ-
ous peak in 1994.3 However, the last five years have seen an 
upsurge in organized violence, particularly in the Middle 
East, where a combination of weak national states, corrupt 
economies, and Western passivity has led to what Peter 
Harling and Alex Simon have called the “chaotic devolution 
of power” and the “militiarization” of societies.4 While the 
roots of the Syria conflict are clearly in the political and eco-
nomic failures in the region, the international system has 
been unable to prevent the escalation of the conflict, in spite 
of the endorsement by the UN World Summit of the concept 
of Responsibility to Protect in 2005.5 
If the international community cannot develop the means 
to prevent and resolve the conflicts that displace large num-
bers of people, as in Syria, then it needs to invest more in sup-
porting solutions for refugees and IDPs and others suffering 
the effects of those conflicts, including host communities. If 
successful, such efforts could also serve as models for other 
seemingly intractable conflicts that have displaced millions, 
as in Iraq and Yemen. Such initiatives, as discussed in the 
concluding chapter of this study, could include more support 
and different kinds of support for refugees in neighboring 
countries and for resettlement in more distant lands as well 
as using development assistance to support solutions for refu-
gees and IDPs. Rather than paying large (though insufficient) 
sums of money to support care and maintenance programs 
for Syrian refugees, perhaps greater incentives should be of-
fered to host governments to support long- term integration 
of refugees into their countries. 
There also may be ways to do much more to recognize the 
agency of refugees and IDPs themselves and support their 
efforts to find their own solutions to displacement. As dis-
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cussed below, most of the Iraqi refugees who fled their coun-
try in the mid- 2000s have likely found their own solutions, 
without international support. Oxford University researchers 
have deemed this “accommodation” rather than integration.6 
Host communities need to be reassured that the presence of 
refugees can contribute to economic growth if they are given 
a chance to help themselves. Furthermore, their “accommo-
dation” need not mean discouraging them from returning 
home. If anything, recent research suggests that economi-
cally better integrated refugees are more likely to more suc-
cessfully manage the return process when the time comes.7 
Ideas and recommendations are spelled out more fully in 
the concluding chapter, but the authors want to signal from 
the beginning that the Syrian displacement crisis compels 
the international community to look beyond short- term hu-
manitarian solutions. The Syrian crisis —coming as it does 
on top of too many other mega- crises —is a clear sign that 
the international humanitarian system can no longer cope. 
The only answer is not simply for Western governments to 
pony up more money for more relief aid for Syrians displaced 
for decades to come. Nor is it to bring more donors —such as 
China and the Gulf states —into the existing system (though 
that is certainly needed to address current shortfalls). The 
magnitude of the crisis and the scale of human suffering 
compel the search for bold and even radical solutions for the 
failures of our present global system. 
T h i s  b o o k
This study begins by placing the Syrian displacement crisis 
in the context of the Middle East —a context shaped by poor 
governance, violence, and resulting waves of displacement 
that have influenced the region’s response to Syrian refugees 
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and IDPs. This is followed by a short overview of the now- 
familiar ground of the descent of Syria into civil war with an 
emphasis on the conflict’s effect on displacing people. The 
particular impact of the refugee flows on Syria’s neighbors —
Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey —is then considered with anal-
ysis of how these three countries have tried to cope with the 
situation in the face of inadequate burden sharing by the in-
ternational community. Discussion then turns to the more 
recent phenomenon of Syrian refugees making their way 
to Europe and the impact of this flow of refugees not only 
on Europe and the global humanitarian architecture but 
indeed on international peace and security too. Chapter 3 
addresses some of the challenges posed by those displaced —
and trapped —inside Syrian borders. While protecting and 
assisting Syrian refugees in host countries is a mammoth 
task, the challenge of doing so for those displaced within 
Syrian borders is even more daunting. Finally, the book 
concludes with a chapter analyzing the identified trends and 
suggesting possible ways forward. Solutions for resolving 
Syria’s civil war are not presented, except in passing to note 
their possible humanitarian consequences. However, it goes 
without saying that ultimately finding solutions for those 
displaced will require addressing the very root cause of the 
crisis: the war in Syria.
This study is based on field researches carried out since 
2013 in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey and on dozens of in-
terviews with humanitarian actors, including those working 
inside Syria and in Iraq.8 Most of those writing about Syrian 
displacement focus on the numbers. Numbers are impor-
tant, but they are constantly changing. The figures presented 
here are current as of the end of 2015, and it is likely that 
these figures will be out- of- date before this book is even 
published. But the issues around Syrian displacement are 
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much broader than the number of people displaced on a 
given date, and this study seeks to look beyond the numbers 
to the larger trends and political implications of Syrian refu-
gee and IDP flows.
A word on definitions: A refugee is a person who has 
crossed an internationally recognized border because of 
conflict or persecution. Protection of refugees is guaran-
teed under the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Proto-
col.9 Neither Lebanon nor Jordan has signed this treaty. 
Although Turkey has ratified the Convention, it maintains a 
geographical limitation, restricting formal refugee status to 
Europeans. In this paper, the term “refugee” is used to refer 
to Syrians who have fled to other countries since the conflict 
broke out in 2011, whether or not recognized as such by the 
host governments. 
The definition of an internally displaced person is much 
broader and carries less legal weight. Unlike refugees whose 
rights are upheld in a long- established, legally binding con-
vention, the normative framework for IDPs is much more 
recent and much less formal. The Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, although affirmed as an important 
framework by the 2005 World Summit, are not a legally 
binding international treaty.10 While the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is mandated 
to protect and assist refugees, there is no corresponding in-
ternational organization responsible for IDPs; rather, that 
responsibility lies with national authorities, supported at 
times by a looser system of international agency involve-
ment. Globally there are around three times as many IDPs 
as refugees.
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T h e  m i d d l e  e a s T  C o n T e x T
While unusual in its intensity and its direct impact beyond 
the region, the Syrian refugee crisis is just the latest of a 
long series of large- scale displacements of people in the 
Middle East over many centuries. Two of the most recent 
displacements —of Palestinians after the founding of Israel 
and of Iraqis during and after the rule of Saddam Hussein —
provide particular context for understanding the plight of 
Syrians today, including the treatment of them by neighbor-
ing countries.
The Ongoing Palestinian Legacy
In 1948 some 700,000 Palestinians (95 percent of the total 
Arab population in the area) fled or were forced from their 
communities and have largely lived as refugees ever since.11 
This displacement not only shaped Palestinian identity, but 
it has dominated Arab- Israeli relations for sixty- plus years 
and has influenced the region’s response to later waves of 
displacement, including both Palestinian and Iraqi refu-
gees. In 1948 the assumption was that the influx of Palestin-
ian refugees would be a temporary phenomenon. The UN 
Conciliation Commission for Palestine was established in 
1948 to mediate the conflict; it failed to do so (a long and 
fascinating story) and ceased its protection functions in the 
mid- 1950s. A successor agency, the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA), was created in 1950 with a three- year mandate 
but is still with us today, caring for almost 5 million Pales-
tinian refugees, including 2 million in Jordan and about half 
a million each in Lebanon and Syria (before the outbreak of 
the Syria conflict in 2011).12 
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In light of the present Syrian crisis, it is interesting and 
sad to look back at the early history of the international re-
sponse to the plight of Palestinians. Sometimes there is an 
assumption that certain bits of history are all preordained, 
but other outcomes were in fact possible back then. The fact 
that a separate UN agency was created to deal with Palestin-
ian refugees (rather than including them in UNHCR, which 
was also established in 1950), that the UN Conciliation 
Commission was disbanded, that more than fifty camps 
were set up for Palestinians, that the right of return was 
enshrined in UN resolutions, and that Arab governments 
found it useful to maintain the visibility of the refugees as a 
bargaining chip with Israel —together meant that solutions 
to Palestinian displacement would remain elusive. At least 
some of these factors are also at play in the current Syrian 
refugee crisis. 
The long- term presence of the Palestinian refugees has 
shaped host governments’ response to both the Iraqi and 
Syrian refugees in several ways. Lebanon and Jordan wel-
comed the Palestinian refugees in 1948, expecting that their 
presence would be a temporary phenomenon. Nearly seven 
decades later, the Palestinian population in the region has 
increased more than fivefold. Lebanon and Jordan took dif-
ferent paths in their treatment of the Palestinians. While 
Jordan gave Palestinians the right to become citizens (and 
most UNRWA- registered refugees in Jordan have done so), 
Lebanon kept citizenship off the table out of concern for its 
own fragile sectarian balance (although Lebanon did grant 
citizenship to about 50,000, mainly Christian, Palestinians 
in the 1950s). It was not until 2010 that Palestinians in Leba-
non were allowed to work on the same basis as other for-
eigners (although the process is onerous and they are still 
prohibited from working in some 20 professions).13 Syria, in 
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fact, was one of the host countries most accepting of Pales-
tinian refugees.
Several lessons from the experience of Palestinians are 
relevant to our story of Syrian refugees today. Governments 
of host countries recognized that allowing refugees to stay 
temporarily was no guarantee that they would soon leave. 
Today, Lebanese and Jordanians constantly draw parallels 
between the Syrian and Palestinian situations. “We thought 
our Palestinian brothers and sisters would only stay for a 
short time,” one Lebanese official noted. “They’ve been here 
67 years. We won’t make that mistake again.” Another of-
ficial said: “If we make life too easy for them, they’ll never 
find solutions elsewhere.”14 
Local integration of Syrians —the second so- called du-
rable solution for refugees —is off the table for discussions 
in Jordan and Lebanon.15 Giving refugees the right to work 
or to become more self- reliant is seen as opening the door to 
allowing them to stay indefinitely, which after the Palestin-
ian experience is simply not acceptable. The long- standing 
Palestinian presence was also a factor in the refusal by gov-
ernments in the region to ratify the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion (or, in the case of Turkey, maintaining the geographical 
limitation). Why take on more legal obligations when they 
were already hosting large numbers of Palestinians? 
Other impacts of the Palestinian situation have been a 
reluctance to establish camps that might turn into perma-
nent settlements along with a tendency to view Palestinian 
refugees themselves with suspicion. When Iraqi refugees 
began fleeing in the mid- 2000s (more on this below), Jordan 
and Syria generously allowed them to enter —except for the 
Iraqi Palestinians who were confined to no- man’s land areas 
between the borders until they were eventually resettled 
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elsewhere. Again when the Syrian refugees began to pour 
across the border of neighboring countries, Jordan imposed 
restrictions on the entry of Palestinians, followed in May 
2014 by Lebanon. Difficulties for Palestinian refugees enter-
ing Turkey were also reported.
And Then There’s Iraqi Displacement
Iraqi refugee movements have a long and volatile history, 
with multiple displacements (both internal and cross- 
border) during the Saddam Hussein regime (1979–2003), 
both returning refugees and newly displaced in 2003–06, 
a dramatic spike in 2006–09, and another wave in 2014–15 
as a result of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) activity 
and increasing sectarian violence.16 From 2006 on, when it 
was recognized that Iraqi refugees constituted a crisis, it has 
been difficult to get a handle on the number of refugees, their 
needs, and even assistance provided by UNHCR or others. 
Registering refugees was problematic from the beginning, 
with many refugees reluctant to register for fear it would lead 
to involuntary repatriation.17 Host governments of Syria and 
Jordan had a vested interest in inflating the number of refu-
gees, and UNHCR was reluctant to challenge those claims (a 
phenomenon seen today in Jordanian and Turkish estimates 
of Syrian refugee numbers). Camps for Iraqi refugees were 
not established in any of the host countries, but rather the 
refugees rented accommodations, moved in with relatives, 
or eked out an existence on the margins of large cities —and 
became largely invisible. Moreover, given the lack of refu-
gee status in host countries in the region, the legal status of 
Iraqi refugees was uncertain as most were considered guests, 
tourists, visitors, or undocumented migrants. 
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The Iraqi exodus of well over a million refugees in the 
mid- 2000s challenged the host governments, but once the 
Syrian exodus began in 2011, Iraqi refugees in the region 
became even more invisible.18 For example, a November 
2015 review of UNHCR’s Iraq webpage found that the latest 
maps of Iraqi refugees dated back to 2008 and that most of 
the analysis of Iraqi refugees ended by 2010.19
Statistics on Iraqi refugees reveal a number of inconsis-
tencies. Most strikingly, the number of Iraqi refugees de-
clined from a high of 2,336,938 in 2007 to 444,471 in 2013 
(the latest year for which comparable data are available.) 
Where did almost 2 million Iraqi refugees go? According 
to UNHCR figures, there were 316,075 returnees between 
2006 and 2013.20 Another 85,000 Iraqi refugees were reset-
tled in the United States.21 But that still leaves 1.4 million 
Iraqi refugees from 2006 who were neither registered in host 
countries in 2013 nor counted in the return or resettlement 
statistics. This may indicate that the 2006 figures were wildly 
overestimated and that the registration systems were terri-
bly flawed. Or it may also indicate that Iraqi refugees have 
been able to find other solutions. It may be, for example, 
that some Iraqis included in the statistics for earlier years as 
living in the region made their way to European countries to 
seek asylum or join the ranks of irregular migrants. 
Dawn Chatty and Nisrine Mansour argue that Iraqi 
refugees don’t fit the Western understanding of the refugee 
regime because their migration is circular —Iraqi refugees 
return to Iraq to check on family members, pick up pension 
checks, etc. They characterize this mobility as the “result of a 
strategy to manage life risks by dispersal of family members 
along pre- established social networks whenever possible.”22 
Many, perhaps most, of the Iraqi refugees arrived in Jordan, 
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Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt with some resources. But as their 
savings diminished and their circular movements became 
more precarious, their situations became more difficult. 
Local integration of Iraqi refugees is rejected by all the 
host governments —already burned by the Palestinians —
which have created various restrictions on residency, reg-
istration, and work authorization. The governments of both 
Jordan and Syria have claimed that the economic burden 
of Iraqi refugees has been very high (Syria —$1.5 billion, 
Jordan —$1 billion in 2008) and around 2010 began to re-
strict the entrance of Iraqi refugees. And yet, while integra-
tion is not possible, local “accommodation” is taking place 
where Iraqis are blending in with their host communities 
(including through intermarriage with locals) and few are 
deported. Interestingly, there have been virtually no cases of 
political violence by Iraqi refugees in any of the host coun-
tries in the region.23 
The case of Iraqi displacement offers some clues as to 
what might happen in the case of the far larger outflows of 
Syrian refugees and some insights into the policies and at-
titudes of host governments. While host governments seem 
determined not to take any measures that will result in the 
permanent settlement of Syrians on their territories, posi-
tive lessons can be drawn from the experiences of both Pal-
estinian and Iraqi refugees in the region.
Refugees who are not living in camps often find their 
own solutions through local accommodation when local 
integration is not an option, when return is impossible, or 
when resettlement can benefit only a small percentage of the 
total caseload.
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T h e  r o o T s  o f  T h e  s y r i a n  d i s P l a C e m e n T  C r i s i s
While the roots of the Syrian conflict are complex and long 
term (and have been analyzed extensively elsewhere), the 
present round of violence dates back to March 2011 when 
Syrian protesters in the southern city of Deraa took to the 
streets to protest the arrest and torture of children who had 
painted antigovernment graffiti in public spaces. The pro-
tests did not call for the overthrow of President Bashar al- 
Assad but rather reflected a range of grievances.24 Security 
forces responded brutally, killing some civilian protesters, 
and as a result, the protests spread to other cities. By June 
2011 over 500 people had been killed and thousands of 
Syrian residents had fled into Turkey, marking the begin-
ning of large- scale refugee movements.25
Former UN secretary general Kofi Annan was appointed 
as a Joint UN- Arab League Special Representative for Syria 
to negotiate an end to the conflict, but left after six months 
as negotiations appeared more elusive than ever. He was 
followed by veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, who also 
left in 2014 after the failure of two rounds of peace talks in 
Geneva between the Syrian government and opposition. The 
current special envoy is Steffan da Mistura, although few 
expect that he will be able to bring the parties to the table. At 
the time of this writing, the military situation on the ground 
continues to displace more people. The latest round of ne-
gotiations held in Vienna by the International Syrian Sup-
port Group in November 2015 and the adoption of the UN 
Note that this section draws on earlier analysis by Elizabeth Ferris, Kemal 
Kirişci, and Salman Shaikh, “Syrian Crisis: Massive Displacement, Dire 
Needs and a Shortage of Solutions,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, September 
18, 2013.
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Security Council Resolution 2254 in December, supporting 
efforts to seek a political solution to the conflict in Syria, are 
welcome developments. However, expectations of concrete 
progress are still not high. As International Crisis Group re-
ported in 2013, the opposition is nearly impossible to elimi-
nate and “the large underclass that is its core constituency 
has suffered such extreme regime violence that it can be ex-
pected to fight till the end.”26 This analysis is even more valid 
today. Discussions about a continued role for Assad in any 
negotiated settlement are enormously divisive. On the one 
hand there are fears that if Assad were to go, ISIS would fill 
the vacuum. On the other hand, the sheer level of violence 
perpetrated by the regime against the civilian population 
makes it difficult to see either the reintegration of refugees 
or long- term stability with continued rule by the regime. 
A UN commission of inquiry has found that both the 
regime and rebels are guilty of war crimes.27 Deadly military 
assaults by the government have included dropping barrel 
bombs on cities such as Aleppo, laying siege to rebel-held 
areas, and almost certainly carrying out chemical weapons 
attacks. A wide array of rebel groups is fighting both the 
regime and each other, ranging from the Western-backed 
Free Syrian Army to Islamist groups such as the al-Nusra 
Front and ISIS. At the time of writing, the Syrian govern-
ment still controlled much of the country, including Damas-
cus and the coast, but was believed to be losing its grip on 
the cities of Aleppo and Deraa. The Kurds control several 
areas of the north and north-east, while ISIS controls a large 
part of eastern Syria and has declared a “caliphate,” which 
also takes in a large part of Iraq. Other opposition forces 
hold substantial territory around Aleppo and in the south 
near the Golan Heights.
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Adding to the complexity of the conflict, Syria has 
become a key battleground for regional proxy wars. As the 
International Crisis Group wrote in 2013: 
The war is metastasizing in ways that draw in re-
gional and other international actors, erase boundar-
ies and give rise to a single, transnational arc of crisis. 
The opposition increasingly resembles a Sunni coali-
tion in which a radicalized Sunni street, Islamist net-
works, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Gulf states 
and Turkey take leading roles. The pro-regime camp 
encompassing Iran, Hezbollah, Iraq and Iraqi Shiite 
militants, likewise appears to be a quasi-confessional 
alliance.28 
Russia, Iran, and the Lebanese militant group Hezbol-
lah have long provided military assistance to the regime, 
with Russia deploying military force in direct support of 
the government since September 2015. On the other side, 
opposition forces have benefited from military and po-
litical support from countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and Turkey, in addition to “non-lethal” assistance from the 
United States, Britain, and other Western powers. These di-
visions have also played out in the diplomatic arena, with 
Russia and China blocking UN Security Council resolu-
tions to impose sanctions on the Syrian regime. A round 
of peace talks between the Syrian government and opposi-
tion groups in Geneva collapsed in January 2014 with no 
agreement. There have been a handful of diplomatic break-
throughs with the Russia-backed deal for Syria to relinquish 
its chemical weapons arsenal, UN Security Council resolu-
tions on cross-border aid, and more recently discussions in 
Vienna. However, the total lack of diplomatic consensus on 
Ferris-Kirişci_Consequences of Chaos_i-xx_1-202.indd   16 3/11/16   2:51 PM
T h e  C o n s e q u e n C e s  o f  C h a o s 17
how to end the conflict means that the proxy war is grinding 
on into its sixth year —with weapons continuing to flow to 
both sides from their respective backers. 
The conflict has been transformed from a rebellion 
against an oppressive regime into a sectarian civil war. The 
opposition has fragmented into various Islamist networks 
and radical groups, such as al- Nusra and ISIS. Foreign gov-
ernments and other interests are funding the war and send-
ing fighters into Syria. An estimated 27,000 to 31,000 foreign 
fighters are now in Syria, and the conflict bears the hall-
marks of a full- on proxy war.29 For some, the conflict seems 
increasingly intended to destroy Syria as a nation- state and 
as a country that, while ruled by an authoritarian regime, 
once enjoyed reasonable prosperity, decent public services, 
and respect for minorities. 
The following section provides a short overview of how 
religious minorities —Alawites, Christians, and Druze —
have fared in the conflict. This theme will be picked up again 
in the analysis of both cross- border and internal displace-
ment, in chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
Minorities in Syria
Arab Sunni Muslims comprise about 65 percent of the 
Syrian population.30 The rest are primarily Christians, Ala-
wites, Druze, and Ismailis, although estimates vary as the 
Syrian government deliberately does not keep official sta-
tistics on religious groups.31 The (Sunni Muslim) Kurds are 
the largest ethnic minority. Syria has been one of the most 
religiously diverse countries in the Middle East, and the 
increasingly sectarian tone of the civil war, combined with 
military gains by ISIS and al- Nusra, sparked growing fears 
for the fate of Syria’s minorities. Indeed, some in the region 
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suggest that the sectarian nature of displacement and the 
particular effects on minorities are reshaping the demogra-
phy of the Middle East and may end up marking the end of 
the nation- state in the region.32 As will be seen in the next 
two chapters, displacement is both the manifestation and 
perhaps the cause of these changes. The Independent Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic noted: “All of the Syrian Arab Republic’s religious and 
ethnic communities are suffering as a result of the conflict. 
Some communities have been specifically targeted .  .  . in 
other instances, the motivations for attacks are more com-
plex, resulting from perpetrators conflating a community’s 
ethnic and/or religious backgrounds and its perceived polit-
ical loyalties. Where ethnic or religious groups are believed 
to be supporters of an opposing warring faction, the entire 
community has been the subject of discrimination and, in 
some instances, violent attack.”33
Alawites, adherents of a branch of Shia Islam, are esti-
mated to make up 10–12 percent of Syria’s population. They 
are considered by some to be among the most socially liberal 
and secular segments of Syrian society and are central to 
support of the Assad regime. About 75 percent of all Syrian 
Alawites live in the coastal Latakia region. Syrian presi-
dent Bashar al- Assad hails from the Alawite minority, and 
his regime has traditionally commanded support from the 
Christian, Druze, and Ismaili minorities. While many in-
dividuals in those communities may have been critical of 
the regime, they tended to regard the secular Alawite gov-
ernment as a better alternative to possible Islamist rule. 
The regime also maintained power by forming an alliance 
with Sunni business elites and portraying itself as a bulwark 
against extremism to moderate Sunnis, some of whom con-
tinued to support the regime well into the uprising. While 
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many Sunnis, especially in Damascus and Aleppo, prized 
stability or benefited economically from the regime, the up-
rising was largely driven by lower- and middle- class Sunnis 
from peripheral areas, who were neglected by the regime’s 
economic liberalization policies amid a major drought.34 
While Assad’s brutal response to the uprising has caused 
him to lose favor with Sunnis and minorities alike, the 
regime would not have lasted this long without a wide sup-
port base. The regime’s efforts to paint the opposition as 
Islamic extremists (even before such groups did actually 
emerge) have helped to maintain the support of minority 
communities. At the same time, the Syrian opposition has 
been criticized for failing to offer an inclusive vision that 
guarantees the safety of minorities.35 
While much of the Syrian army was Sunni, Alawites 
occupied key positions and played a major role in the vio-
lent crackdown on peaceful protesters and armed rebels. 
They have also made up the majority of the shabbiha —
pro- government armed gangs accused of beating and kill-
ing protesters and carrying out atrocities such as the 2012 
Houla massacre.36 With army casualties mounting in Ala-
wite heartlands such as Tartus, there are reports that some 
are no longer willing to fight for the regime in far- flung 
areas of Syria.37 There is also speculation that the regime and 
the Alawite community will eventually withdraw to their 
coastal enclave and set up their own mini- state, as happened 
under the French mandate following World War I. 
Analysts have observed mounting sectarian rhetoric 
against Alawites —which, combined with news of military 
gains by ISIS and other extremist rebel groups, have sparked 
fears of a genocide. While there is also serious concern 
about the fate of Christians and Druze, Alawites will clearly 
be the most vulnerable in the event of a regime collapse. In 
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an interview with Al Jazeera, the leader of al- Nusra, Abu 
Mohammed al- Golani, inferred that Alawites must not only 
abandon Assad but convert if they don’t wish to be killed.38 
(Christians would pay a special tax.) One analyst has warned 
of the potential for mass flight of Alawites, as well as other 
minorities, if the regime loses its hold on its coastal heart-
land.39 As they would likely flee to unstable, over- strained 
Lebanon, there is dangerous potential for revenge attacks 
against them by other refugees as well as local communities.
Christians made up about 10 percent of Syria’s popula-
tion, with the largest denominations being the Greek Ortho-
dox and Greek Catholic church.40 Before the conflict, Syrian 
Christians, including Armenians, were spread throughout 
the country, with sizeable populations in Damascus, Homs 
(including surrounding areas), and Latakia. The Christian- 
majority villages of Saydnaya and Maaloula and the monas-
tery of Mar Musa are outside Damascus and were popular 
tourist sites. Christians were perceived as supporting the 
regime and enjoyed a relatively high level of religious free-
dom. Christians have also figured among Syria’s business 
and cultural elite and held high positions in the government 
and security forces. One of the leading figures of the Da-
mascus Spring opposition movement in the early 2000s was 
a Christian intellectual, Michel Kilo. Ironically, one of the 
founders of Ba’athism, the political ideology on which the 
current regime rests, Michel Aflaq, was also Christian.
With violent sectarianism expected to worsen in Syria, 
Christians along with Alawites are considered the most 
vulnerable minorities.41 Initially, some Christians in Homs 
and other parts of Syria had taken part in peaceful demon-
strations calling for reforms, but they became increasingly 
alarmed due to the growing radicalization of the opposition 
and reports of sectarian revenge.42 Those who were able made 
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plans to leave Syria for Lebanon and beyond. While some 
Christians have tried to avoid being drawn into the conflict, 
others signed up with pro- government militias.43 By 2012 
sectarian slogans such as “Christians to Beirut, Alawites to 
the grave” were shouted at antigovernment protests although 
some questioned the motivation of such demonstrators.44 
Fears of sectarian violence at the hands of rebels, if origi-
nally exaggerated by the regime, soon turned to reality. In 
2014 Melkite Greek Catholic patriarch Gregorios III Laham 
said that more than 1, 000 Christians had been killed, entire 
villages emptied, and dozens of churches damaged or de-
stroyed.45 In September 2013 the ancient Christian town of 
Maaloula came under attack by rebel forces led by the al- 
Nusra Front.46 A number of senior Christian clerics have 
been kidnapped, including the heads of the Greek Ortho-
dox and Syrian Orthodox churches in Aleppo.47 Human 
Rights Watch has documented deadly indiscriminate 
rocket, mortar, and car bomb attacks by rebels on civilians 
in government- held areas, including the Christian areas of 
Qassa, Bab Touma, and Bab Sharqi.48 Schools and hospitals 
were among the buildings hit.49
The fortunes of Christians worsened with the expansion 
of ISIS control in eastern Syria, where they have been or-
dered to convert to Islam, pay a special tax, or face death. 
As Islamic State militants advanced on Hassakeh province 
in February 2015, some 1,000 families fled their homes and 
up to 285 people were kidnapped.50 Mounting fears over the 
fate of Syrian Christians in rebel- held areas have led to high- 
profile efforts to evacuate them. 
The Druze follow a monotheistic, secretive religion 
drawn on Ismailism, the second largest branch of Shia 
Islam.51 Their faith also incorporates elements of Christian-
ity and Judaism and is denounced as heretical by al- Qaeda 
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and ISIS. Druze minorities also exist in neighboring Leba-
non and Israel.52 In Syria, they are mainly concentrated 
in Sweida province, in Syria’s south, where they make up 
almost 90 percent of the population.53 They are perceived to 
be supportive of the regime and traditionally have high par-
ticipation rates in the Ba’ath Party.54 Druze have also fought 
in the Syrian army and pro- government militias, but the 
Druze- dominated Sweida province had remained relatively 
calm until recently. During summer 2015, there were fears 
of a massacre of Syria’s Druze as rebels made gains south of 
Damascus.55 The Druze were facing their most serious exis-
tential threat since the start of the conflict, with the south-
ern Druze- dominated Sweida province under threat from 
ISIS and al- Nusra fighters, and the Druze forming their own 
security forces to protect themselves.56 
By June 2015 Israel was preparing for the possibility 
of Syrian Druze refugees trying to cross into the Israeli- 
controlled Golan Heights, and the chief of staff of the Israel 
Defense Forces warned that Israel will act to prevent a mas-
sacre on its border.57 With the situation of Syrian Druze 
looking far more precarious as the conflict entered its 
sixth year, some regional Druze leaders —including Leba-
non’s Walid Jumblatt —urged their co- religionists to throw 
their lot in with the opposition.58 According to a report in 
the Washington Post, Druze leaders inside Syria called for 
neutrality, and one local spiritual leader, Wahid al- Balous, 
raised a militia of thousands of men (which is apparently 
independent from the regime) to defend the Druze.59 There 
were also other reports of Druze men refusing to fight in 
the Syrian army so they could stay home and protect their 
communities.60 
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T h e  e s C a l a T i n G  C o n f l i C T 
Options for resolving the conflict are painfully scarce and 
seem to becoming more limited as the number of parties 
to the conflict proliferate. The UN Security Council has 
been paralyzed on the conflict, given the likelihood of Rus-
sian and Chinese vetoes on any meaningful action to put 
an end to the violence. As the conflict drags on, the pos-
sibilities for more sectarian violence increase. Many regime 
supporters —including Alawites, Christians and Druze —
are terrified about their future, convinced that their fate is 
either to kill or be killed. Large- scale retribution if either 
side “wins” is likely.61 Russian military intervention in sup-
port of the Assad regime is yet another complicating factor 
that makes it likely the war will continue. It also makes it 
even more unlikely that Western powers will seek to impose 
a no- fly zone or other form of intervention. The intensifica-
tion of Russian, U.S., and coalition airstrikes in the after-
math of the November 2015 attacks in Paris add still more 
uncertainty to an already chaotic situation. 
C o n s e q u e n C e s  o f  C h a o s :  m a s s  d i s P l a C e m e n T
The escalation of the conflict over the past five years has 
had serious humanitarian consequences. As rebel forces 
seized control of towns in several parts of the country and 
as front lines shifted, sometimes on a daily or hourly basis, 
the challenge of accessing Syrian civilians in need of assis-
tance became more difficult. Also, not only do front lines 
keep moving, but so do large numbers of Syrians seeking to 
escape the violence. 
While millions of Syrians have fled their homes due to 
violence from the regime or the opposition, the military gains 
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by ISIS have triggered further waves of massive displacement. 
Tens of thousands of civilians fled Kobane in late 2014 as 
Syrian Kurdish fighters and ISIS battled for control of the stra-
tegic town on the Turkish border. Media reports also suggest 
that many civilians fled ISIS- controlled cities such as Raqqa, 
the capital of the group’s self- declared caliphate. In addition 
to living under ISIS’s brutal rule, civilians in these areas also 
fear U.S., Russian, and Syrian government airstrikes. 
Across the border in Iraq, the ISIS advance has had an 
even more devastating impact on the humanitarian situ-
ation. At least 3.2 million people have fled from areas that 
fell under ISIS’s control between January 2014 and October 
2015.62 Almost half a million fled in June and July 2014 alone, 
as ISIS captured Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, and sur-
rounding areas.63 In August 2014 the world watched in horror 
the plight of tens of thousands of fleeing Yazidis facing star-
vation and dehydration on a mountain as ISIS took over the 
Sinjar area of northern Iraq.64 While Iraqis of all faiths and 
ethnicities have been fleeing ISIS violence and extremist in-
terpretation of Islamic law, minorities have been particularly 
vulnerable. Christians have been subjected to abuses such 
as the confiscation of their homes and forced conversion, 
while thousands of Yazidi women and girls were kidnapped 
and reportedly were subjected to domestic and sexual slav-
ery.65 Matters got worse, with ISIS in mid- 2015 taking over 
Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, causing more than a 
quarter of a million people to flee the area.66 Overwhelmed 
with the scale of displacement and facing funding shortfalls, 
the United Nations warned in August 2015 that aid opera-
tions in Iraq were “hanging by a thread.”67 
While much of the media’s attention has focused on the 
atrocities of ISIS in both Iraq and Syria, continuing violence 
by the Assad regime —particularly the 33,000 aerial bom-
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bardments carried out since the conflict began up through 
the summer of 2015 —has been the main driver of displace-
ment of Syrians.68 Persistent Russian aerial bombardments 
made matters even worse, aggravating the displacement and 
accompanying humanitarian crisis.69 
Displacement within and from Syria has been massive, dy-
namic, and rapid. As in other conflicts, displacement occurs 
for a number of reasons. Indiscriminate attacks against civil-
ians have led many to flee the dangers of being caught in the 
crossfire or being deliberately targeted by armed forces. Many 
refugees in neighboring countries report that they fled their 
homes because of attacks, bombardments, or fear of being the 
target of military action. But there are also indications of tar-
geted human rights violations and particularly fears about the 
growing sectarian nature of the conflict. The UN Commis-
sion of Inquiry found that fear of sexual violence has been a 
trigger for displacement, stating that “fear of rape is a driving 
motivation for families fleeing the violence.”70 The commis-
sion concluded that these instances of forced displacement, 
together with indiscriminate bombardment of civilian loca-
tions, constituted a crime against humanity and a war crime.71 
There are also fears that displacement is being used as 
a tool of sectarian cleansing. Writing in November 2011, 
the International Crisis Group reported that “communal 
instincts and, in certain instances, genuine threats, are in-
ducing citizens to resettle in like- minded areas, producing 
a worrying pattern of sectarian segregation.”72 As in Bosnia 
and Iraq, displacement is not only an unintended byproduct 
of conflict but also a deliberate strategy.
People are displaced not only because of direct attacks 
and violence but also because they can no longer survive in 
their communities because of the effects of the war. When 
people lose their jobs and cannot access basic services, they 
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move to areas where they hope they will be able to survive, 
often first within the country and then later across a border 
into a neighboring country. 
It is difficult to overestimate the impact of the war on 
normal life in Syria. The destruction of utilities and essential 
infrastructure, and the unraveling of public services such as 
waste disposal, electricity, fuel, education, and medical care 
have disrupted the functioning of life on all levels. In March 
2015 the United Nations Development Program reported 
that 80 percent of Syrians inside the country were living in 
poverty, life expectancy has plunged by 20 years, and the 
economy had lost $200 billion since the conflict began. It 
estimated that 3 million Syrians had lost their jobs during 
the conflict, with unemployment surging from 14.9 percent 
in 2011 to 57.7 percent at the end of 2014. Over 50 percent 
of children were not attending school in 2014.73 Indeed, the 
lack of opportunities for children to continue their educa-
tion seems to be a driving force of displacement.
G e n d e r  a n d  s y r i a n  d i s P l a C e m e n T 
Civilian men make up the largest group of victims, the UN 
Commission of Inquiry said in its August 2015 report. “Ci-
vilian men perceived to be of fighting age have been targeted 
by warring parties during ground attacks. They are also the 
primary civilian victims of enforced disappearance, torture 
and unlawful killing.”74 Men are arbitrarily arrested by the 
government and detained because of their own actions or to 
pressure family members wanted by the authorities. There 
is a countrywide pattern in which mainly adult male civil-
ians have been seized by government forces and then disap-
peared. The government’s expanding conscription policies 
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have become a major cause of displacement, both internally 
and cross-border.75 The UN Commission added that “multi-
ple accounts have been documented of women leaving their 
husbands behind in opposition-held areas to accompany 
their pre-adolescent sons through the checkpoints and out 
of the area before they reach an age where they are likely to 
be stopped by Government forces.”76 ISIS also has forcibly 
recruited men and boys and imposed restrictions on those 
living in areas under their control, including dress codes 
and prohibitions against being in the company of women to 
whom they are not related.77
Women and girls have been targeted on the basis of 
their gender by both government and opposition forces. 
“For the belligerents, the very act of detaining a woman, 
with all the risks to her person that this implies, appears 
designed to humiliate not only the woman, but also —and 
arguably, primarily —her male relatives,” the UN Commis-
sion reported. “Women have suffered rape and other forms 
of sexual violence by government personnel while held in 
detention facilities.” Because women can move more freely 
than men in government- controlled areas, they are at in-
creased risk of physical and sexual assault. When their male 
family members are detained or disappear, women are often 
left with no means of supporting themselves. Without con-
firmation of deaths of husbands or fathers, they are in legal 
limbo, unable to inherit or sell property or to remarry. As 
mentioned above, violence against women has increased 
dramatically as a result of ISIS’s growing control of territory 
and population. In ISIS areas, women and girls over the age 
of ten may not appear publicly without being entirely cov-
ered and may not travel without a close male relative. For 
women whose husbands have died, have fled, or are at the 
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battlefront, this means that they cannot leave their homes 
for any reason without risking punishment.78 
Given the escalating levels of violence inside Syria, it is 
perhaps not surprising that so many Syrians have fled their 
communities. The number of registered refugees in neigh-
boring countries increased from 8,000 in 2011 to almost 
500,000 only a year later, and was well over four million in 
late 2015 (see figure 1- 2). Close to 500,000 Syrians entered 
Europe in 2015 by sea, making up the largest segment of the 
more than 1 million who sought safety in Europe during 
the year. Meanwhile the number of people displaced inside 
Syria has continued to rise, with estimates in late 2015 
reaching 6.5 million.79
s T a G G e r i n G  a m o u n T s  — b u T  s T i l l  n o T  e n o u G h  f u n d i n G
As the Syrian crisis is in its fifth year, it is getting harder 
to mobilize the necessary minimum humanitarian assis-
tance. If there is a silver lining to the movement of Syrians 
to Europe in August–September 2015, it is that donor coun-
tries are stepping up their contributions —perhaps recog-
nizing the link between inadequate support to refugees in 
the region and the hundreds of thousands of Syrians now 
traveling to European borders. The European Union has al-
ready made promises to increase substantially its financial 
support for neighboring host countries.
Table 1- 1 summarizes the international response to UN 
appeals for Syria and the region. These figures show
 ■ Steadily increasing appeals for international assis-
tance, with the request in 2015 almost ten times the 
amount requested in 2012;
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 ■ More funds requested for supporting refugees than 
affected civilians inside Syria although the numbers 
of the latter are far higher. This is at least partly the 
consequence of difficulties in accessing populations in 
need in Syria; and
 ■ A disproportionate (although still seriously insuffi-
cient) amount of appeals for the Syrian crisis rather 
than for other crises in the world. 
Almost half of the worldwide appeal for humanitarian 
funding was requested for Syria. At the end of 2014 the UN 
appealed for $16.4 billion to assist 57 million people in 22 
countries.80 To put it another way, the $4.5 billion appeal 
for 4 million Syrian refugees works out to about $1,125 per 
refugee. In comparison, the appeal for $16.4 billion for the 
global total of 57 million people (which includes the Syrian 
refugees) comes to about $290 per person. 
These funding disparities raise questions, not just for 
f i G u r e  1 - 2 .  Number of Syrian Refugees, 2011–152005
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Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Syria Regional 
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Syrian refugees in the region and for those displaced by the 
conflict inside Syria, but for the future of the international 
humanitarian system —a theme to which we will return in 
the final chapter of this study.
What does this mean for the regional response to Syrian 
refugees? In comparison with other major crises, the 
Syrian response has been well- funded, although the UN 
appeals have never been fully funded. If international as-
sistance decreases, this will increase the pressure on host 
governments —which are already doing everything they can 
to reduce the number of Syrian arrivals, discourage them 
from living lives of dignity and self- reliance, and encour-
age them to return to Syria. One of the rarely discussed 
realities is that international aid supports protection of the 
human rights of refugees and the internally displaced. Host 
governments allow refugees to stay partly in exchange for 
international financial support. The borders of all of Syria’s 
neighbors are now effectively closed, with the exception of 
Turkey, although specific border crossings also open and 
close depending on the conflict. 
We turn now to an examination of the Syrian refugee 
phenomenon —and the impact of the refugees on the gov-
ernments and societies which host them.
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C h a P T e r  2
Syrian Refugees: Challenges to Host Countries 
and the International Community
T he scale of refugee movements from Syria has been both rapid and massive. A full year after the first disturbances 
in Syria, the number of registered Syrian refugees in the 
neighboring countries was just over 26,000.1 Nearly four 
years later, as of end-December 2015, this total was just 
under 4.6 million.2 None of the host governments expected 
the displacement either to reach such a scale or to last this 
long. 
The initial displacement occurred against the optimistic 
background of the early days of the Arab Spring and thus 
under the assumption that any displacement caused by pop-
ular uprisings in Syria would be of a very temporary nature. 
Many in the region (and outside the region as well) initially 
believed the Syrian regime would be replaced by a reform-
ist one, mirroring the transition that had just taken place 
in Tunisia and Egypt. Instead, the situation in Syria esca-
lated into a civil war. Indiscriminate government attacks on 
and repression of civilians forced more and more people to 
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become either internally displaced or flee into neighboring 
countries. Since the summer of 2014, additional displace-
ment has resulted from the brutal treatment of civilians by 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and from fighting 
between ISIS and other opposition groups. The Russian in-
tervention in the Syrian civil war in support of the Syrian 
government since September 2015 has led to further dis-
placement and to prospects that the situation could get even 
worse. 
The registered refugee populations in Lebanon and 
Jordan have by and large remained stable at around 630,000 
since early 2014 in Jordan and around 1.1 million since late 
2014 in Lebanon, the results of hardening border policies in 
both countries (see figure 2-1).3 In the case of Turkey, the 
number of refugees has continued to increase, reaching 
2.5 million as of the end of December 2015.4 The escalation 
of violence in and around Aleppo, partly resulting from 
Russian intervention but also engendered by pro-regime 
factions, is expected to precipitate the displacement of up to 
another 3 million people toward Turkey.5 In the meantime, 
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Refugee Response.
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the actual number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey 
increased by almost half a million between early October 
and late December —and that in spite of the movement of 
Syrians leaving Turkey for Europe.6 Approximately 245,000 
and 117,000 registered Syrian refugees are in Iraq and Egypt, 
respectively, together with another estimated 28,000 refu-
gees in North African countries. The majority of the refu-
gees live outside camps in these five host countries. Most of 
the refugees are Sunni, but minorities such as Armenians, 
Assyrians, Kurds, Roma, and Yazidis have also joined their 
ranks. 
As noted in the previous chapter, with the exception of 
Turkey the other host countries are not signatories of the 
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. This 
means that Syrian refugees do not have the possibility of 
receiving a full-fledged refugee status, and instead are con-
sidered “guests” —an ill-defined status offering no legal pro-
tection. In effect, the situation is not very different in Turkey, 
as Turkey maintains a “geographical limitation” that limits 
the application of the Geneva Convention to those asylum-
seekers who have become refugees as a result of “events oc-
curring in Europe.”7 This means that Turkey neither grants 
refugee status to Syrians nor allows them the possibility of 
remaining in the country for the long term. Resettlement 
and voluntary repatriation are seen as the only durable solu-
tions. Instead of being recognized as refugees with rights, 
Syrians are granted “temporary protection” in Turkey. 
The role and status of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) vary across these host 
countries. UNHCR has been involved in the registration of 
refugees —a critical process in terms of ensuring protection 
and access to basic services, including education, health, 
food, and social support. In Jordan and Lebanon, UNHCR 
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has also been the lead international agency in ensuring basic 
humanitarian assistance for the refugees and managing the 
camps. All of these countries have extended generous sup-
port to the refugees, but none has allowed the refugees to 
work legally, dramatically limiting their ability to gain access 
to legal livelihoods and improve their living conditions. 
In the meantime, there is now a general consensus that 
many, possibly most, Syrian refugees will remain in neigh-
boring countries for the foreseeable future. This raises a host 
of questions, especially for Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey —
the three countries that have received 90 percent of the 
refugees registered in Syria’s neighborhood. What has been 
the economic, social, and political impact on these three 
countries of the refugee crisis? How has the international 
response evolved? How can the cooperation between these 
three countries and the international community in address-
ing the needs of refugees be improved? Are there lessons to 
be learned? These questions are the focus of this chapter.
T h e  G r o W i n G  r e f u G e e  C r i s i s 
In addition to the significant increase in numbers, there 
are three striking differences between the refugee situation 
today and that of only a few years ago. Firstly, the ethnic 
and religious background of the refugees has become much 
more diverse, especially in the case of Turkey. Originally, 
the refugees were overwhelmingly Arab Sunni Syrians with 
a smaller number of Turcomans and Alawites. Today, they 
have been joined by Kurds from northern Syria as well as 
Yazidis and Christians from Iraq. Some 40,000 to 50,000 
Iraqis fled to Turkey following the capture of Mosul and its 
environs by ISIS in June 2014; later, the Peshmergha forces 
of the Kurdish regional government as well as the U.S. air-
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strikes were able to push back against the ISIS onslaught. 
By the time the situation stabilized, however, the number 
had increased to about 240,000–250,000.8 The Turkish gov-
ernment and various municipalities constructed camps 
to house some of the refugees, while most settled into vil-
lages and towns in southeastern Turkey inhabited by their 
coreligionists or ethnic brethren. Another mass exodus oc-
curred in October 2014, when around 170,000 Syrians, most 
of them Kurds, fled the fighting between the Democratic 
Union Party (PYD, from the Kurdish, Partiya Yekîtiya De-
mokrat) and ISIS in Kobane. Some of these refugees have 
since returned, although some still live in one large gov-
ernment camp and smaller municipal camps, while others 
remain dispersed throughout Turkey’s Suruç region, across 
the border from Kobane. 
In June 2015 clashes erupted between ISIS and the PYD 
forces along with their Syrian Arab allies —this time for 
the control of the Syrian border town of Tel Abyad. About 
25,000 Arabs, Kurds, and Turcomans fled into Turkey under 
chaotic circumstances. Most of the refugees who escaped 
into Lebanon and Jordan were Sunni Arabs from the cen-
tral and southern parts of Syria; some were Christians. In 
the fall of 2015 Russian military intervention aggravated 
the situation. Then in November 2015, just days before the 
downing of a Russian fighter plane by Turkey, there were 
reports of Turcomans being displaced to the Turkish-Syrian 
border where a makeshift camp was set up for them.9 Sub-
sequent Russian operations in the area became even more 
forceful, undermining humanitarian assistance efforts and 
causing additional displacement.10 The very real possibility 
of increased confrontations between various Syrian oppo-
sition groups and ISIS, as well as Russia, in areas close to 
Turkey risks aggravating the displacement crisis. One Turk-
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ish report estimated that another “3 to 5 million Syrians are 
expected to leave their country.”11
Secondly, the political response of countries receiving 
Syrian refugees has also dramatically changed, particularly 
for Jordan and Turkey. The governments there received 
the first waves of refugees with open arms. This was partly 
driven by the fact that the refugee numbers initially were 
limited, and both governments believed the regime in Da-
mascus would soon collapse and the refugees could return 
home quickly. They thus instituted an “open door policy” 
and began to set up camps for the refugees. Jordan invited 
UNHCR to manage the camps and co-register the refugees. 
In Turkey, camps were set up and run by the Disaster and 
Emergency Management Agency, while the government 
formally extended temporary protection to the refugees in 
October 2011, stating that it would manage the situation 
without international assistance.12 
However, much sooner than expected, both Ankara’s 
and Amman’s hopes that the refugees would be able to 
return to a reformed Syria were dashed.13 Instead, Turkey 
became increasingly embroiled in efforts to overthrow the 
Assad regime through active support for the opposition, in-
cluding radical Islamic groups.14 Furthermore, as the cost 
of maintaining Syrian refugees rapidly increased, Turkey 
sought greater international support and persistently called 
for the establishment of a “safe haven” for refugees inside 
Syria, though with little success on either count.15 Jordan, 
unlike Turkey, did not completely rupture its relations with 
the Syrian regime and eventually succeeded in creating a 
kind of informal safe zone that enabled some refugees to 
return to southern Syria. Jordan was also able both to mo-
bilize more international assistance for refugees and to limit 
the flow of refugees into its territory. Although the Jorda-
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nian government continues to identify its policy as “open 
doors,” human rights and international nongovernmental 
organization officials note that it is not really the case in 
practice.16 Turkey’s track record in this regard has also been 
questioned, with cases of refoulement (expelling refugees 
back into dangerous situations), forced returns, and other 
violations of the government’s “open door” policy being 
frequently reported.17 These practices have reportedly in-
creased since the deal reached between the European Union 
and Turkey in November to stem the flow of Syrian refugees 
(discussed further below).18 
The case of Lebanon is somewhat different. The long-
standing governmental deadlock engendered by the failure 
to elect a new president and sensitivity over delicate sectar-
ian balances, especially between the Sunni and Shia commu-
nities in Lebanon, have shaped the government’s response to 
the Syrian crisis. The near-paralysis of the government ini-
tially resulted in “semi-laissez faire” policy, enabling refu-
gees to enter the country unhindered. Lebanon’s previous 
experiences with Palestinians and the lessons drawn from 
the long civil war between 1975 and 1990 led the govern-
ment to prohibit the establishment of refugee camps.19 In-
stead, hundreds of small makeshift settlements have sprung 
up to house those refugees who have been unable to find 
better shelter. Furthermore, the fragile sectarian situation 
and the fact that Hezbollah, the leading Shia Lebanese po-
litical actor, has been actively supporting the regime in Syria 
have strained Lebanon’s capacity to receive large numbers 
of primarily Sunni refugees. Alarmed by the reality that by 
early 2015 the number of Syrian refugees surpassed one-
fourth of Lebanon’s own population, the government put in 
place a visa requirement for Syrians to enter Lebanon and 
then stopped registering any further refugees.20 In effect, 
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this led to the abandonment of Lebanon’s open-door policy. 
At the same time, the precipitous decrease in humanitarian 
aid, coupled with administrative measures that made the re-
newal of residency permits more difficult and expensive, has 
led some Syrians to leave Lebanon.21 Meanwhile, those who 
remain behind are trapped in a vicious cycle of insecurity.22 
The third factor is that the worsening refugee crisis has 
deepened the social, economic, and political problems of 
the host countries. The massive growth in the number of 
refugees outside camps and the lack of adequate assistance 
policies toward them have aggravated a range of social prob-
lems. Refugees experience problems of adaptation especially 
in urban settings (where most are living) in terms of access 
to shelter and basic services such as education and health 
care. An added problem in the case of Turkey is the lan-
guage barrier that complicates the refugees’ ability to cope 
with the challenges of day-to-day survival. 
Now that the initially generous welcome has worn thin, 
public opinion toward refugees is becoming increasingly 
negative. The sight of Syrians begging in the streets is caus-
ing particular resentment among local people, especially 
in cities in western Turkey. There have also been reports of 
occasional violence between refugees and locals.23 In turn, 
this reinforces a growing public perception that associates 
Syrian refugees with criminality. A public opinion poll con-
ducted in Turkey in October 2014 revealed that more than 
62 percent of those surveyed supported the idea that Syrian 
refugees were implicated in criminality and were respon-
sible for the uptick in the number of crimes committed.24 
As early as 2013, a poll in Lebanon found that 52 percent of 
respondents believed Syrian refugees posed a threat to na-
tional security and stability, and more than 90 percent said 
the Syrian conflict had a negative impact on the Lebanese 
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government’s capacity to protect Lebanese citizens.25 These 
concerns persist, and a survey in June 2015 noted that almost 
half of those surveyed fear for their personal safety because 
of the refugees.26 Similar complaints also have been made 
in Jordan.27 Yet these attitudes represent a stark contrast 
with local authorities’ and security officials’ observations 
in all three countries: in reality, criminality is surprisingly 
low, and Syrian community leaders are very effective in pre-
venting crime and defusing tensions between refugees and 
locals. 
The presence of large numbers of refugees, especially 
in urban centers, generates competition for public services 
with local residents. The cost of providing these services to 
a growing number of refugees, together with the costs of the 
camps in Jordan and Turkey, fuels the resentment of local 
communities. In the case of Turkey, this is heightened by the 
fact that the government continues to allocate funds from its 
own budget to pay for dealing with the refugees. This prac-
tice hits a particular nerve among the locals, who feel that 
it undermines their own access to, for instance, health ser-
vices, while health personnel are occupied to an overwhelm-
ing degree with the refugees.28 Not surprisingly, 71 percent 
of the Turkish public told pollsters that Syrian refugees have 
cost the economy dearly, and 60 percent objected to their 
taxes being spent on the refugees.29 Similar observations can 
also be made for education, especially in Jordan and Leba-
non, where both governments have opened their schools to 
Syrian refugee children. In Lebanon, there are now more 
Syrian children in public schools than Lebanese children, 
in part reflecting the dominance of the private educational 
system unaffordable for the refugees.30 Jordan has scheduled 
teaching staff in double-shifts to accommodate the new stu-
dents and handle overcrowded classrooms.31 On the other 
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hand, cost considerations and public opinion have led the 
Jordanian government to scale down substantially the refu-
gees’ access to public health services. 
The Economic Impact of the Refugees
The urban refugees present very visible economic prob-
lems. One striking case in point is the increase in prices 
in general, but especially in the real estate market —which 
gives rise to additional complaints among local residents. 
Furthermore, many refugees are employed informally and 
often are prepared to work for lower wages than locals.32 In 
Turkey, 69 percent of the public in the regions close to Syria 
believe that refugees are taking away their jobs.33 A similar 
survey finding is also reported in Lebanon.34 This feeling 
also is widely shared in Jordan. The fact that refugees neither 
pay taxes nor make contributions to social security expenses 
creates additional distortions in the economy. This situa-
tion not only makes Syrian refugees vulnerable to exploi-
tation but also generates resentment, especially from local 
unskilled workers looking for employment in the informal 
sector. The reluctance of governments to open the labor 
market to refugees or to support livelihoods for them ap-
pears to further aggravate the situation, especially in Jordan 
and Lebanon, where subsistence assistance to refugees has 
been substantially curtailed.35 
In spite of these negative consequences, the refugee crisis 
has also led to an increase in economic activity and added 
more positions for skilled laborers in host countries. The 
growth in the number of national and international non-
governmental organizations and specialized agencies aiding 
Syrian refugees has created opportunities for employment 
in the host countries and set the conditions for economic 
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growth through their demand for local goods and ser-
vices.36 Regional cities such as Amman, Beirut, Gaziantep, 
Kilis, and others have become visible hubs of humanitar-
ian activity. Furthermore, the three neighboring countries 
have become important suppliers of humanitarian and 
other goods being sent into Syria. For example, the Turkish 
provinces sharing a border with Syria saw their exports to 
Syria rise by more than 200 percent from 2011 to 2014, while 
the overall increase for Turkey’s exports to Syria in general 
was only 11 percent.37 As much as Jordan and Lebanon have 
seen their exports to Syria fluctuate, they have nevertheless 
continued to be important suppliers of fresh and processed 
food, household goods, and construction materials.38 Ad-
ditionally, greater economic activity has been spurred by 
small and larger businesses, often in the form of restaurants 
but also factories set up by Syrians who were able to bring 
their capital to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. For example, 
according to a study by the Economic Policy Research Foun-
dation of Turkey, the number of companies established in 
Turkey with Syrian shareholders increased to 1,256 in 2014 
from just 30 such companies in 2010.39 Including the “in-
formal” Syrian business establishments increased the 2014 
figure to more than 10,000.40 One Jordanian economist 
remarked that refugees increased demand “by using their 
wages to rent apartments, buying goods and services, put-
ting factories and retailers to work.”41 Similar observations 
can be made for Lebanon.
However, there is also a downside to this picture. Syrian 
refugees have become a source of cheap labor willing to work 
in positions that local workers are reluctant to take up. With-
out legal employment, as one Turkish academic in Gazian-
tep noted, the educated and middle-class Syrian refugees are 
reduced to cheap labor.42 Furthermore, the failure to gener-
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ate livelihoods is forcing refugee families to resort to “nega-
tive coping mechanisms.” There is a serious problem of child 
labor across the three host countries, as children are less 
likely to be arrested for working illegally than are adult men 
and women. In Jordan and Lebanon, the case is aggravated 
by a desire to circumvent the risk of detention and deporta-
tion for illegal employment.43 Similarly, families are allow-
ing and encouraging underage girls to marry early, even 
submitting their daughters to polygamous marriages.44 This 
presents a legal problem in Turkey, where marriage under 
the age of eighteen and polygamy are both prohibited by 
law. There are growing concerns among women and human 
rights advocates that the spread of this practice risks under-
mining the effectiveness of the law, especially at a time when 
a recent constitutional court ruling in Turkey has decrimi-
nalized religious weddings without civil marriage.45 Some 
women who are desperate to feed their families now resort 
to prostitution —yet another example of the negative social 
impact the presence of Syrian refugees is having on host so-
cieties. A Joint Agency Briefing Paper prepared by a group of 
international nongovernmental organizations said this pic-
ture has become the norm for refugees, adding: “More and 
more refugees are being pushed to make desperate choices. 
Children are forced to leave school and work illegally, girls 
are forced into marriage before their time, and many have 
little option but to risk their lives on dangerous boat journeys 
in the hope of reaching Europe, or even to return to Syria.”46
Political Consequences
The continued influx of large numbers of refugees has also 
had political consequences. As noted above, public reaction 
toward refugees has shifted from a generous welcome to 
Ferris-Kirişci_Consequences of Chaos_i-xx_1-202.indd   44 3/11/16   2:51 PM
T h e  C o n s e q u e n C e s  o f  C h a o s 45
calls for their departure. These calls, however, are not uni-
form and are influenced by ethnic and religious affinities. 
In Turkey, for example, religiously conservative Turks and 
Turkish citizens of Arab descent, often members of the gov-
erning Justice and Development Party constituency, have 
consistently supported the government’s openness to receiv-
ing the bulk of the refugees, provided that they are Sunni 
Arabs.47 Secular Turks, Alevis, and Kurds, by contrast, fear 
the prospect of welcoming large numbers of Sunni Arabs, 
as they may change the demographics of local society and 
politics.48 Interestingly, since the influx of refugees from 
Kobane, Kurdish views on Syrian refugees have become 
more aligned with those of ruling party supporters.49 
Yet, at the same time, the reluctance of the Turkish gov-
ernment to assist the Kurds in their resistance to the on-
slaught of ISIS in Kobane in the fall of 2014 and an initial 
hesitation to allow Kurdish refugees to enter Turkey deeply 
scarred Kurds’ trust in the Turkish government. The situ-
ation continued to worsen in the run-up to the national 
elections in Turkey in June 2015, as the Kurdish People’s 
Democratic Party campaigned against the government. 
Subsequently, tensions between the Kurds and the Turkish 
government were exacerbated by the deaths of more than 
30 people in July 2015 in a bombing in the Turkish town of 
Suruç across from Kobane, followed by a similar bombing 
in Ankara in October that killed more than 100 people and 
that was orchestrated by ISIS-affiliated suicide bombers. The 
cycle of violence that followed these events killed hundreds 
of civilians, Kurdish militants, and security forces —and 
continues to pose a threat to the stability of Turkey. Turkey’s 
Kurdish-populated Southeast increasingly looks like Iraq 
and Syria.50 It is very difficult to understand this sudden es-
calation without appreciating the impact that the siege of 
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Kobane and the arrival of Kurdish refugees from Kobane 
have had on Turkish domestic politics.51
In Lebanon, the political impact of Syrian refugees has 
been a particularly acute concern. Not surprisingly, the ar-
rival of refugees that eventually constituted a fourth of the 
population —in a country where demographic balances 
among the Sunni, Shia, and Christians have always been at 
the center of politics —has produced negative ramifications.52 
This has been further complicated because most refugees are 
Sunni and have fled Syria as a result of government attacks 
on their communities. One leading player in Lebanese poli-
tics, Hezbollah, is actually an overt ally of the Syrian regime, 
and its foot soldiers have directly fought in support of the 
regime and against Syrian opposition groups.53 In turn, 
Syrian rebels, including radical Islamic groups, have even 
attacked Hezbollah positions along the Syrian-Lebanese 
border.54 These developments created a very tense situation 
in certain parts of Lebanon such as the Bekaa Valley where 
many Syrian refugees have settled. Clearly, the civil war in 
Syria has directly affected Lebanon’s domestic politics —to 
the extent that it has run the risk of reigniting a civil war.55 
More recently the November 2015 suicide bombings in 
Beirut, for which ISIS claimed responsibility, demonstrated 
Lebanon’s vulnerability to violence in the region.56 
Lebanon has a long and torturous relationship with Syria, 
which historically had difficulties in accepting Lebanon’s ex-
istence as a separate and independent state. Syria was deeply 
involved in the Lebanese civil war, and for years afterward 
many people considered Lebanon to be under Syria’s occupa-
tion.57 This occupation came to an abrupt end after the 2005 
assassination of Rafik Hariri, a former prime minister. Even 
after Syria’s withdrawal, the close relationship between the 
two countries did not end, and many Syrians continued to live 
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and work in Lebanon, some of whom actually became refu-
gees sur place after the eruption of the Syrian conflict.58 The 
refugees and Syria’s particular legacy in Lebanon fuel fears 
of a repetition of the situation when the influx of Palestinian 
refugees in 1948 and subsequent developments launched the 
protracted journey toward the Lebanese civil war.59 
This legacy of Palestinian refugees also plays a role in 
shaping Jordan’s concerns regarding the impact of Syrian 
refugees. The arrival of more than half a million Syrian refu-
gees evoked, in the minds of the public and the leadership, 
the memories of the influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948 
and again in 1967. These memories include a violent uprising 
in 1971, when radical Palestinian groups rebelled against the 
Hashemite kingdom.60 This experience left a deep imprint on 
Jordanian sense of national identity and national security, 
highlighting the importance of maintaining the delicate bal-
ance between “East Bankers” and Jordanians of Palestinian 
descent. More than 2 million Palestinians are still registered 
in the refugee camps across Jordan; the arrival and the con-
tinuing presence of more than half a million Syrian refugees 
therefore creates a politically sensitive situation for a country 
of only 6.7 million. Furthermore, somewhat like in Turkey, 
one’s political affiliation does play a role in determining at-
titudes toward the Syrian refugees. Trends indicate that sym-
pathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, compared 
with the more nationalist and secular Jordanians, are more 
likely to support the welcoming approach. 
m a n a G i n G  T h e  r e f u G e e  i n f l u x
Often overlooked is modern Turkey’s long history as a 
country of asylum and immigration. Between the establish-
ment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and roughly the end 
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of the Cold War, it received more than 1.5 million immi-
grants from the Balkans.61 Turkey also served as a country 
of asylum for individuals fleeing the Soviet bloc during the 
Cold War years. There were also mass influxes of refugees 
from Bulgaria and Iraq in 1989 and 1991. Since then, Turkey 
has received numerous applications from the nationals of a 
wide array of Asian and African countries, and it was listed 
by the UNHCR as the fourth largest recipient of individual 
asylum-seekers in 2014.62 
As discussed earlier, unlike Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey 
is a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugees, but it grants “full” refugee status only to asylum-
seekers who have fled “events occurring in Europe.”63 Other 
asylum-seekers are granted the right to remain in Turkey 
only until their resettlement can be arranged. This practice 
was incorporated into the Law on Foreigners and Interna-
tional Protection adopted in April 2013.64 As of May 2015 
Turkey was host to 230,000 non-Syrian individual asylum-
seekers, mostly Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, and Somalis.65 
There are certainly similarities (as mentioned above) in 
how each of these countries has received and managed the 
refugee crisis. However, as the crisis persisted, each country 
developed its own unique approach. Jordan worked much 
more closely with the international community and pushed 
harder for international burden sharing; but as the crisis 
wore on, the government cut back on the benefits for refu-
gees, public opinion soured, and national resources became 
strained. Unlike Jordan, Lebanon, as a function of its par-
alyzed state and weak government, introduced a kind of 
“semi laissez faire” approach that has left refugees either to 
survive on their own resources or from those offered by the 
international community. Like its Jordanian counterpart, 
the Lebanese government has energetically denied refugees 
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the possibility of legal employment and since 2014 has also 
introduced restrictions on new arrivals and imposed new 
fees and procedures for renewing residency permits. Turkey, 
on the other hand, followed a distinctive approach. Initially 
it turned away international assistance and tried to manage 
the crisis on its own. As Turkey’s plans failed to create a safe-
zone in Syria, where would-be refugees could live instead 
of entering Turkey, the Turkish leadership developed an 
uneasy relationship with the international community. This 
relationship oscillated between pragmatism and harsh criti-
cism. In the meantime, the government continued to extend 
assistance, but, like Jordan and Lebanon, it, until recently, 
did not allow the refugees to take up jobs legally (although 
more and more refugees reportedly worked in the informal 
sector). 
Initially Jordan set up the Zaatari camp, south of its 
border with Syria, for the refugees, with a peak popula-
tion in March 2013 of more than 150,000. This camp then 
became Jordan’s third largest city and was subsequently fol-
lowed with the construction of additional camps.66 Simul-
taneously, Jordan engaged the cooperation of the UNHCR 
as well as other international agencies, allowing them to 
manage the day-to-day affairs of the camp. However, as the 
numbers continued to increase and the conflict in Syria es-
calated, the expectation of a quick return was replaced by 
growing concerns about the political implications of per-
manent camps. As discussed in detail above, past experi-
ence with Palestinian refugees accentuated these concerns. 
Jordan very quickly instituted, together with UNHCR, 
a registration process for urban refugees and made regis-
tration a requirement for access to such public services as 
health and education. Jordan also welcomed a long list of in-
ternational agencies to help support the needs of refugees in 
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coordination with the Ministry of Planning and the Hash-
emite Charity Organization. 
The size of the refugee population and the protracted 
nature of the conflict in Syria have put dramatic strains on 
Jordan’s financial and limited natural resources, including 
water.67 The government has virulently complained about 
inadequate burden sharing on the part of the international 
community and pushed for greater funding to support the 
refugees. The point was made starkly by King Abdullah II 
during his address to the UN General Assembly in Sep-
tember 2015 at the height of the European refugee crisis.68 
This concern for greater economic support is not surprising. 
According to some, hosting refugees who make up more 
than 10 percent of the population in a relatively small and 
resource-poor country even runs the risk of transforming 
Jordan from a “middle income” to a “low income” country.69 
Furthermore, the mounting economic cost of hosting the 
refugees has created tension between the Jordanian govern-
ment and international agencies, as the sides disagree over 
the actual number of refugees under the government’s care. 
While the UNHCR put the number of Syrian refugees at 
around 630,000 in October 2015, the government insisted 
that the actual figure was more like 1.4 million. The gov-
ernment was not quite transparent about how it arrived at 
this figure, which appeared to include Syrians who were 
already in the country before the crisis erupted.70 Further-
more, motivated by sensitivity toward public opinion, the 
government demanded that a greater share of international 
assistance be directed toward local communities. This was 
starkly reflected in the Jordan Resilience Plan, whose focus 
was primarily on programs for local communities rather 
than the refugees.71 
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Budgetary concerns coupled with domestic political 
considerations also led the government to cut off health 
subsidies for refugees and deny refugees access to the local 
labor market. These developments coincided with a drastic 
scaling down of support from the World Food Program, 
leaving an increasing number of the refugees in particularly 
vulnerable situations. Inability to maintain a livelihood and 
the utterly desperate situation that many Syrian refugees 
found themselves in pushed an increasing number of Syr-
ians to return to Syria and/or to travel from Jordan on to 
Europe.72 These returns were also prompted by the relative 
calm in southern regions of Syria that border Jordan. In Oc-
tober 2015 the returns to Syria were estimated to be around 
140 a day.73 However, among human rights and some inter-
national agency circles there were concerns that these re-
turns might not have been voluntary and therefore not in 
line with international law.74 This concern was aggravated 
by a government practice that made it increasingly difficult 
for Syrians to enter Jordan and benefit from what was fast 
becoming a “not-so-open-door policy.”
Lebanon, largely because of the Palestinian experience, 
decided right from the beginning not to set up refugee 
camps. Instead, refugees were initially sheltered in available 
housing and accommodation centers but subsequently were 
left to fend for themselves. As a result, a large proportion of 
the more than 1.1 million refugees had to build their own 
makeshift shelters (referred to as “informal tented settle-
ments”) while some managed to rent accommodations, 
usually of very poor quality. One of the few measures the 
Lebanese government introduced, beyond following strictly 
their registration, was to allow Syrian refugee children access 
to schools. Actually, more than half of the students regis-
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tered in Lebanese schools as of mid-2015 were Syrian chil-
dren.75 Refugees had to rely on their own means for meeting 
their health needs or to seek access to services provided by 
international agencies and their nongovernmental partners 
responsible for implementation. The government worked 
closely with the World Food Program to make a food cash 
program available for refugees. However, lack of funds led 
to a severe curtailment of the program in 2015. This was ag-
gravated by the government’s longstanding decision not to 
allow refugees to work legally. In an effort to maintain their 
livelihoods, many resorted to negative coping mechanisms 
such as child labor and prostitution —increasing the pres-
sure on refugees to return to Syria or to leave Lebanon for 
other destinations.76
To Europe via Turkey
The decision to end Lebanon’s “open door” policy in late 
2014 and the introduction of major and costly administra-
tive measures increasingly complicated the possibility for 
Syrian refugees to stay in Lebanon.77 National security con-
siderations and especially the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon’s 
executive circles and its support for the Assad regime sug-
gested that this trend was not likely to change in the near 
future. It was therefore not surprising that some refugees felt 
obliged to return to the precarious circumstances prevailing 
in Syria, and those who could not afford to take such risks 
attempted to make it to Europe.
Turkey began to receive its first refugees from Syria as 
early as April 2011, and like Jordan and Lebanon adopted an 
“open door” policy. In the initial stages of the crisis, refugees 
were mostly housed in schools, sports halls, unused ware-
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houses, and factories. As the numbers continued to increase, 
the Disaster and Emergency Management Agency was given 
the task of constructing purpose-built camps for refugees 
while the government formally extended “temporary pro-
tection” to Syrian refugees in October 2011.78 In less than 
two years more than twenty camps had been set up, hous-
ing about 200,000 refugees. Soon it became evident that the 
agency could not go on constructing camps, as more and 
more refugees arrived and preferred to live in urban settings. 
The government made provisional arrangements to ensure 
access to health services, but it was not until October 2014 
that the government adopted what it called a Temporary 
Protection Circular to define temporary protection, insti-
tuted registration of the refugees, and established coordina-
tion between different agencies to provide better services for 
urban refugees.79 The disaster agency remained responsible 
for establishing and running refugee camps as well as ensur-
ing emergency assistance for new arrivals, while the Direc-
torate General for Migration Management took over the task 
of registration and overall coordination. As of late December 
2015 almost 2.5 million refugees were registered, with more 
than a quarter of a million of them living in twenty-five refu-
gee camps, including five camps set up specifically to house 
Christians, Kurds, and Yazidis. Another 200,000 to 250,000 
refugees had failed to register for a variety of reasons, and 
some commentators believe that many of the Syrian refugees 
that fled to Europe were among them.80 
Managing the presence of more than 2.5 million refugees 
has not been an easy task —even for a country with signifi-
cant administrative and economic capacity. This was com-
plicated by an initial reluctance by the government to seek 
international assistance. Turkey chose not to be included in 
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the first Syrian Regional Response Plan of the UN and pre-
ferred not to cooperate with the UNHCR beyond ensuring 
supplies of tents for camps and overseeing voluntary return. 
However, as the burden of refugees dramatically increased, 
the Turkish government started to coordinate more with 
international agencies such as the International Organiza-
tion on Migration, UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Food Pro-
gram, and the World Health Organization.81 After initial 
resistance by the government, a range of international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) also established them-
selves in Turkey. They worked with a growing number of 
Turkish and Syrian NGOs to respond to the needs of urban 
refugees by supporting activities that ranged from teaching 
language courses, including Turkish, to running courses to 
help women acquire vocational skills and psycho-social sup-
port programs.82 Unlike Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey never 
put into place a comprehensive food cash support program 
for urban refugees beyond modest and limited programs of-
fered by some NGOs.83 
As much as Turkey’s hosting of Syrian refugees received 
wide-ranging praise (including from the authors), Turkey’s 
management of the presence of Syrian refugees has not been 
without difficulties.84 One immediate problem had to do 
with access to the services promised under the Temporary 
Protection Circular. Amnesty International and others re-
ported that Syrian refugees on occasion were denied entry 
into Turkey, especially in the case of Palestinian refugees 
from Syria. There also were allegations of violation of non-
refoulement, one of the central pillars of the Temporary 
Protection Circular, as well as reports of forced relocation of 
urban refugees into refugee camps.85 These cases appear to 
have increased since Turkey reached a deal with the EU in 
November 2015 to stem the flow of Syrian refugees.86 
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Furthermore, heads of some international nongovern-
mental organizations continued to complain about encoun-
tering difficulties in registering their organizations with the 
government and that the process of registration was very 
vague and ambiguous. There also were complaints, espe-
cially from Syrian NGOs, that local government officials fre-
quently fined them for employing personnel without work 
permits.87 Simultaneously, NGO staff as well as local gov-
ernment officials complained about a flood of small NGOs, 
often with no more than an office and a door bell, seeking 
to benefit from the situation for personal gain. Difficulties 
of coordination and especially duplication of tasks were also 
raised as challenges that required attention to better manage 
the needs of urban refugees.
T h e  l o n G  r u n  a n d  b u r d e n  s h a r i n G
Given the extensive destruction in Syria and the absence of 
prospects for an immediate political solution to the conflict, 
there is a broad-based recognition in Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Turkey that Syrian refugees are not likely to be able to return 
home for a long time. However, the issue of the refugees’ 
long-term status is unclear. In these three host countries the 
refugees are generally referred to as “guests” and left in a gray 
zone in terms of their rights and the level of protection they 
can enjoy in the long run.88 None of the traditional “durable 
solutions” —in the form of voluntary return, integration into 
host societies, or resettlement —has been available to them. 
In the meantime, the Syrian conflict is entering its sixth 
year and many of the refugees have been away from their 
homes for years. Some of the urban refugees in neighboring 
countries are slowly but surely integrating themselves into 
local communities. Babies are being born; marriages with 
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local people are occurring; some of the refugees are building 
new lives even if their future in all three countries remains 
legally precarious and economically vulnerable.89 In effect, 
some Syrian refugees in Turkish urban settings are no longer 
refugees waiting for the war to end, but immigrants ready to 
write a new chapter in their lives.90 At the same time, many 
also hope to move on to Europe. Just about half a million 
of them made their way to the European Union during the 
course of 2015 in search of a better and more secure future.91 
The journeys to Europe for Syrians and other nationalities 
have been fraught with difficulties as refugees have had to 
resort to the services of unscrupulous smugglers, and more 
than 3,770 deaths have occurred as a result of accidents in 
the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. 
The refugees face a wide range of challenges in the long 
run. Once again, there are both similarities and differences 
across Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. One common chal-
lenge is how to cope with tension associated with the refu-
gees’ long-term presence in host countries. The publics of 
all three countries resist the notion that refugees may have 
to become a permanent part of their host communities; the 
idea of their eventually becoming citizens is unacceptable. 
In Jordan and Lebanon, integration presents a problem par-
ticularly because of the countries’ small populations and 
limited national resources. In the case of Turkey, however, 
the challenge is more of a cultural one. First of all, Turkey 
has never before received and integrated Arab refugees or 
immigrants. Furthermore, the presence of Arab refugees in 
some parts of the country is a source of resentment toward 
the current government and is seen as part of an effort to 
Islamize the country. 
Nevertheless, in Turkey, in spite of the absence of a com-
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prehensive governmental policy toward integration, signs 
of a piecemeal policy have emerged with respect to educa-
tion and employment. Employment is seen as an important 
avenue to informal integration but also inclusion in local 
communities.92 As Syrian refugees have seen their savings 
disappear, they have been forced, as mentioned earlier, to 
find illegal employment in various sectors of the economy 
ranging from agriculture to the construction sector and 
the textiles industry. The number of Syrians illegally em-
ployed in Turkey in 2015 was put at around 300,000, while 
the number of actual work permits issued for Syrians was 
a mere 3,900.93 Many Syrian entrepreneurs brought their 
businesses to Turkey and provided employment to both ref-
ugees and locals. However, being able to work legally in the 
country will be critical for the integration of Syrian refugees 
in Turkey. As one Syrian refugee starkly captured it, em-
ployment, like education, is a security issue. He noted “how 
refugees who are left jobless and without means of survival 
can become the devil. They can turn into [pro-Assad mili-
tants] or join the likes of Jabhat al-Nusra and IS. Providing 
them with employment allows them to reintegrate into soci-
ety and gives them hope for a better life.”94 
In principle, the Temporary Protection Circular gives 
registered refugees the right to seek legal employment in 
Turkey. Before the general elections in June 2015, the govern-
ment had prepared legislation to open parts of the national 
economy to formal employment for Syrian refugees.95 This 
was a huge step forward for supporting the incorporation of 
the Syrian refugees into Turkish society in a more construc-
tive manner. This step also was encouraged by representa-
tives of local business associations in the provinces close to 
the Syrian border, who argued that there was a shortage of 
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labor in the region. The proposed legislation addressed the 
problem of “negative coping strategies” that leave Syrian 
refugees vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. It enabled 
Syrian skilled workers, such as orthodontists, engineers, 
teachers, and nurses, to contribute to the Turkish economy 
and society.96 The legislation was stalled for much of 2015 
because of the country’s two parliamentary elections, but it 
was revived, and finally adopted, after the governing party 
won a decisive victory in the November elections.97 
A recent report supported by the Turkish Confederation 
of Employer Associations drew attention to the need to rec-
ognize that Syrians are not about to return and that “the 
matter at hand has come to a phase that demands transition 
from emergency support policies to those of integration.”98 
The report, based on interviews with leading business rep-
resentatives, highlights the demand for a comprehensive 
strategy to integrate Syrian refugees with particular empha-
sis on the need for education and regulating their access to 
employment. 
Instead, the frustrating deadlock over legal access to 
labor markets during 2015 pushed refugees into moving 
toward European Union countries. Granting formal access 
to the labor market would also help considerably to reduce 
the current level of expense that the government incurs for 
the upkeep of the refugees. Most important, it would help 
empower the refugees in camps and get them out of the pas-
sive state of existence —the result of their dependency on 
government and international handouts. 
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Conflicting Priorities in Jordan
The Jordanian government strictly prohibits the employ-
ment of Syrian refugees and penalizes violators by deporting 
them.99 Furthermore, the government does not allow any vo-
cational projects or training programs to equip refugees with 
marketable skills. Nevertheless, refugees do work illegally 
and often take up positions that local workers do not fill. At 
the same time, the government is also concerned that better-
trained and skilled Syrian refugees displace local Jordanians 
from jobs.100 A study conducted by the International Labor 
Organization in 2014 noted that the level of unemployment 
among Jordanians had increased from 14 percent to 22 per-
cent since the arrival of refugees from Syria.101 The study also 
estimated that half of the Syrian men living outside camps 
were informally employed. Yet, at the same time, a promi-
nent Jordanian economist also noted that “only 4 percent of 
Jordanians compete for low-skilled jobs that refugees would 
be employed in.”102 These are menial jobs traditionally filled 
by foreign workers, most from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen. 
The government is caught between conflicting priorities. 
On the one hand it needs to be sensitive to public opinion in 
a country that experiences high unemployment. Yet at the 
same time, similar to its Turkish counterpart, it faces an-
other dilemma: frustrated and unemployed young refugees 
risk becoming a security challenge.103 Employment, however, 
may prolong the stay of refugees and increase the likelihood 
of their integration in a Jordan that is already sensitive about 
the demographic balance in the country. 
Despite these conflicting concerns, the cutbacks in sub-
sidies for health services and food clearly need to be ad-
dressed. This has led the Jordanian government to enlist the 
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help of the UN in opening some sectors of the Jordanian 
economy to refugee labor with the proviso that the arrange-
ment should create new jobs rather than displace Jordanian 
workers.104 The government, as of early 2016, continued 
to explore the idea of opening the construction, domestic 
work, agriculture, and textiles sectors to employment while 
supporting Jordan’s industrialization efforts as part of a 
“holistic approach” to managing the refugee crisis.105 The 
competing considerations clearly capture the difficulties 
that accompany policymaking for the long term.
Additional Challenges in Lebanon
The situation in Lebanon is similar to the one in Jordan, 
with the exception that the ratio of Syrian refugees to the 
local population is much higher. This in itself creates ad-
ditional challenges. Otherwise, as in Jordan, economic 
and employment-related considerations are critical to the 
refugees’ long-term presence in Lebanon. In this respect, 
one challenge is the generally held belief that Syrian refu-
gees are forcing wages down, causing greater unemploy-
ment, and increasing the number of Lebanese living below 
the poverty line.106 Yet, in the economic realm the inflow of 
humanitarian aid amounting to roughly $800 million has 
been calculated to have had significant positive multiplier 
effect on the Lebanese economy.107 Even so, this effect needs 
to be balanced against the decline of income from tourism, 
trade, and investments resulting from the crisis in Syria. An 
International Labor Organization study in 2014 noted that 
nearly one-half of the working-age Syrian refugees were ec-
onomically active in Lebanon and were “engaged in agricul-
ture or in personal and domestic services and, on a smaller 
scale, in construction. These jobs provide little income and 
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no security or protection, reflecting refugees’ low skill ca-
pacities.”108 In the meantime, however, Lebanese authorities 
have become much stricter about employment prospects for 
Syrian refugees as well as their stay in the country. Concerns 
about the likely political impact on Lebanon of such a size-
able Syrian refugee community are driving these measures. 
One commentator described the presence of the large ref-
ugee population as creating “a social and political ticking 
bomb, particularly in relation to the identity and existence 
of the Lebanese entity.”109 Therefore, the combination of eco-
nomic and political considerations makes the prospects of 
improving the inclusion of Syrian refugees into mainstream 
Lebanese society an even greater challenge than in Jordan 
and Turkey. 
Education also is critical for ensuring better inclusion of 
Syrian refugees into local communities. The fact that Syria 
shares a common language with Lebanon and Jordan makes 
the process of inclusion much easier than in Turkey. Syrian 
refugees in Turkey, unless they are Turcoman, face the added 
challenge of having to operate in a completely different lin-
guistic environment, not to mention the complications of 
deciphering different scripts in everyday life. Jordan and 
Lebanon opened their national education system to the ref-
ugee children. Even so, Syrians in Lebanon face a challenge 
because the language of instruction is usually in French or 
English, with Arabic being taught in parallel.110 Nonetheless, 
both countries introduced double shifts at schools to accom-
modate the children. 
The experience of Turkey has been much more compli-
cated and problematic. The need to provide education was 
recognized at a relatively early stage. Initially, however, a 
rather fragmented and poorly coordinated policy on educa-
tion emerged based on the premise that the refugees were 
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in Turkey temporarily. Refugee children in camps acquired 
early access to schooling based on a modified Syrian cur-
riculum in Arabic accompanied by language classes in 
Turkish. In urban settings, the government permitted chil-
dren whose parents had residence permits to access Turkish 
schools while Syrian-run schools, called Temporary Educa-
tion Centers, emerged but had little governmental supervi-
sion. Concerns increased about the content and quality of 
the education, especially with respect to religious teach-
ing. These concerns finally led the Ministry of Education 
to implement a much-needed policy to bring all informal 
Syrian schools under its supervision.111 At the same time, 
in June 2015 the ministry was preparing its own schools 
in the border areas to accommodate Syrian children into 
second shifts and follow a curriculum to the ones in refugee 
camps.112 Furthermore, parents who are registered under 
the Temporary Protection Circular now have the option of 
sending their children to Turkish schools as well. 
In all three countries the greatest challenge is that only a 
fraction of the school-age children actually access or attend 
school regularly; for instance, only a third of the 621,000 
school-age Syrian refugee children are in school in Turkey.113 
The situation is not much better in Lebanon and Jordan. 
Economic difficulties, and the “negative coping mecha-
nisms” they have adopted for livelihood, keep children 
from attending schools regularly. Yet a Turkish education 
official acknowledged: “Whether the refugees stay or return 
to Syria, we simply cannot afford to allow for a lost genera-
tion,” adding that “without a chance of education, they risk 
falling victim to radical and terrorist groups.”114 This need 
to avoid a “lost generation” should be emphasized, since 
most Syrian children inside Syria are not in school, and the 
country’s future may well depend on the education received 
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by Syrian children outside the country. In this regard, there 
is closer cooperation with UNICEF in the three countries 
to develop and fund programs to reach a larger number of 
Syrian refugees. There is also broad recognition that edu-
cation is critical to any prospects for integration into host 
societies. However, it is difficult to see how this situation can 
be improved unless Syrian refugees also are given access 
to livelihood opportunities so they can afford to send their 
children to school rather than rely on the income they can 
seek out in the streets or through child labor. Similarly, host 
countries will need considerable support to meet the costs 
associated with infrastructure and capacity building.
In the long run, ensuring the integration of the refugees 
would be a “win-win” for all involved: Syria, especially after 
the war is brought to an end; the three host countries; and 
the international community. Host countries will need to 
recognize that integration does not necessarily mean that 
refugees will never return to their native lands. Instead, 
access to education and livelihood opportunities is much 
more likely to provide the basis of “sustainable return” when 
the day comes than if the refugees remain completely depen-
dent on handouts and are forced into a state of passivity.115 
However, it would be unfair to expect miracles from the 
host countries if left to their own devices. These countries 
are actually providing the international community with 
a “public good.” Protection of refugees is considered to be 
an international responsibility, one that demands burden-
sharing. As discussed in the introduction of this book, so 
far burden sharing in the form of refugee resettlement from 
the host countries and funding to meet the needs of refugees 
has been disappointing. The UN, in its Regional Refugee 
and Resilience Plan for 2015–16, has recognized that local 
communities hosting refugees also deserve assistance, and it 
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budgeted for projects to increase the resilience of these com-
munities. This is a very positive step; however, it is disap-
pointing that UN budgets remain seriously underfunded. It 
is paramount that the international community finds better 
ways to share the cost of projects with the host countries and 
also contribute global expertise in addressing the challenges 
of providing education and employment opportunities for 
Syrian refugees. 
Burden sharing is also critical in terms of legitimiz-
ing the expenses of the government in the eyes of the host 
countries’ publics, and it demonstrates that caring for the 
refugees is an international responsibility and that these 
countries are not alone. However, in turn the host govern-
ments, when presenting the expenditure that they have 
made for the Syrian refugees, would earn the trust of the 
international community if they acknowledged that funds 
do come from abroad —even if not at the desired level. These 
funds help meet at least some of the needs of the refugees, 
provide jobs for local nationals, and contribute to the local 
economy. International agencies and nongovernmental or-
ganizations often use these funds to buy local products, pay 
local taxes on them, and pay the salaries of local employ-
ees. Yet, hosting more than 4.5 million refugees has indeed 
called for great sacrifices from host countries. Measuring 
that sacrifice is of course difficult and complicated, if not 
outright impossible, even for economic costs alone. 
It is clear that whatever the actual cost for Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Turkey, the financial assistance from the inter-
national community has fallen well short of what is needed. 
Ankara puts the direct cost of caring for the refugees at $7.6 
to $8 billion, Amman at $ 4.5 billion by 2016, and Beirut at 
more than $4 billion so far.116 On the other hand, a World 
Bank assessment put the overall cost of the Syrian crisis at 
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$35 billion through mid-2014 without including the actual 
cost of caring for the refugees.117 As noted in the introduc-
tory chapter, the Syrian crisis has received a disproportion-
ate percentage of global humanitarian funds. Even so, the 
$15 billion that the international community has committed 
or spent in the form of assistance since the beginning of the 
crisis falls well short of meeting the needs of the Syrian dis-
placed and refugees.118 
The European refugee crisis, discussed below, has drawn 
attention to the plight of Syrian refugees in neighboring 
countries and accentuated the need for greater recognition 
of the burden carried by these countries. This has led to sev-
eral positive developments. The European Union and the 
United States have agreed to increase their funding for pro-
grams to address the needs of Syrian refugees in the region. 
After long and arduous negotiations late in November 2015 
the EU and Turkey formally adopted an “Action Plan” that 
will make more than 3 billion euros available for supporting 
Syrian refugees in Turkey.119 Total funding for UN budgets 
for Syria has edged up from less than one-fourth in mid-
summer to a little over half by the end of 2015.120 Britain has 
also taken the lead to call for a major “Syrian Donors Con-
ference” in February 2016.121 Furthermore, the Group of 20 
Leaders’ Communique adopted at the summit in Antalya, 
Turkey, in mid-November 2015 included a paragraph call-
ing on the leaders “to continue further strengthening our 
support for all efforts to provide protection and assistance 
and to find durable solutions for the unprecedented num-
bers of refugees and internally displaced persons in vari-
ous parts of the world” including Syria.122 There were also 
calls emphasizing that protecting and assisting the refugees 
was a global responsibility that should be distributed more 
equally. However, it will be critical to translate these devel-
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opments into actual projects to benefit both Syrian refugees 
as well as their host communities. 
Similarly, the international community has not been 
particularly generous with respect to resettlement. In spite 
of numerous appeals by United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres to the EU and the 
United States to offer more resettlement places available, 
only about 125,000 spots were available as of December 
2015. That number represented less than 3 percent of all 
Syrian refugees.123 It was the arrival by September 2015 of 
more than half a million Syrian refugees and others by sea 
that forced the EU to respond.124 In September the EU de-
cided to resettle 160,000 refugees among EU member coun-
tries but did not make places available for taking refugees 
directly from the major refugee-hosting countries.125 Brit-
ain, which had accepted fewer than 5,000 Syrian refugees 
since 2011, promised to admit 20,000 more refugees in the 
next five years from countries neighboring Syria.126 France 
also announced that it would make its 24,000 quota avail-
able in the next two years for resettling Syrian refugees from 
the neighboring countries.127 The Action Plan adopted be-
tween the EU and Turkey referred vaguely to making places 
available for resettlement of Syrian refugees from the coun-
tries of the region.128 Time will tell whether a subsequent EU 
“voluntary admissions” program to resettle Syrian refugees 
from Turkey will work.129 However, the fact that as of early 
2016 only 272 refugees were relocated from Greece and Italy 
on the basis of the deal reached among EU members was not 
very promising for the future of this “voluntary” scheme.130 
The EU-Turkey Action Plan was intended to provide 
much more support for host countries and for Turkey in par-
ticular. The plan promised to share the cost of the refugees’ 
upkeep, access to public services, and their participation in 
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local economies. In return, Turkey was expected to prevent 
the smuggling into the EU of Syrian refugees and other mi-
grants. EU leaders, ranging from German chancellor Angela 
Merkel to the European Commission vice president Frans 
Timmermans and the European commissioner Johannes 
Hahn, stressed the importance of cooperating with Turkey 
to stem the flow of refugees into Europe and promised the 
prospect of introducing visa-free travel for Turkish nationals 
as well as revitalizing negotiations for Turkey’s long-delayed 
accession into EU membership.131 However, the plan also re-
ceived considerable criticism for being focused primarily on 
addressing the interests of the EU and Turkey rather than 
the welfare of Syrian refugees. Critics also noted that it was 
based on a transactional “we pay, you keep the refugees” 
logic, with little regard for ethical and value issues.132 Am-
nesty International was particularly critical of the plan; its 
report noted in detail that denying the refugees the possibil-
ity to seek protection in Europe would fall short of forging a 
durable solution to the crisis.133 
The European refugee crisis is still evolving. By the end 
of 2015, the number of arrivals had reached more than one 
million (see figure 2-2). More than one-half of these refu-
gees are Syrians, some of whom came directly from Syria 
via Turkey and some of whom left the countries hosting 
Syrian refugees.134 In any event, many experts now recog-
nize that lack of adequate international solidarity in shar-
ing the burden of managing the Syrian refugees was a major 
and compelling reason why Syrians began to flee to Europe 
in massive numbers. In that respect, it is significant that 
the refugees who were interviewed on why they decided to 
attempt to get to Europe cited the desire to ensure the ed-
ucation of their children and the lack of access to labor mar-
kets.135 These happen to be two areas with which the hosting 
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countries neighboring Syria have struggled the most and 
have failed to make significant progress. Substantive and ef-
fective international assistance might have produced a dif-
ferent result. Furthermore, the absence of any prospects for 
a legal path for moving on to third countries encouraged 
many Syrians to resort to human smugglers. It is not sur-
prising that many struggled for years in neighboring coun-
tries, lost hope about the future, and finally resorted to a 
form of “self-resettling” themselves to Europe. 
Managing a mass influx of refugees in such a short period 
of time and then integrating those who have been recognized 
as refugees will be a mammoth task. Germany has been 
at the forefront in receiving the bulk of the refugees, and 
German chancellor Angela Merkel has received wide inter-
national praise —but also much domestic criticism —for her 
stand.136 However, the fact that some of the perpetrators of 
the November 2015 attacks in Paris appear to have entered 
Europe through Greece has further complicated the man-
f i G u r e  2 - 2 .  Irregular Migrant and Refugee Arrivals 







































































































































Source: United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, “Refugees/Migrants 
Emergency Response Plan.”
Ferris-Kirişci_Consequences of Chaos_i-xx_1-202.indd   68 3/11/16   2:51 PM
T h e  C o n s e q u e n C e s  o f  C h a o s 69
agement of the refugee crisis. There already have been calls 
that measures introduced to ensure public security across 
Europe should not work to the detriment of refugees and 
that borders should definitely not be closed. Such measures 
would undermine the prospects of future resettlement from 
host countries and make the situation even more precarious 
for refugees in flight. At the same time, there are also wor-
ries that the pressure to cope with the crisis could risk the 
unraveling of the EU itself, while others have been critical 
of the EU’s selfishness and failure to live up to its values.137 
Security concerns subsequent to the Paris attacks and 
the December 2015 attack in San Bernardino, California, 
have destroyed the good will that emerged in the United 
States in support of receiving Syrian refugees, which had 
been the initial response to a widely published photograph 
of the body of a little boy on a Turkish beach in September 
2015. The reaction to San Bernardino was swift, with a large 
group of governors announcing their opposition to the re-
settlement of any Syrian refugees in their states.138 The U.S. 
House of Representatives passed a bill calling for even more 
onerous security restrictions on Syrian refugees. This rheto-
ric is particularly disappointing because it came at a time 
when the U.S. administration had just committed itself to 
admitting 10,000 Syrian refugees before the end of October 
2016, as well as expanding the annual general resettlement 
quota from 70,000 to 100,000 in the coming years.139 These 
steps were particularly welcomed by advocates, because pre-
viously the United States had been slow in admitting Syrian 
refugees and was facing criticism from refugee advocacy 
groups. Fewer than 2,200 Syrians have been resettled in the 
United States since the war’s outbreak in 2011.140
The absence of effective burden sharing had played an 
important role in Turkey’s call for safe zones in Syria —an 
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issue discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Turkey 
has pushed the idea on numerous occasions since 2012, 
when the number of Syrian refugees first crossed the 
100,000 “red line” once declared by the government.141 The 
Turkish government has frequently sought support for safe 
zones from the United States and the EU. In July 2015, upon 
signing an agreement with the United States to coordinate 
its military effort against ISIS, Turkey advocated the estab-
lishment of such a zone within the so-called ISIS-free area 
north of Aleppo, stretching about sixty miles along the 
Syrian- Turkish border.142 Due to Washington’s continued 
resistance, however, this safe zone was never realized.143 The 
idea was subsequently revived by the president of Turkey 
during the November 2015 G-20 summit but did not receive 
much support from U.S. president Barack Obama.144 Nor 
was the idea embraced by the EU, which was itself strug-
gling with unprecedented refugee arrivals.145 Because of Eu-
ropean reluctance, the creation of a safe zone was dropped 
from the agenda of the EU-Turkey summit of late Novem-
ber. In any event, the Turkish downing of a Russian fighter 
plane in late November 2015 brought the prospects of a safe 
zone to an end. Russia’s introduction of powerful ballistic 
missiles into Syria has ironically created a de facto no-fly 
zone in reverse.146 The Turkish idea of a safe zone in Syria 
across from the Turkish border may well be dead for the 
foreseeable future.
We turn now to an examination of some of the challenges 
posed by those displaced —and trapped —inside Syrian bor-
ders.
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C h a P T e r  3
Communities at Risk inside Syria
The Internally Displaced, Palestinians, Besieged, 
and Other Trapped Populations 
W hile much of the world’s attention has focused, perhaps understandably, on the exodus of Syrian refugees flee-
ing their country, less attention has been paid to those dis-
placed within the country and even less to those who are 
unable to leave their communities. This chapter looks at the 
dynamics of internal displacement within Syria and at the 
plight of those who for various reasons are unable to move. 
We then turn to the extremely complicated issue of how to 
assist and protect civilians within the borders of their own 
country. In particular, this chapter addresses issues of cross-
border assistance to areas not under the control of the gov-
ernment and to the potential for safe areas, no-fly zones, 
humanitarian corridors, and other forms of humanitarian 
intervention to provide assistance to those affected by the 
Syrian conflict who remain within Syria’s borders.
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i n T e r n a l ly  d i s P l a C e d  P e o P l e
While the protection of those people who flee across inter-
national borders is the responsibility of the governments 
that host them, with the support of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the responsibility 
for protecting those displaced within their own countries 
falls to their national governments. In the UN’s legal jargon, 
these people are known as “internally displaced persons,” 
or IDPs. 
The primary role of the state is clear in principle, recog-
nized both in international law and regularly reaffirmed in 
international statements of principle. Most notably, United 
Nations Resolution 46/182 of 1991, on “Strengthening the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance,” which remains 
the normative basis for international humanitarian action, 
states: 
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national 
unity of States must be fully respected in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations. In this con-
text, humanitarian assistance should be provided 
with the consent of the affected country and in prin-
ciple on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.
Each State has the responsibility first and fore-
most to take care of victims of natural disasters and 
other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, 
the affected State has the primary role in the initia-
tion, organization, coordination, and implementa-
tion of humanitarian assistance within its territory.1
One of the great human rights achievements of the past 
two decades has been the recognition that the rights of 
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those displaced within their borders need to be protected; 
this recognition has been accompanied by the development 
of a normative framework to affirm those rights. The Guid-
ing Principles on Internal Displacement affirm that the state 
has primary responsibility for protecting the rights of IDPs 
and that IDPs should expect their government to fulfil this 
responsibility toward them. The document then proceeds 
to spell out the rights of IDPs and consequent responsibili-
ties of the authorities in all phases of displacement: protec-
tion from arbitrary displacement, protection and assistance 
during displacement, and securing solutions to displace-
ment.2 The Guiding Principles specify that humanitarian 
organizations have a right to offer assistance, that consent 
to such offers should not be arbitrarily withheld, and that 
authorities should ensure “rapid and unimpeded” access to 
the displaced.
The Guiding Principles were affirmed in the World 
Summit Outcome Document of 2005, in which 186 heads 
of state unanimously reiterated the primary responsibility 
of states to address internal displacement and affirmed the 
Guiding Principles as “an important international frame-
work for the protection of internally displaced persons.”3 
In the same World Summit Outcome Document the inter-
national community also endorsed the concept of the “re-
sponsibility to protect,” known as R2P, which described a 
collective international responsibility to protect people from 
genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity. 
This was no mere coincidence: The idea of a responsibility to 
protect was inspired by and emerged from efforts through-
out the 1990s to design an effective international response to 
protect IDPs based on the concept of “sovereignty as respon-
sibility.”4 While it is beyond the scope of this study to trace 
the ups and (mostly) downs of the implementation of R2P, 
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suffice it to say that the concept has not been applied in Syria 
in spite of the fact that war crimes and widespread atroci-
ties have been unambiguously documented. Nor has the 
Syrian government exercised its responsibilities to protect 
and assist IDPs and to facilitate the “rapid and unimpeded 
access to the displaced.” 
Moreover, the fact that the Syrian government is car-
rying out widespread and increasingly lethal attacks on 
civilian areas highlights a fundamental contradiction in 
international law: The same authorities that cause displace-
ment are also responsible for protecting and assisting those 
displaced by their actions. While Syria is certainly not the 
only government in this position, the sheer scale of both in-
ternal displacement and well- documented atrocities in Syria 
highlight the inherent contradictions in the way IDPs are 
treated in international law.5
i n T e r n a l  d i s P l a C e m e n T  i n  s y r i a
There have been examples of large- scale displacement in Syr-
ia’s recent history —most notably in Hama in 1982 when the 
government forced some 250,000 people from their homes 
and killed more than 25,000 in a campaign to suppress pro-
tests by the Muslim Brotherhood.6 More displacements re-
sulted since 2006 from a devastating drought. Historically, 
however, rates of rural- urban migration have been relatively 
low in Syria. Rather, in spite of authoritarian domestic and 
bellicose foreign policies, Syria was known as a generous 
and welcoming host for Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. 
Since the eruption of violence in March 2011, an increas-
ing number of people have been displaced from their homes, 
the vast majority of whom remain within Syrian borders. 
Much more is known about the 4- plus million refugees in 
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neighboring countries than about the almost 6.5 million 
IDPs. While governments or the UNHCR have established 
systems to register refugees in all the neighboring countries, 
the Syrian government has no such registration mechanism 
inside the country. Access by UN agencies to the internally 
displaced is both limited and sporadic. The Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the UN 
body responsible for compiling data on the number of IDPs 
and in October 2015 estimated their number as 6.5 mil-
lion IDPs —a figure that has declined since the high of 7.6 
million in October 2014, perhaps reflecting the increase in 
people fleeing the country.7 OCHA began reporting on IDP 
estimates only in January 2013 and has only updated the 
figure four times since then.8 In contrast, UNHCR reports 
refugee numbers on a regular basis, usually weekly. While 
refugee estimates generally show a fairly direct linear trend, 
numbers of IDPs seem to lurch upward in stepwise fashion. 
As of late 2015, the governorates (provinces) with the most 
IDPs were Aleppo (1.2 million), Rural Damascus (1.269 mil-
lion), and Idlib (705,000).9 These IDPs are part of a larger 
group of 13.5 million estimated to be in need of humanitar-
ian assistance (see figure 3- 1).10 
The stepwise movements in IDP numbers reflects the dif-
ficulties in compiling such numbers as well as the inherently 
political nature of coming up with estimates of IDPs in a 
highly volatile context. When their situation worsens, people 
go to stay with relatives in another part of the country and 
then move back (or move somewhere else) in response to 
local security issues. The Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (IDMC) in Switzerland, the world’s leading author-
ity on IDP data, further notes that different methodologies 
are used by different actors and in different parts of Syria. 
11 The figures presented by OCHA are in fact triangulated 
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between statistics collected by the Syrian government, the 
Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society, and OCHA. But none of 
these actors has access to some parts of Syria, and those are 
areas likely to have high rates of internal displacement. The 
Syrian government (like governments in other parts of the 
world) has an interest in minimizing the extent of internal 
displacement and argues that humanitarian agencies inflate 
their estimates for political reasons. 
Even in using the figure of 6.5 million IDPs, it must be 
emphasized that this is a very rough estimate, particularly 
given the dynamic nature of displacement. For example, 
IDMC reported that the conflict newly displaced as many as 
1.2 million Syrians in 2014.12 Even in the midst of the con-
flict, some people are able to return to their homes. Thus the 
United States Agency for International Development cited 
UN reports that as of mid- September 2015, more than 3,000 
households, 80 percent of them Palestinian, had returned to 
the Husseinieh neighborhood in Damascus two years after 
they had been displaced by armed conflict.13 
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Given both the direct and indirect effects of the conflict, 
millions of Syrians have left their communities in search of 
safety and survival. Displacement in Syria, as elsewhere, is a 
dynamic process. Many people have been displaced multiple 
times. People return to their homes to check on property 
and relatives, they go to stay with relatives in areas perceived 
as safer and then move on when conditions deteriorate. 
There is a clear relationship between internal displacement 
and refugee movements. As a Jordanian Foreign Ministry 
official stated, “Jordan is typically the fourth stop for Syr-
ians; most of the refugees arriving have been previously dis-
placed at least three times inside Syria.”14
For those displaced within Syria, shelter is an immedi-
ate and serious concern. In 2014 analysts estimated that 30 
percent of the country’s housing stock had been destroyed —
and there have been widespread aerial bombardments since 
then.15 The overwhelming majority of IDPs (85 percent) stay 
with relatives or friends or rent accommodations in the com-
munities where they arrive.16 But when resources run out or 
when IDPs have no relatives or friends to stay with, they 
seek alternative accommodations by living in abandoned 
property, in makeshift shelters, or even in caves. According 
to Syrian government reports in 2013, only 4 percent of IDPs 
in the country were living in collective shelters.17 
Compared to refugees who have made it out of the coun-
try, those displaced within Syria are probably more vulner-
able because they are closer to the violence, less likely to be 
assessed and counted, and less likely to have access to inter-
national assistance. Older people, for example, are probably 
less able to travel far from home. While people over 65 made 
up some 6 percent of Syria’s pre- war population, they ac-
count for only 1.6 percent of registered refugees.18 Perhaps 
because women are able to move more freely through check-
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points or because men have been killed or are fighting, most 
IDPs are women and girls. While IDPs have been taken in 
by host families and communities, in some places the sheer 
number of IDPs seeking safety has increased tensions. Even 
in official camps, sudden influxes of IDPs may overwhelm 
services. Health services and education for children are 
largely absent, and children are experiencing clear signs 
of trauma.19 In 2013 reports were that half of IDP children 
had dropped out of school —a figure that seems to have re-
mained constant.20 In 2015 OCHA reported that in addition 
to those already out of school another 25 percent of children 
were at risk of dropping out.21
IDPs face serious protection needs related to the ongo-
ing conflict. Many people have lost identity and other docu-
ments, and without them crossing checkpoints is risky. 
One- half of the civil affairs departments in the country have 
been destroyed, hampering the replacement of documenta-
tion.22 Families have been separated, there is a heightened 
risk of sexual violence, and children are at risk. IDPs and 
refugee women report increased domestic violence and 
pressure to resort to negative coping methods such as early 
marriage and prostitution.23 IDPs living in makeshift camps 
near the Turkish border have been attacked.24 The prolifera-
tion of small arms and the widespread presence of mines, 
explosive remnants of war, and unexploded ordnance pose 
a particular threat for children. Children have been used as 
human shields and recruited into armed forces, in particular 
by armed opposition groups, while in Lebanon some report-
edly have engaged in armed hostilities.25 IDPs also face risks 
because of the loss of social networks that can protect people 
in conflict situations by providing guidance on issues such 
as who can be trusted and what are the safe routes through 
the country or city. 
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There is no legal or policy framework for IDPs in Syria.26 
In fact, the Syrian government does not acknowledge that 
there are IDPs in the country. Rather, according to the 2013 
report of the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights 
of IDPs, “the Government stated its position that the Syrian 
Arab Republic was not suffering from a phenomenon called 
‘internally displaced persons’ but rather had been subject to 
a series of terrorist attacks undertaken by armed outlaws. As 
such, persons being assisted were referred to as ‘people who 
left their homes as a result of the current events.’”27
While all IDPs in Syria are at risk, specific groups have 
experienced particularly high risk, including the Palestin-
ian and Iraqi refugees, religious minorities, and Kurds.
Palestinian and Iraqi Refugees
Palestinian and Iraqi refugees have been particularly vul-
nerable. The UN’s agency for the Palestinians —the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) —reports that 
all twelve Palestinian refugee camps and all 560,000 regis-
tered Palestinian refugees in Syria have been affected by the 
war. The majority of the 450,000 refugees remaining in Syria 
are internally displaced and in need of humanitarian assis-
tance. One- third of UNRWA facilities in Syria have been 
damaged or destroyed, and UNRWA reports that the civil-
ian character of the camps and neutrality is no longer re-
spected.28 This is a breach of international law under which 
refugees are protected during armed conflict, in all circum-
stances and without adverse distinction.29 
The destruction of homes in Palestine refugee camps, the 
violence, the loss of livelihoods, and the exhaustion of sav-
ings and assets have forced many Palestinians living in Syria 
to leave their communities —but they have been turned back 
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at borders when they have tried to escape the country. Jordan 
has denied entry to most Palestinians since the beginning of 
the crisis, and in May 2014 Lebanon imposed restrictions on 
Palestinians’ entry. All together around 80,000 Palestinian 
refugees from Syria have been displaced across international 
borders, including 42,500 in Lebanon and 16,000 in Jordan. 
Those who have sought protection in neighboring countries 
experience marginalization and acute vulnerability and 
are unable to access civil registration procedures and basic 
social services.30 
Yarmouk, a Palestinian refugee camp near Damascus, 
was established by the Syrian government in 1957 and by 
the time the present conflict broke out in 2011 was home to 
150,000–200,000 Palestinians as well as some 650,000 Syr-
ians. In 2012 intense fighting broke out in the camp between 
pro- regime and opposition forces, with the Free Syrian 
Army and the al- Nusra Front taking control of the camp by 
the end of the year. Those who could, left. The Syrians living 
in Yarmouk mainly went to stay with relatives and friends 
in central Damascus or other cities or moved to Lebanon 
or Jordan. But the Palestinians in the camp had fewer op-
tions. In mid- 2013 the government imposed an almost total 
siege, prohibiting the entry or exit from the camp of all but 
a few emergency medical cases. All twenty- eight schools in 
the camp were closed, electricity was shut off, and food and 
medical supplies were in short supply. A news article in The 
Guardian cited a report by a Palestinian woman from Yar-
mouk that at the worst point of the siege a kilo of rice cost 
about 120 times more there than in central Damascus (prices 
later fell sharply in both places).31 The siege was “relaxed” in 
January 2014, and although there were some ad hoc aid de-
liveries during 2014, access remained extremely limited. ISIS 
attacked the camp in April 2015. Although its control was 
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short- lived, the camp remains under the control of opposi-
tion groups with the government controlling the entrance to 
the camp. In July 2015 the UN took Yarmouk off its list of 
besieged areas, but the conflict remains intense and access 
is extremely limited. For example, UNRWA has been unable 
to access the camp’s interior since March 28, 2015. An es-
timated 5,000–8,000 inhabitants remain in the Yarmouk 
camp, and, as of September 2015, typhoid had broken out.32 
Iraqi refugees in Syria also have been affected by the con-
flict. In 2012 UNHCR reported that there were over 400,000 
Iraqi refugees in Syria (although only 62,000 were reported 
as receiving assistance from UNHCR).33 With the escalation 
of the conflict, at least 100,000 Iraqis are reported to have 
returned to Iraq from Syria, further complicating the situa-
tion in northern Iraq where they join large numbers of Iraqi 
IDPs and Syrian refugees in a part of the country facing seri-
ous political pressures.34
Religious Minorities
As noted in the introductory chapter, most of the victims of 
the Syrian war, including most of those displaced, are Sunni 
Muslims —and yet the impact of displacement on minorities 
is significant, given their relatively smaller percentage of the 
population. The increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict 
is reflected in patterns of displacement. In its August 2015 
report, the Independent International Commission of In-
quiry on the Syrian Arab Republic stated: “As communities 
and groups are, or feel, threatened, they have retreated into 
areas where they believe themselves to be more protected. 
This has further strengthened the dangerous perception of a 
link between some ethnicities and/or religions and political 
allegiances. Consequently, indiscriminate attacks on areas 
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held by an opposing warring party are increasingly likely to 
affect specific religious or ethnic communities.”35 
There is little reliable information about how many Ala-
wites have been internally displaced, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that those who did not already live in Alawite- 
majority areas have fled to what they believe to be safer areas 
within Syria.36 Regardless of sect, most Syrians with the 
means to do so have already left the country, and the Alawi-
tes are likely no exception. However, UNHCR reports that 
very few people from minorities have registered as refugees 
in Jordan, and even in Lebanon (which has its own Alawite 
community) minorities fear registering due to concerns 
about retribution from other refugees.37 A small number of 
Alawites have reportedly fled to Turkey to seek shelter with 
their co- religionists, Turkey’s Alawite community, and have 
gone to cities where the opposition party, the Republican 
People’s Party, runs municipalities.38 As the conflict has 
become more sectarian, Syrian Alawites have avoided the 
Sunni- dominated border camps and fled to areas such as 
Istanbul, where one local NGO estimated in late 2013 that 
there were approximately 3,000 Syrian Alawites, hundreds 
of them homeless. Spillover from the Syrian conflict has also 
reportedly increased tensions between Turkey’s Alawite mi-
nority and Turkish Sunnis in Hatay province, which borders 
Syria and was part of its territory until 1939.39
There also is little reliable information about the number 
of Christians who have fled Syria. While most Syrian Chris-
tians are thought to have joined their co- religionists in Leba-
non, media reports suggest that a small number have sought 
sanctuary in Jordan and Turkey.40 In mid- 2013 Turkish of-
ficials announced they were building a tented camp with a 
capacity of 2,500 in Midyat, a town in Mardin province near 
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the Syrian border, to house Christian refugees.41 Turkey has 
a small Assyrian minority living in the same area. By the 
end of the year, about a hundred Syrian Christian families 
had reportedly fled to the Mardin area, but it is unclear how 
many were actually living in the camp.42 Some Syrian Chris-
tians have sought sanctuary with church communities in 
Istanbul.43 However, not all Syrian Christians are counting 
on Turkish hospitality. In February 2015 the Syrian Catholic 
archbishop of the conflict- torn region of Hassakeh accused 
Turkey of preventing Christians from fleeing Syria while al-
lowing ISIS fighters to cross the border unchecked.44 
Small numbers of ethnic Armenians from Syria have 
also sought refuge in Turkey.45 Syria’s Christian minority 
includes about 100,000 people of Armenian descent, mostly 
centered in the Aleppo area. By mid- 2015, it was estimated 
that around 40,000 Armenians remained in the city. More 
than 15,000 had left for Armenia, which offered them citi-
zenship.46 However, many are struggling to make a living 
in their new home. Up to forty Syrian Armenian fami-
lies reportedly settled in Nagorno- Karabakh, a disputed 
region that is part of Azerbaijan but has an ethnic Arme-
nian minority. Armenia has also received Yazidi refugees 
from Iraq.47 In March 2013 Islamist rebels seized control of 
the Syrian- Armenian town of Kassab, which lies near the 
Turkish border, displacing most of the town’s population.48 
Throughout Syria, Armenians have reportedly become tar-
gets for kidnapping, extortion, and murder.
One little- known minority group in Syria deeply af-
fected by the civil war are the Dom. They form a distinct lin-
guistic group with links to India and the Roma in Europe. 
The Dom have traditionally faced discrimination and have 
also been displaced by the current conflict. Field research 
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suggests that thousands have fled to Turkey and continue to 
face discrimination there, too.49 
The Particular Case of Kurdish Displacement inside Syria
The widespread internal displacement in Syria is affect-
ing patterns of both sectarian and ethnic settlement in the 
country. When people are displaced, they tend to move to 
areas where their own ethnic group or sect is in a major-
ity (as was the case in Iraq). The case of the Syrian Kurds is 
particularly interesting in this regard as it demonstrates the 
relationship between displacement, ethnic/sectarian divi-
sions, the military conflict —and perhaps some of the future 
possibilities for the country. 
Syria’s Kurdish population lives near the Turkish and 
Iraqi borders, although there are also substantial Kurdish 
populations in Syria’s large cities. But unlike northern Iraq, 
the territory of Kurdish settlement in Syria is not contiguous 
and does not have the mountainous territory from which 
an armed insurgency against central rule can be organized. 
Over the years, the Syrian Kurds were partly co- opted by 
the regime and their political activities vis à vis Turkey and 
their smuggling were tolerated. But they have also seethed 
under systematic discrimination and repression. Some 
300,000 Kurds —15 percent of the estimated 2 million Kurds 
living in Syria—remain stateless. In April 2011 the regime 
gave citizenship to 150,000 stateless Kurds, but many were 
unable to benefit from these provisions. Kurds did not give 
Assad much credit for the grossly overdue measure, but nei-
ther did they flock to join the uprising against him.50
Traditional Kurdish political parties feared reprisals if 
they actively joined the opposition even though many young 
Kurds did so. And the regime for the most part left the Kurds 
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alone.51 The largest and most influential of the Syrian Kurd-
ish political parties, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya 
Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD), perceived as a Syrian- Kurdish 
offshoot of the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
in Turkey, has historically been reluctant to confront the 
regime, prompting charges of collusion, especially from the 
Turkish government.52 
With the conflict and the ensuing displacement, the situ-
ation changed as Kurds previously displaced from the region 
returned to Syria’s Kurdish regions in the north; as of Octo-
ber 2012 half of Syria’s Kurdish regions were controlled by 
local Kurdish leaders, including at border points with Iraq’s 
Kurdish autonomous region. By mid- 2012 the PYD took 
advantage of the partial withdrawal of regime forces from 
Kurdish areas to establish its political and security presence 
and openly asserted itself as the authority in charge of state 
institutions in most predominantly Kurdish towns. The only 
Kurdish political rival to the PYD is a coalition of Kurdish 
parties aligned with the Kurdistan Regional Government in 
Iraq. But Kurdish factions compete not only with each other 
but also with non- Kurdish opposition groups, and most are 
alienated from the Islamist and Arab nationalist opposition 
groups (in part because of the dependence of these groups 
on Turkey and Gulf- based conservative sponsors). Sectarian 
and ethnic tensions flared up in 2013 between Kurds and 
Arabs, leading to clashes between the PYD’s People’s Pro-
tection Units (YPG) and the Free Syrian Army.53 However, 
in June 2015 PYD and local groups associated with the Free 
Syrian Army fought together in dislodging ISIS from the 
border town of Tal Abyad. Since then, in coordination with 
the United States, Syrian Kurds have been pushing south 
toward ISIS’s stronghold of Raqqa, and there are reports of 
YPG efforts to displace non- Kurds from the region.54
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Syrian Kurds have emerged as a major —and probably 
the most effective —partner of the U.S.- led coalition in its 
fight against ISIS. The growing cooperation between the U.S. 
military and the YPG has reportedly angered Turkey, which 
views the PYD as an affiliate of the PKK and hence as a se-
curity threat.55 The YPG emerged victorious from the long 
battle over the border towns of Kobane (reportedly with the 
assistance of Kurdish fighters from Iraq and Turkey) and Tal 
Abyad. However, along with Kurdish battlefield successes 
there have been reports of tensions with Arab opposition 
groups and even accusations that Kurdish forces are involved 
in ethnic cleansing.56 In July 2015 the YPG announced that 
it was now in full control of the city of Hassakeh, with both 
ISIS and the regime withdrawing. Kurds are also in control 
of a corner of Syria in the northwest known as Afrin, in this 
way creating a “Kurdish corridor” along most of Turkey’s 
border with Syria with the exception of a stretch of land west 
of the Euphrates. The Turkish government considers the 
prospect of an uninterrupted Kurdish- controlled zone along 
its border a threat to national security and is vehemently op-
posed to YPG or PYD crossing the Euphrates to the west.57 In 
turn this complicates Turkey’s relationship with the United 
States, which maintains very close cooperation with the PYD 
in the fight against ISIS.
The fighting in Kurdish areas has also created large- 
scale displacement. Since July 2012 a steady influx of Syrian 
Kurds have crossed into Iraq, numbering close to 250,000.58 
In mid- 2012 Human Rights Watch reported that most 
Syrian Kurds in Iraq were fleeing the fighting with opposi-
tion groups, as well as conscription and the violence of the 
regime, although ISIS and other Islamist militant groups 
have since become the dominant threat rather than Free 
Syrian Army– affiliated militants.59 
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The arrival of Syrian Kurds has placed considerable pres-
sure on authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan, which is also facing 
a massive influx of IDPs from elsewhere in Iraq. Despite a 
shared cultural heritage, tensions have emerged between 
Syrian Kurdish refugees and the host community. Syrian 
Kurds were originally given residency and work permits, 
but as competition increased with Iraqi Kurds for scarce 
livelihoods, authorities in Erbil and Sulaimaniya suspended 
the issuing of residency cards and encouraged refugees to 
move into camps.60
As the battle was raging in mid- 2015 in the border town 
of Kobane, UNHCR said that over 170,000 Syrian Kurds 
had crossed into Turkey.61 However, the agency said many 
preferred to continue their journey to the Kurdish region 
of Iraq or to other areas in Syria. As discussed in chapter 
2, in early 2015 Turkish authorities opened a refugee camp 
in Suruç to accommodate the refugees from Kobane, while 
some remained housed in camps managed by the munici-
pality.62 
On July 20, 2015, tensions flared over a suspected ISIS sui-
cide bombing in Suruç, Turkey, which left 32 people dead.63 
Most of those killed were young activists helping to rebuild 
Kobane, which lies just across the border. Kurdish leaders 
blamed the Turkish government for failing to take sufficient 
measures against ISIS. PKK militants have retaliated by kill-
ing two Turkish police officers, accusing them of collaborat-
ing with ISIS.64 Also in July 2015, Turkey launched airstrikes 
against both ISIS and Kurdish targets inside Syria.65
The displacement of Kurds to their historical homeland 
and the establishment of Kurdish parties’ control of these 
areas offer the possibility for the creation of a Kurdish 
homeland; this is an outcome obviously feared by the Turk-
ish government, which is concerned about the impact of 
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such an outcome on its own Kurdish population.66 But over 
the long haul there are likely to be differences among Iraqi 
Kurdistan —which wants to consolidate a broad, Kurdish- 
dominated area straddling the Iraqi- Syrian border —and the 
Syrian Kurdish opposition and Turkey.
Displacement inside Syria thus has direct implications 
for the future of Kurds in Syria and the region. Internal 
displacement inside Syria is also linked to the movement 
of refugees across all of Syria’s borders.67 This phenomenon 
also likely will have long- range consequences for the region. 
a i d  i n s i d e  s y r i a
Syria is the most difficult operating environment in the 
world today for delivery of humanitarian assistance. While 
funding for humanitarian aid inside Syria is in short 
supply —and, as discussed in chapter 1, is funded at a lower 
rate than refugee operations —the main difficulties stem 
from the hostile policy of the Syrian government, the mul-
titude of armed actors, and the conflict itself. The fact that 
the battle lines are constantly shifting and different groups 
exercise control of territories at different times means, for 
example, that roads that are open one day are closed the 
next. The limited availability of fuel, the lack of drivers and 
transportation companies willing to operate in certain areas 
of the country, and damaged infrastructure are further im-
pediments to delivery of relief items. As a former UN official 
working in Syria summarized, “To work on humanitarian 
issues inside Syria is to walk an ethical tightrope.”68
Even before the conflict, international agencies were 
viewed with suspicion by the Assad government and faced 
restrictions on their actions. For example, the few agen-
cies working with Iraqi refugees were forbidden to meet 
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with each other.69 As the Syrian conflict has escalated, the 
government has viewed international humanitarian actors 
with increased suspicion, seeing them as allied with West-
ern interests and as potential “trojan horses” that can col-
lect information to be used for military purposes. After all, 
military intervention in Libya was justified by the West as a 
measure to protect civilians. 
The regime has imposed numerous bureaucratic obstacles 
on humanitarian actors working in government-controlled 
areas and penalties for those working in cross-border opera-
tions.70 Permission to deliver aid to government-controlled 
areas requires days, sometimes weeks, of advance notice 
and sign-offs from multiple agencies. The government has 
been very restrictive about which international organiza-
tions it will permit to operate inside its borders. It main-
tains strict limits on numbers of visas and approves very few 
local Syrian partners for the international nongovernmen-
tal organizations, with the notable exception of the Syrian 
Arab Red Crescent Society, an auxiliary to the government 
that is the channel for the vast majority of aid deliveries.71 
Its approval is required for field offices, deployment of staff, 
and mobilization of convoys, and it is largely responsible for 
carrying out needs assessments in the country. Its network 
of some 11,000 volunteers throughout the country is un-
paralleled. But the Red Crescent Society walks a tightrope. 
Viewed as agents of the government by some, its staff have 
also been accused by the government of aiding the rebels, 
and over fifty of its staff and volunteers have been killed in 
action.72 While the Syrian government has begun to allow 
international agencies to work with other Syrian local part-
ners, many of these are newly formed and lack capacity.73 
International nongovernmental organizations that run 
cross-border aid programs are not permitted to work in 
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government-controlled areas, thus forcing them to choose 
which side to work on. Deliveries of medical supplies have 
come under particular scrutiny as they are seen as help-
ing the rebels. Even the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, which has some 300 staff working inside Syria 
(its largest operation in the world), has not been able to get 
access to detention centers, a core component of its humani-
tarian work. The Red Cross, like the UN and other interna-
tional nongovernmental organizations, has faced frustrating 
delays in delivering assistance to vulnerable groups. 
From time to time agency convoys have been allowed to 
deliver aid from government- controlled areas to areas that 
previously had been inaccessible because they are controlled 
by non- state armed groups. In May 2015 the UN reported 
that it had requested forty- four such convoys since Decem-
ber 2014, only four of which had been completed.74 Security- 
related impediments to access include active fighting and 
military operations, closure of key access routes, and a 
proliferation of formal and informal checkpoints. In addi-
tion, an increasing number of humanitarian workers and 
UN staff members have been killed, injured, or kidnapped 
and attacks on goods and facilities and UN vehicles have 
multiplied.75 As of June 2015, seventy- seven humanitarian 
workers had been killed since the beginning of the conflict, 
including ten in the first half of 2015.76 Diversion of aid by 
both opposition and government forces reportedly is a fre-
quent occurrence. OCHA reported in mid- 2015 that access 
to affected populations decreased in the first half of the year 
due to a combination of factors, including “insecurity and 
shifting conflict lines, deliberate interference, restrictions 
on access and onerous administrative procedures that con-
strain the effective delivery of assistance.”77
It is a testament to the commitment of staff and agencies 
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that aid, insufficient as it is, has been provided inside Syria. 
The World Food Program provides food aid to 4 million 
people inside Syria each month, and to another 1.5 million 
refugees in neighboring countries.78 But in September 2015 
the agency had to cut aid to one-third of refugee beneficia-
ries due to funding shortfalls.79 Other UN agencies, such as 
UNHCR and the UN Population Fund, have provided relief 
items to Syrians affected by the conflict, but it is hard to 
assess the impact of this assistance, particularly given the 
fact that more than 13 million Syrians are estimated to be 
in need of humanitarian aid and that almost 4.8 million live 
in what are perhaps euphemistically called “hard-to-reach” 
areas. 
Many of those interviewed for this study were critical of 
the United Nations’ role inside Syria, saying that UN agen-
cies were treading a fine line between being co-opted by the 
government and maintaining the independence embodied in 
humanitarian principles. The fear of being expelled from the 
country was perhaps the driving force in their conciliatory 
actions vis-à-vis the government. The intense politicization 
of aid, along with the inability to use traditional monitor-
ing mechanisms and tools in delivery of aid, put tremen-
dous pressure on all agencies. As Ben Parker, former head of 
OCHA’s operations in Syria wrote: “The international system 
became warped under this onslaught, leading to turf battles 
and sharp practice, fundraising contradictions, donor in-
terference, double-speak and poor risk management, all the 
while under intense pressure and micro- management from 
headquarters and capitals. Any divisions were exploited by 
government and security agencies.”80
As discussed further below, UN Security Council resolu-
tions have allowed some cross-border operations, but UN 
agencies and NGOs involved in cross-border operations were 
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not in contact with those agencies working inside Syria. At 
the end of 2014, humanitarian partners providing assistance 
inside Syria —whether operating from Damascus, Turkey, 
or Jordan —committed themselves to working together in 
a “Whole of Syria” approach.81 This initiative brought to-
gether more than 270 international and national actors 
under a comprehensive framework, common response plan, 
and supporting coordination structure. Interviews with UN 
staff in Turkey in June 2015 revealed some cautious opti-
mism that this new mechanism might overcome some of the 
obstacles that have limited the effectiveness of UN actions.
This suggests a common paradox in humanitarian assis-
tance: those most in need of aid tend to be found in the areas 
most difficult for international organizations to access. No-
where is this more evident than in Syria’s “hard- to- reach” 
areas and “besieged communities.” According to OCHA, 
the UN was able to reach less than 1 percent of the 422,000 
people living in besieged areas and only 5.2 percent of the 
4.8 million people in need in hard- to- reach areas.82
Besieged Areas
As of September 2015 an estimated 4.8 million Syrians lived 
in UN- designated hard- to- reach areas, most of which are 
in ISIS- held territories. Of 127 hard- to- reach areas, UN 
agencies and NGOs reached only 29 during July 2015.83 
Throughout the crisis, sieges have been used by the Syrian 
government and to a lesser extent by opposition armed 
groups. Although the government denies that it conducts 
sieges of civilian areas in Syria, its first short- term siege 
was imposed on Deraa city in 2011, with longer- term sieges 
then used in rural Damascus in 2012 with an intensifica-
tion of sieges in 2013. In August 2015 UN secretary- general 
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Ban  Ki- moon estimated that 422,000 people lived in areas 
besieged by armed groups, including 163,500 besieged by 
government forces in Eastern Ghouta; 4,000 by government 
forces in Daarayya; 266,500 by non- state armed groups in 
Zahra and Nabul; and 228,000 by ISIS in the government- 
controlled western neighborhoods of Deir- ez- Zor city.84 The 
Syrian- American Medical Society argued that the numbers 
were far higher and, if partially besieged communities are 
taken into account, the figure as of early 2015 was probably 
over 1 million people.85
As the Independent International Commission of In-
quiry on the Syrian Arab Republic observed, “Siege war-
fare is conducted in a ruthlessly coordinated and planned 
manner, aimed at forcing a population, collectively, to sur-
render or suffer starvation.” Government forces continue to 
besiege rebel- controlled districts in eastern and southern 
Damascus. “Civilian residents in these areas have died from 
starvation, from injuries sustained in aerial bombardments 
and, as a consequence, from a lack of medical care.” It is 
not only the government that has used sieges, but also other 
anti- government armed groups, particularly ISIS. “Wher-
ever sieges are employed, a black market economy has 
been created for goods that are smuggled in or are ushered 
through checkpoints through payment of bribes.” Sieges are 
also a business. “In most instances, armed actors remain 
able to function. It is the civilian population who suffers.”86
Areas under siege, such as Aleppo and Homs, have little 
or no access to aid. Indeed, both the government of Syria 
and opposition groups have cut off movement to and from 
certain areas for years.87 UN Security Council resolutions 
2139 and 2165 demanded that all parties to the conflict, and 
in particular the Syrian authorities, end all attacks against 
civilians, lift all sieges, and provide unfettered cross- line 
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and cross- border humanitarian aid. According to Amnesty 
International, “well over a year after the resolutions were 
passed, the parties to the conflict continue to violate them, 
and international law, with impunity.”88
Counting besieged areas is a tricky and difficult task, 
particularly in the absence of traditional human rights 
monitoring mechanisms. The Syrian- American Medical 
Society not only came up with a different estimate of the 
number of people living in besieged areas but questioned the 
methodology employed by OCHA to designate these areas, 
adding a classification of “partially- besieged,”’ which some-
what overlaps with OCHA’s classification of hard- to- reach 
areas. The author of that report noted that OCHA may un-
derestimate the scale of the problem because of a reluctance 
to antagonize the government and its desire to be able to 
continue operating in Syria. 
Amnesty International in August 2015 estimated that 
more than 400,000 civilians lived in areas under siege.89 It 
studied the situation for the 163,0000 people living under 
siege in Eastern Ghouta, an industrial and agricultural area 
thirteen kilometers northeast of Damascus, where chemi-
cal weapons were used in 2013. Parts of the area have been 
under siege by the Syrian government since late 2012. The 
report found that “the Syrian government is systematically 
subjecting civilians in Eastern Ghouta to an unlawful siege 
which restricts civilians, the wounded and sick from being 
able to leave the area and restricts the delivery of humani-
tarian and medical assistance and goods needed for sur-
vival, as well as striking medics, aid workers and facilities in 
indiscriminate attacks.” 
Non- state armed groups, according to Amnesty Interna-
tional, are also responsible for inflating the price of food, 
arbitrarily restricting the movement of civilians wishing to 
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leave, and abducting and arbitrarily detaining people. “Ac-
cording to the Syrian American Medical Society, 208 civil-
ians died from the lack of food or access to medical care 
in Eastern Ghouta from 21 October 2012 to 31 January 
2015,” the report said. This is an area where protests began 
in Douma in March 2011. By early 2013 much of Eastern 
Ghouta had fallen under the de facto control of an array of 
some sixteen armed groups opposed to the Syrian govern-
ment. In April 2013 the Syrian army mounted an offensive 
against the armed groups and tightened restrictions on ci-
vilians. Amnesty estimated that 9,000 fighters were in East-
ern Ghouta and said fighting had seen each side take the 
offensive at different times.90 
As a forthcoming Mercy Corps report makes clear, the 
impact of sieges varies, depending on whether they occur 
in a rural or urban area. Sieges of urban areas typically in-
volve a more thorough blockade and greater hardship than 
in rural areas because urban populations are unable to sup-
plement their food with agriculture. The research also finds 
that prices of basic foodstuffs and other necessities are often 
manipulated by different parties to the conflict. Internal 
armed groups control market prices to raise profits while 
armed groups sometimes deliberately manipulate internal 
markets to reduce local farmers’ profits by allowing in con-
voys of certain goods at strategic points in time.
In July 2015 medical assistance reached just 1.8 percent of 
the population considered by the UN to be besieged, and no 
food or other types of humanitarian relief could be provided. 
This figure was even lower than the previous month, when 
5 percent of those in officially recognized besieged areas 
were reached with medical aid, but no other assistance of 
any kind.91 It may be, however, that local organizations and 
international nongovernmental organizations operating co-
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vertly were able to assist some people in these areas and their 
contributions are simply not registered by the UN system.
Conditions for those living in besieged areas are unbeliev-
ably difficult, with extreme levels of unemployment leading 
to desperation and poverty; limited food, water, and fuel sup-
plies; and escalating food prices. 92 The Syrian American Med-
ical Society cited the cost of a kilo of sugar in Damascus city 
at $0.66, while in Eastern Ghouta during the 2013–14 siege 
it reached $19.00 (and dropped to $3.30 after March 2014).93 
How do civilians survive such conditions? Reports are 
that they use firewood for fuel, grow rooftop gardens, move 
field hospitals underground, scavenge, and resort to boiling 
weeds, extracting glue from shoes, and eating cats and dogs. 
Some civilians starve to death.
Cross-Border Operations
Cross- border operations to provide aid to displaced and 
other vulnerable Syrians living in areas outside the control 
of the Syrian government have been going on almost since 
the beginning of the conflict. These operations have pro-
vided life- saving assistance to hundreds of thousands, per-
haps millions, of vulnerable Syrians. And yet, because these 
operations are opposed by the Syrian government, aid orga-
nizations and other actors have largely operated under the 
radar in areas controlled by a wide range of armed groups, 
some of whom have seen the provision of relief assistance as 
a means of consolidating their positions. 
In July 2014 the UN Security Council authorized cross- 
border aid delivery without the consent of the Syrian govern-
ment at four border crossings in Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey.94 
The final text of the council’s resolution was itself a compro-
mise, as proponents of these operations had wanted permis-
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sion to use all available border crossings. In December 2014 
the UN announced that the Security Council had renewed 
until January 2016 the authorization for UN agencies and 
partners to deliver cross- border aid via two border crossings 
in Turkey (as well as one in Iraq and one in Jordan). The 
UN announced in January 2015 that forty aid shipments 
to Syria had been made via Turkey (and another fourteen 
from Jordan) since the Security Council first authorized the 
cross- border routes in July 2014.95 The UN reported that a 
total of 600,000 Syrians had been assisted over the previous 
six months with food, water, and medical supplies. However, 
in March 2015 a coalition of NGOs, including the Norwe-
gian Refugee Council and Oxfam, said the resolutions on 
cross- border aid had not been translated into action on the 
ground. In fact, the agencies said, the number of Syrians in 
need of assistance in hard- to- reach areas had almost dou-
bled to 4.8 million.96
In spite of UN efforts and reports on aid shipments, UN 
involvement in cross- border aid operations has been mini-
mal in comparison with aid operations by other interna-
tional actors, including donor governments, international 
NGOs, Syrian diaspora groups, Turkish and Gulf NGOs, 
and a number of other actors. The fact that such operations 
are taking place outside of traditional coordination mech-
anisms means that there has been a lack of transparency 
about the operations and especially about what happens to 
the aid when it is delivered inside Syria. Virtually all inter-
national actors involved with these cross- border aid deliver-
ies rely on Syrian partners to distribute the aid, including 
Syrian civil society organizations, local councils, and per-
haps armed groups. 
There have been persistent reports of aid being used to 
support military operations of opposition armed groups. 
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A December 2014 New Yorker article noted that ISIS was 
widely believed to have established a presence in Gaziantep, 
the main hub for cross- border aid operations in southern 
Turkey.97 Americans in Gaziantep were warned that ISIS 
operatives were tracking their activities. U.S. aid for local 
councils had been going to rebel- held areas of four northern 
Syrian provinces: Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Aleppo, and Idlib. But 
by summer 2014, ISIS had seized much of Raqqa and Deir-
ez-Zor. According to the New Yorker’s sources, this sparked 
a debate in Washington about whether the cross- border aid 
was enabling ISIS, but the aid continued to flow in. There is 
also a debate about the accountability of aid administered 
from Gaziantep. Despite the U.S. use of remote monitoring 
techniques such as GPS devices, along with photos, signed 
receipts, and reports from third parties, one Syrian opposi-
tion spokesman overseeing cross- border aid estimated that 
30–40 percent was lost to scams by warlords and others. 
By June 2015, shortly after its victory in Palmyra, ISIS had 
reportedly captured an area of Aleppo province that gave 
it access to the road to the Bab al- Salam border crossing, 
threatening a major aid supply route.98
According to OCHA, as of July 2015 seven UN agen-
cies and the International Organization for Migration had 
deployed 2,463 trucks worth of assistance in 104 consign-
ments, reaching around 386,000 people with food, almost 
50,000 with health supplies, 10,000 with water, and 12,700 
with non- food items. The U.S. government reported in 
September 2015 that it was reaching 5 million people per 
month in Syria.99 It is difficult to interpret such figures since 
a person “reached” with assistance may have received a one- 
time food parcel sufficient for a month or a five- liter con-
tainer of water or perhaps a bucket or tarp. The World Food 
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Program’s report that it provided food to 4 million Syrians 
every month is more reassuring. 
Currently the bulk of cross- border aid by UN agencies 
and their partners —forty of fifty- four shipments in 2014 —
originates in Turkey and reaches only the northern region of 
Syria, while aid moving in from Jordan tends to be distrib-
uted near the shared border in Syria’s south.100
Local and Diaspora Groups
Almost all cross- border aid is distributed through local 
Syrian organizations, which are tasked with the risk of 
traveling inside Syria, organizing the distributions, and 
reporting back to donors. Using local agencies is good 
practice —they know the language, culture, and communi-
ties. Some of these civil society groups existed in Syria before 
the war, some emerged in response to the crisis, and other 
groups were formed in diaspora communities that wanted 
desperately to help. “In Syria, the local groups that are now 
doing so much of the lifesaving aid are in many places the 
only ones with real access to desperate Syrians who cannot 
survive without help,” two researchers for Refugees Inter-
national reported in May 2015.101 But staff and volunteers in 
these organizations work in dangerous environments and 
their funding depends on subgrants where reporting pro-
cesses can be onerous. There are tensions between donors 
and these local groups, with complaints that the methods 
being used may be appropriate for non- conflict areas but are 
impractical in the active conflict zones inside Syria. Some 
changes have been made in these procedures —such as doc-
umentation of aid delivery through photographs rather than 
signed forms, but given donors’ concerns about diversion 
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of aid and the lack of capacity by the Syrian organizations, 
these tensions are likely to continue.102 Training of Syrian 
organizations has taken place on specific issues —such as 
how to track and record financial transactions, on interna-
tional humanitarian law, and on how to address the special 
needs of women and children in programming. But the Ref-
ugees International mission found that follow- up to these 
training activities had been inadequate, and the researchers 
called for more concerted work on capacity building.103
The money trail is complicated. A donor government —
say the United States or the United Kingdom —gives funds to 
UN agencies and to international nongovernmental organi-
zations (who also receive other funds from the UN), which in 
turn pass the money on to Syrian diaspora groups, which in 
turn give the aid to local groups inside Syria, which then give 
actual aid to people in need.104 Some diaspora groups have 
been able to meet U.S. government eligibility requirements 
for humanitarian response funding and can directly apply 
for grants from the U.S. government.105 There are also indica-
tions that coordination mechanisms have improved their re-
sponsiveness to concerns of local agencies by including them 
in coordination mechanisms and providing interpretation.106
s a f e  h av e n s ,  n o - f ly  Z o n e s ,  a n d  o T h e r 
f o r m s  o f  i n T e r v e n T i o n
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Turkey has been at 
the forefront of calling for the establishment of a safe zone 
inside Syria. Although the issue has not gained widespread 
traction (and even less so in light of the recent Russian in-
volvement in the conflict), it is a suggestion that continues 
to surface in different quarters —and perhaps for different 
reasons. Important questions arise about exactly what con-
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stitutes a safe zone, although there seems to be a consen-
sus that some degree of military force would be required to 
maintain it. Is a safe zone a weapons- free, neutral area ad-
ministered by humanitarian actors to protect civilians? Or 
is it an area where opposition forces can move freely and 
where military personnel are responsible not only for pro-
tecting civilians seeking safety there but also for distribut-
ing humanitarian relief? Will creation of the safe zone be 
negotiated by humanitarian actors or imposed by force? If 
the latter, what level of military force will be required to 
guarantee the safety of the civilians taking refuge there, and 
who will provide that military force? 
Some of the strongest calls for safe zones have come from 
actors with little or no operational humanitarian experi-
ence. In effect, these calls seem to represent a form of “in-
tervention lite” —less costly and risky than outright military 
intervention to stop the carnage but seemingly more robust 
than merely providing aid.107 
The historical record of safe zones as tools for protecting 
civilians is a decidedly mixed one, with the mass killings in 
Srebrenica, Bosnia, in 1995 standing out as the starkest ex-
ample of their failure. Taylor Seyboldt, in his classic analysis 
of different forms of humanitarian intervention, found that 
those with specific and limited objectives tend to be most 
successful.108 Phil Orchard looked at the failed interventions 
in Somalia (1991–95) and Bosnia (1991–95) and found that 
safe areas in the 1990s all suffered from three problems. 
First, safe areas were intended to meet an incompatible com-
bination of objectives, namely supporting civilian protec-
tion and humanitarian assistance while seeking to contain 
potential refugee flows in their home state. Second, the safe 
areas that failed were based on a flawed logic —either relying 
on, at best, grudging consent of the affected state or bellig-
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erent parties or on appeals to respect the legitimacy of the 
UN Security Council. Third, the creators of safe areas failed 
to take into account the response of belligerents, who often 
directly targeted civilians and had no stake in the interven-
tion to protect them.109 
One fairly successful use of a safe haven occurred in 1991 
in northern Iraq when some 500,000 Iraqi Kurds sought to 
escape the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime by flee-
ing into Turkey. The Turkish government refused to admit 
them and instead prevailed upon the international commu-
nity to create and police a safe zone inside northern Iraq, 
called Operation Provide Comfort. With a “no-fly zone” 
enforced by U.S., British, and French aircraft, this safe area 
functioned more or less well, and the displaced Iraqi Kurds 
were able to return to their communities within months. 
This experience has undoubtedly influenced Turkey’s calls 
for a safe zone in Syria. But the Iraqi government was forced 
to acquiesce to the creation of the Kurdish zone, while the 
Assad regime remains steadfastly opposed to incursions of 
its sovereignty —and therein lies the rub.
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, when the UN 
Security Council determines that there is a threat to inter-
national peace and security, it can take measures deemed 
necessary to restore peace and security. “Such measures 
may include the imposition of safe areas to secure an endan-
gered population, even without the consent of the parties 
to a conflict. Subsequent UN resolutions have upheld these 
rules and created UN- facilitated safe areas, such as UNSC 
Resolution 819, which established “safe areas” in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during the war in the 1990s. As a practical 
matter, the creation of a safe zone —absent consent of the 
parties —will usually require some element of force to deter 
attacks and protect those inside the zone.”110
Ferris-Kirişci_Consequences of Chaos_i-xx_1-202.indd   102 3/11/16   2:51 PM
T h e  C o n s e q u e n C e s  o f  C h a o s 103
A recent workshop jointly organized by the International 
Committee for the Red Cross and InterAction articulated a 
number of concerns about safe zones. For example, they may 
act as a pull factor for refugees, as seems to be occurring at 
the present time in South Sudan. A report on the workshop 
said: “The establishment of a safe area near an international 
boundary could result in a tightening of borders by neighbor-
ing states. Such border restrictions may lead to refoulement, 
and undermine security for civilians that are unable to reach 
a safe area or flee to a safe refuge outside their country. De-
claring a safe area could also create the illusion of security for 
civilians, and may result in their taking risks they would not 
otherwise take, including returning to their country of origin 
in adverse conditions.”111 Establishing such an area could blur 
the lines between military objectives and humanitarian goals 
and compromise the rights of people seeking asylum, the Red 
Cross/InterAction report said. A safe area or buffer zone es-
tablished without the consent of the state could “be perceived 
as a target, posing new risks for civilians seeking safety and 
could also become a magnet for armed opposition groups.”112
No- fly zones also were discussed in the context of 
NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 —an intervention 
cited since by both proponents and opponents of no- fly 
zones. The Red Cross/InterAction report noted: “A no- fly 
zone imposed by one or more states on another state (with-
out consent) may violate state sovereignty, and initiate an 
international armed conflict.” Establishing such a zone, the 
report added, could “entail significant offensive operations 
against the forces posing a threat to civilians, at least tem-
porarily, leading to serious consequences for the civilian 
population concerned.” Establishing a buffer zone would 
require ground forces to secure arms caches and clear out 
belligerents with weapons. Air operations alone may not be 
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adequate to prevent or mitigate violence on the ground and 
instead could speed up violence on the ground. Finally, the 
report said, “military interventions that have the declared 
objective of protecting civilians run the risk of morphing 
into operations to defeat an enemy rather than intervening 
impartially on behalf of a civilian population at risk.” 113 
While there are powerful arguments that safe zones may 
not provide protection to Syrian civilians (and could, in fact, 
put them in increased danger), the almost total lack of other 
options for protecting Syrians (and stemming the refugee 
flow) has led thoughtful observers to argue that such safe 
areas could be a “less bad” option than the current dismal 
situation. The result has been a robust public debate about 
whether, how, where, and in what form a safe zone could be 
established.114
It is quite striking that humanitarians —who were at the 
forefront of calling for intervention in Rwanda and Soma-
lia two decades ago —have been almost silent on the issue of 
safe zones for Syria. As one senior official of a humanitar-
ian organization remarked: “We’ve been there. We’ve seen 
it doesn’t work.” Diane Paul is one of the few experienced 
humanitarian workers who has called for the establishment 
of a safe zone, albeit with a set of conditions that likely would 
be impossible to implement.115 The idea is also advocated by 
a former ISIS hostage.116 Writing from a different perspec-
tive, Michael O’Hanlon argues that such a zone could not 
only protect civilians but also support the moderate opposi-
tion, which is perhaps the best hope of bringing an end to the 
bloodbath —itself a humanitarian objective.117 Phil Gordon, 
James Dobbins, and Jeff Martini argue that establishing 
three safe zones, as part of a negotiated cease-fire, could set 
the stage for a longer- term transitional arrangement.118
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On the political front, Turkey has been one of the stron-
gest and earliest champions of a safe zone in Syria, perhaps 
seeing it as a way of decreasing the number of refugees ar-
riving on its borders —or perhaps recalling the largely posi-
tive experience of the 1991 safe zone established to protect 
Iraqi Kurds fleeing chemical and other attacks. So far, there 
has been strong opposition from both Russia and China, as 
well as Syria. This opposition stems in part from NATO’s 
operations in Libya in 2011, which were justified in terms of 
protecting civilians but which morphed into regime change. 
Syria rejects the notion of safe zones as violation of Syrian 
sovereignty or as a conspiratorial attempt to occupy and 
partition the country. Russia and China, which tradition-
ally oppose UN and other interventions within national 
borders, maintain that safe areas would be a threat to Syria’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. France and the United 
Kingdom have been hesitant to endorse safe areas in Syria, 
reportedly because of their concern with the complexity and 
long- term political implications of such actions.
Thus far, the U.S. government has opposed setting up 
safe areas in Syria, although it has indicated a willingness 
to at least consider the issue as part of the negotiations 
with Turkey to enable the United States to use the NATO 
air base in Incirlik for its air campaign against ISIS. Ini-
tially, the Turkish government was reluctant to cooperate 
unless Washington agreed to carve out a buffer zone in 
northern Syria.119 Members of the U.S. Congress have been 
much more vocal than the White House in calling for safe 
areas, in particular Senator John McCain, who stated in 
2012 that safe areas could be platforms for increased hu-
manitarian aid and also staging areas for armed moderate 
opposition groups.120 Since then former secretary of state 
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Hillary Rodham  Clinton and some Republican presidential 
candidates have also advocated some type of no- fly zone in 
Syria.121
Russian military intervention in support of the Syrian 
regime seems to have put a damper on discussions of safe 
zones in Syria, at least for the time being.122 Russian air-
strikes, beginning in September 2015, disrupted aid opera-
tions, destroyed medical facilities, and caused hundreds of 
civilian deaths.123 In November 2015 Russian jets struck 
areas near IDP camps inside Syria near the Turkish border, 
killing at least fifty people, followed shortly afterwards 
by the Turkish downing of a Russian jet.124 The crisis that 
erupted in Russian- Turkish relations after this attack made 
the idea of a “no- fly zone,” let alone a safe zone, pretty much 
moot. Russia has not only imposed economic sanctions on 
Turkey but has also moved ballistic missiles into Syria to 
deter any Turkish planes from entering Syrian airspace.125 
Furthermore, Russian president Vladimir Putin, in his ad-
dress to the nation in December 2015, made it quite clear 
that Turkish jets or military entering Syria would be prime 
targets.126 This in effect created a de facto no- fly zone, albeit 
with an entirely different motivation than discussed in 
Western circles.127
Although the current political situation precludes se-
rious discussions of safe areas or a no- fly zone, it is likely 
that the political context will change again in the coming 
months, and considerations of such alternatives could once 
again be on the table.
While proposals for a safe area or a no- fly zone are prob-
lematic on many levels, the fact remains that there are no 
easy solutions for protecting Syria’s civilians from the rav-
ages of an increasingly convoluted and brutal war. Displace-
ment is, above all, a protection strategy for individuals and 
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families. Fleeing their communities in search of safety is 
sometimes the only way to survive. As long as the war con-
tinues, Syrians will continue to be displaced. And as long 
as the international community is unable to come up with 
a means of resolving this terrible conflict, outsiders will be 
forced to search for ways to mitigate the harm to those suf-
fering the effects of war. 
We turn now to exploring some of the challenges that 
Syria’s displacement poses to the international system.
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C h a P T e r  4
Syrian Displacement and 
the International Order
syria’s war was not caused by the international community but rather was the product of deep-seated political and 
economic factors endemic to the region and specific actions 
taken by the Bashar al-Assad regime and various insurgent 
groups. While the war has been abetted by international 
actors who have supplied arms and fighters to all sides of the 
conflict, it is important to underscore that the roots of the 
conflict are mostly internal. Similarly, the displacement of 
one-half of Syria’s population was not caused by the inter-
national community. 
But as the war and the resulting displacement pose a 
threat to international peace and security —the very kind 
of threat that systems of global governance are intended to 
address —we look now at what Syrian displacement tells us 
about the present international order. This chapter begins 
with a synthesis of central themes emerging from this study, 
followed by recommendations for moving forward. In par-
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ticular we argue that the time is right to develop what we 
call a New Global Approach for Syria. 
i m P l i C a T i o n s  o f  s y r i a n  d i s P l a C e m e n T 
f o r  i n T e r n a T i o n a l  o r d e r
The Syrian conflict and resulting displacement are clear signs 
that the present international system for preventing and re-
solving conflicts has been deeply challenged. The United 
Nations was created to “save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war,” and the Security Council in particular 
was given the responsibility of ensuring global peace and 
security.1 The “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, launched 
with such optimism a decade ago, has utterly failed in the 
case of Syria. Of course, there have been other cases where 
the UN has successfully intervened to prevent and resolve 
conflicts, such as in Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, and Mali, and in 
cases such as South Sudan where UN peacekeeping opera-
tions have demonstrated flexibility in protecting civilians in 
new ways. 
But robust action to halt the violence in Syria has not 
occurred, due to the lack of consensus among major powers 
about the way forward. The UN Security Council has issued 
resolutions calling for an end to the conflict, for the protec-
tion of civilians, and for an end to sieges of entire communi-
ties, but these resolutions have had little or no impact on the 
conflict on the ground. The adoption of a roadmap for peace 
in Syria in December 2015, calling for UN-led negotiations 
on a political transition and for an immediate cease-fire, of-
fered a glimmer of hope for the way forward.2 The political 
obstacles to the implementation of this long-delayed pro-
posal are manifold. 
It may be that the Syrian conflict has become too com-
Ferris-Kirişci_Consequences of Chaos_i-xx_1-202.indd   110 3/11/16   2:51 PM
T h e  C o n s e q u e n C e s  o f  C h a o s 111
plex, the political interests too diverse, and the proliferation 
of actors too great for the UN to be able to take effective 
action to prevent chaos. These factors suggest that the in-
ternational community should tackle the much-discussed 
need for Security Council reform. We do not have the exper-
tise to propose such changes, and there are many proposals 
by much more knowledgeable groups about what is needed.3 
But we can say on the basis of this study that the present in-
ternational system for preventing the war and resolving the 
underlying conflict that has displaced so many has —for five 
years —failed in Syria.
In spite of growing attention to the role of regional orga-
nizations, Syrian displacement is also a clear indictment of 
the failure of regional bodies to prevent and resolve crises. 
While both the Arab League and the Organization of Is-
lamic Cooperation suspended Syria’s membership in 2011 
and 2012, respectively, neither has played a significant role 
in addressing the conflict. The Arab League, which played 
an important role in supporting the use of military force 
in Libya (from which it later backtracked), has been almost 
completely absent on the Syria conflict. The Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation has failed to bring about a unified posi-
tion on the Syrian crisis among its members. The principal 
actions of both the Arab League and the Islamic organiza-
tion have been to call on the UN Security Council to take 
action.4 In failing to rise above specific political interests, 
regional actors in the Middle East have not provided an al-
ternative conflict resolution strategy for Syria. Thus far, they 
also have failed to offer a coherent regional approach to the 
refugee situation, even though some of their members are 
the most directly impacted by the crisis. 
The European Union has been active on Syria, but its 
actions also have failed to bring about either an end to the 
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conflict or even a coordinated approach to the refugee crisis. 
EU engagement in support of UN-led efforts to bring about 
a political solution has been more robust than those of either 
the Arab League or the Organization of Islamic Coopera-
tion, but in the end, the EU has adopted the same approach: 
calling on the UN to resolve the conflict. This seems to in-
dicate that the role of regional organizations is limited in 
conflict resolution; the tools available to them are simply 
inadequate to bring an end to Syria’s civil war. 
However, the lack of European solidarity in respond-
ing to the initial Mediterranean migration crisis in 2013–14 
and to the much larger mass influx by sea and land in 2015 
raises fundamental questions about the future of European 
integration. Rather than rising to the challenge of creating 
a stronger union through a common approach to the crisis, 
the policies adopted can best be described as a “beggar thy 
neighbor” approach. The impact on European unity of the 
refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere —
coupled with the aftermath of the November 2015 terror-
ist attacks in Paris —could be profound, threatening the 
tremendous progress made to enable free movement across 
European borders, including the Schengen agreement.5 The 
imposition of border controls within Europe, on more than 
a temporary basis, could have long-term consequences in 
ways that call into question the very principles of European 
unity.6 
The solution to the crisis of Syrian refugees and inter-
nally displaced people (IDPs) is political. It has long been 
a mantra in the humanitarian community that “there are 
no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian crises.” The so-
lutions have to be political, in which different groups in a 
society somehow find a way to settle their differences. This 
is particularly apparent in Syria. Former secretary of state 
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Madeleine Albright rightly noted that the crisis in Syria 
“is not only a humanitarian emergency, but also a political 
emergency. It is a series of political failures that have led to 
the grave situation that we find today.”7 No matter how much 
money is mobilized for humanitarian aid, or how many hu-
manitarian workers are deployed, or how many refugees are 
resettled, Syria’s humanitarian crisis will persist until the 
conflict is resolved and possibly beyond it, too. 
Displacement —whether cross-border or internally —
always has political consequences. But the refugee/security 
nexus has catapulted to global attention in the case of Syrian 
refugees, particularly after the Paris attacks. Even before 
then there was a perception in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon 
that crime was increasing because of the presence of Syrian 
refugees, although there was little, if any, hard evidence for 
that conclusion. Since the November 2015 Paris attacks, the 
association of Syrian refugees with terrorism has taken on 
a particularly ugly tone, especially in the United States. A 
paradigm shift in understanding the relationship between 
refugees and security is urgently needed, based on solid em-
pirical evidence and an acknowledgement of the security 
risks that may result from protracted displacement. As dis-
placement drags on, and if solutions do not emerge, it is pos-
sible, in the words of one expert, that refugees “will become 
involved in political violence and be susceptible to militant 
recruitment .  .  . protracted situations result in reduced ex-
pectations for the future, increasing feelings of hopeless-
ness, and desperation among refugees/displaced persons.”8 
Hence, mobilizing the political will to ensure decent protec-
tion for the refugees and respond to their needs, including 
offering them the possibility to rebuild their lives and take 
control of their futures, will be critical.
Thus far, resettlement of Syrian refugees has played a 
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very minor role in the response to the massive Syrian dis-
placement crisis. Resettlement, unlike asylum, is based on 
a process of identifying, selecting, vetting, and supporting 
refugees from countries of first refuge to third countries 
outside the region. As a system developed in the aftermath 
of World War II and particularly during the Cold War era, 
resettlement has become a tool for protecting refugees who 
face risks where they are and for finding solutions for par-
ticularly vulnerable refugees. It is also a bureaucratic, slow, 
and expensive process, costing an average of some $15,000 
per resettled refugee. 9 And yet, resettlement is a strong 
example of a truly durable solution. Resettled refugees do 
very well, and they contribute to their host countries. This is 
particularly the case in the United States, which has a long 
tradition of refugee resettlement and which played a lead-
ership role in developing the global resettlement system.10 
In the present political context, it will require considerable 
political leadership and effort both in the EU and the United 
States to advocate for and implement a policy of resettling 
Syrian refugees. Yet, without a robust resettlement program, 
it will be difficult to strengthen the principle of burden shar-
ing, which is in urgent need of reaffirmation, along with the 
very values that the transatlantic community is supposed to 
represent. 
Responding to displacement inside Syria is a far more 
complex and politically treacherous endeavor than respond-
ing to more than 4.5 million refugees in many different 
countries. The international community has provided mas-
sive support for assistance inside Syria, and many dedicated 
local and international staff have risked their lives to deliver 
relief. In spite of these efforts, assistance to displaced people 
still inside Syria —as well as to those who are trapped in 
their communities —is insufficient. It took years for the UN 
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Security Council to adopt decisions enabling international 
agencies to be able to provide some assistance across borders 
and in areas not controlled by the Syrian government. The 
relatively “soft law” on aiding IDPs has been as ineffective as 
the more formal “hard law” on the protection of civilians in 
combat zones. The disregard of these laws by state actors has 
been exacerbated by the practices of non-state actors that 
often have deliberately used civilians as shields or targets. In 
other situations of internal displacement, working to build 
capacity and political will of the government is the obvious 
approach, but this does not seem to be possible in Syria 
As discussed in chapter 3, the notions of “safe areas,” 
“no-fly zones,” and “humanitarian corridors” are frequently 
brought up as means to protect both IDPs and civilians gen-
erally inside Syria. These proposals need to be approached 
very carefully. “Safe havens” have also been advocated as 
areas that could eventually evolve into mini-states consti-
tuting the basis of a confederal Syria.11 They could also play 
a role if a completely different constellation of states emerges 
in the aftermath of the conflict —consisting of ethnically 
and religious homogenous stand-alone stages, including one 
“Sunnistan.”12 But as of now, there is a striking lack of po-
litical consensus on whether and how such safe zones might 
function. 
T h e  i n T e r r e l a T i o n s h i P  b e T W e e n  s o l u T i o n s 
T o  T h e  C o n f l i C T  a n d  d i s P l a C e m e n T 
Any solution to the Syrian conflict must take displacement 
into account. If Assad remains in power, the possibilities of 
large-scale refugee returns are limited. It is hard to over-
estimate the bitterness and alienation felt by many refugees 
at the suffering caused by the Assad regime. Studies show 
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that peace processes that fail to take into account the desires 
of the displaced populations are not sustainable.13 The Se-
curity Council in its resolutions has a tendency to mention 
displacement only in terms of returns of refugees.14 This is 
both simplistic and inadequate. In the case of Syrian refu-
gees, it is unlikely that most will return home in the foresee-
able future, but if and when they do return, they will need 
robust support to reintegrate into their home communi-
ties. Alternative solutions —such as local integration and 
resettlement —should be considered in any peace agreement. 
Offering opportunities to refugees to develop their own 
livelihoods would not just benefit the economies of host 
communities but also improve the capacity of refugees to 
return home when the possibility emerges. The World Bank, 
in a 2015 report on Syrian refugees in Turkey, advocated 
taking a more developmental approach to supplement the 
humanitarian response and argued that “experience shows 
that when refugees are supported in becoming socially and 
economically self-reliant, and given freedom of movement 
and protection, they are more likely to contribute to their 
host country. They are also more likely to be able to under-
take a successful return process.”15 Supporting the “inte-
gration” of refugees into their host communities especially 
through access to livelihood opportunities does not neces-
sarily mean fewer returns.16 
Any solution to the Syrian conflict needs to provide suf-
ficient funds for the physical reconstruction of the country. 
This will be a daunting task. As a former Syrian official noted, 
“if or when the war ends, any government will find itself 
ruling over a pile of rubble.” The cost of rebuilding some 2.1 
million homes, one-half the country’s hospitals, and more 
than 7,000 schools destroyed in Syria is put at more than 
$300 billion by this official, who also said: “I don’t know who 
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will fund this.”17 As much as it may seem unrealistic at this 
point, the international community needs to start thinking 
about a Middle East Recovery Plan, somewhat reminiscent 
of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II. If 
the Vienna process and the UN roadmap for peace in Syria 
do indeed take hold and progress is made toward a politi-
cal solution in Syria, this idea of a “recovery plan” that also 
addresses the return of refugees and IDPs is essential. Such 
an initiative could grow out of a comprehensive regional ap-
proach to the Syrian refugee crisis as discussed later here.
Any solution to the Syrian conflict also must provide 
an accounting for the crimes committed. Transitional jus-
tice mechanisms are painfully slow and rarely address dis-
placement.18 This must change in any post-conflict plan for 
Syria. Whether criminal prosecutions through the Inter-
national Criminal Court, or truth commissions, or justice-
sensitive security sector reform —use of these transitional 
justice mechanisms could play a central role in determin-
ing whether the displaced can return and whether a post-
conflict Syria will be stable and secure.19 There is a very real 
danger that a quick fix (though even quick fixes seem dis-
tant at the time of this writing) will contain the seeds of the 
next conflict. If there are large-scale retributions, if the rule 
of law cannot be ensured, if those responsible for dropping 
barrel bombs remain in power, then further conflict and 
displacement are likely. 
To cite again the Independent International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic:
Government forces have committed gross violations 
of human rights and the war crimes of murder, tor-
ture, rape, sexual violence and targeting civilians. 
Government forces disregarded the special protec-
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tion accorded to hospitals and medical personnel. . . . 
Anti-Government armed groups have committed the 
war crimes of murder, execution without due process, 
torture, hostage-taking and attacking protected ob-
jects. . . . The litany of abuses listed here captures only 
part of the trauma experienced by Syrian civilians, as 
the world stands witness.20
Syrian displacement is inextricably linked with these 
larger questions of accountability and governance processes. 
But displacement also raises specific challenges to how the 
world responds to major humanitarian emergencies. In this 
regard, we offer reflections from two very different perspec-
tives: bottom up and top down. The top-down approach is 
more comfortable for those working on either the national 
or international level as well as for academics; somehow it is 
easier to figure out the elements of a grand plan for refugees 
(and we present some of these ideas below) than to enter the 
messy world of trying to understand how refugees and IDPs 
support themselves without international assistance. None-
theless, we suggest that understanding the bottom-up ap-
proach may in fact turn out to be the best hope for refugees 
and IDPs.
r e C o G n i Z i n G  r e f u G e e s  a s  a C T o r s
While refugees and IDPs are usually depicted in Western 
media only as the victims of conflict, they are survivors. 
Displacement is, first and foremost, a protection strategy. 
While national authorities and international agencies have a 
responsibility to protect and assist them, the fact is that most 
are surviving not because of international aid but by their 
own means. And it is likely that most will find their own solu-
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tions without international support; certainly that has been 
the case in the resolution of most displacement situations. 
As with the case of Syrian refugees today, local integration 
was rejected by all the governments hosting Iraqi refugees in 
the mid-2000s. And yet, Dawn Chatty and Nisrine Mansour 
found that while integration wasn’t possible, local “accom-
modation” is taking place where Iraqis are blending in with 
their host communities (including through intermarriage 
with locals), and few are deported.21 Similarly, Katy Long 
found that mobility is an effective protection strategy for 
refugees; in fact, large numbers of Central American refu-
gees in the 1990s found their solutions through migration 
rather than through formal international schemes.22
These findings suggest two implications for international 
actors. First, they should be more humble in considering the 
effects of their actions. Second, more concerted and sus-
tained international efforts are needed to help refugees and 
IDPs to survive and to find their own solutions. Refugees 
in neighboring countries are running out of resources, and 
their coping strategies are under tremendous strain. For 
many, savings have been depleted and cuts in international 
assistance mean that minimum basic needs are not being 
met. The fact that so many Syrians have made the painful 
decision to move further away from Syria and to make risky 
journeys to Europe is a sign that their resilience is wearing 
thin. International humanitarian agencies are simply unable 
to meet the assistance needs of the refugees, and they often 
cannot protect refugees and displaced persons even in areas 
where they are working. 23 
In the case of refugees living in neighboring host coun-
tries, the single biggest change that would allow them to 
prosper would be having the right to legal employment and 
access to livelihoods. The governments of the region have 
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legitimate reasons for not wanting refugees to work, includ-
ing concerns about domestic unemployment and potential 
political backlash. But if the refugees are to remain in these 
countries for at least some period of time, their ability to 
work would both reduce their burden on the finances of host 
countries and their dependence on international assistance. 
Having jobs would allow them the dignity that comes with 
self-sufficiency, as well as enable them to contribute to the 
economy of host communities. The question then becomes: 
How can the international community support the host 
governments in such a way that they see a benefit in allow-
ing refugees access to employment? 
This is a tough issue that flies in the face of the current 
“incentive structure” in which host governments receive 
international funds for care and maintenance of refugees. 
There is a need for a new incentive structure for incorporat-
ing refugees into local labor markets and enabling them to 
access a livelihood. It is encouraging that this idea was in-
corporated into the G-20 leaders’ November 2015 commu-
niqué in the form of a call for “efforts to ensure that refugees 
can access .  .  . livelihood opportunities.”24 If the incentive 
structure were changed so that host governments realized 
a direct benefit from allowing refugees to work (with ap-
propriate safeguards for those unable to work), this would 
have an enormous effect on refugees’ ability both to survive 
in the current climate and to move toward solutions. Such 
a change would not have to happen either immediately or 
across the board. For example, there may be ways of grad-
ually opening up the labor market to refugees by starting 
with specific sectors, such as allowing Syrian school teach-
ers to be paid for teaching Syrian refugee children. 
The issue of livelihoods is also tied closely to education. 
Too many Syrian refugee children are out of school because 
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they need to work to support their families. It is widely rec-
ognized that they are not in school and are at risk of be-
coming a “lost generation” with consequent implications for 
security. Livelihoods and education need to be approached 
in a holistic fashion and, beyond security considerations, 
their impact on economic growth needs to be well under-
stood. While ensuring access to education to all refugee 
children will require additional funds, other steps need to 
be taken, including supporting efforts by universities in host 
countries to admit Syrian refugees and finding ways to cer-
tify refugee students’ academic records when documents are 
missing. Discussions of refugee education usually focus on 
primary schools, but opportunities for providing university 
and vocational training for older students could well be key 
to Syria’s near-term future. 
Providing education and livelihood opportunities to ref-
ugees has significant financial, social, and political conse-
quences for the governments hosting Syrian refugees. These 
consequences need to be taken seriously by the international 
community. 
It is important to underscore that the burden of protect-
ing and assisting refugees has largely fallen on the shoulders 
of major host countries —primarily Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Turkey. As this study has detailed, the governments of these 
three countries have been on the front line of responding 
to refugees. While this study has been critical of some as-
pects of their response, they have done amazing work with 
inadequate international support. The international refugee 
system, created in the aftermath of World War II, was built 
on the premise that responsibility for refugees is an interna-
tional responsibility, not just the responsibility of the gov-
ernments of the countries to which refugees happened to 
arrive.25 The implicit “deal” was that if a government kept 
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its borders open and allowed refugees to arrive, the interna-
tional community would play its part. In the case of Syria, 
international donors have provided an unprecedented influx 
of funds —far more per capita than for refugees displaced by 
other conflicts that are not in the media spotlight. Still, the 
support has not been enough: not enough to provide lives of 
dignity for the refugees, and not enough to reassure the host 
governments. In other situations (notably Southeast Asia), 
the resettlement of refugees relieved sufficient pressure on 
host governments to allow them to continue offering asylum 
to refugees in their countries. But resettlement opportuni-
ties for Syrians have been limited. International agencies 
and humanitarian actors have had to do their best with very 
limited and constantly diminishing funds. 
Appeals by host governments and the UN system for 
more assistance received scant attention —until large num-
bers of Syrians began to arrive in Europe. Public empathy 
and solidarity with Syrian refugees and the accompanying 
positive climate in support of resettlement and assistance, 
however, was cut short by the Paris attacks. The resettlement 
issue very quickly became securitized, and in a disappoint-
ing but unsurprising manner many politicians in the United 
States as well as in Europe adopted xenophobic rhetoric 
toward Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, the governments of 
Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States, among 
others, continued to adhere to their commitment to receive 
refugees in spite of the unfavorable domestic context. But 
even if the number of resettlement places was to increase 
significantly, there are limits to resettlement, particularly if 
funding for increased resettlement of Syrian refugees comes 
at the expense of financial support for refugees in the region. 
In addition, the majority of the refugees likely will want to 
return to their homes once a settlement can be reached in 
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Syria and rebuild their country, even though prospects for 
return will decrease with time. Large-scale resettlement 
could undermine these efforts and could deprive post- 
conflict Syria of the human capital that will be needed for 
the mammoth task of reconstruction. Instead, the strategic 
use of resettlement is needed, in which a robust and viable 
resettlement program gives priority to vulnerable cases and 
supports solutions for refugees.
In the meantime, borders are closing to Syrian refugees. 
Host countries are experiencing fatigue resulting in part 
from inadequate burden sharing. Host country officials 
do not miss a chance to criticize the double standards of 
others, especially EU countries, in calling on them to keep 
maintain their borders open to Syrian refugees while clos-
ing their own borders.26 An unfortunate situation has de-
veloped in terms of Turkey’s open door policy since a deal 
was reached between the EU and Turkey to stem the flow of 
Syrian and other refugees and migrants. Turkey has indeed 
stepped up its efforts to halt human smuggling of Syrian 
refugees across the Aegean Sea and has stopped an increas-
ing number of boats while constructing a wall on part of the 
Syrian border.27 Yet, at the same time, human rights orga-
nizations have reported that Syrian refugees are being de-
tained and even forcefully returned to Syria.28 Both the EU 
and Turkey have the obligation to make sure that Syrians 
fleeing war and destruction continue to enjoy protection 
and that European interests in halting migratory pressures 
and Turkish desires for closer EU relations do not under-
mine refugee protection.
There are many challenges in responding to Syrian dis-
placement: strengthening resilience and supporting refugees 
and IDPs to find their own solutions; ensuring protection 
and security for both refugees and for host communities 
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alike; addressing the concerns of host governments and help-
ing them provide livelihood and education opportunities 
for refugees; mobilizing not only more international assis-
tance but more long-term development aid, even as the war 
continues; ensuring that efforts to respond to humanitarian 
needs contribute to a solution to the war and do not make 
things worse; and recognizing the importance of addressing 
displacement in whatever political solution is eventually ne-
gotiated to end the conflict. None of these challenges can be 
satisfactorily addressed on its own. Rather, what is needed is 
a new international approach to Syrian refugees and IDPs: 
a new agreement that in essence represents a new kind of 
international “bargain” for refugee response. We call this a 
“New Global Approach for Syria.”
This New Global Approach for Syria would provide a 
holistic and comprehensive approach to finding solutions 
for the 4-plus million Syrian refugees and to developing 
sound alternatives to responding to the more difficult issue 
of supporting solutions for Syria’s 6.5 million IDPs. The New 
Global Approach for Syria could serve as a model for other 
large-scale displacement situations. 
r e C a s T i n G  T h e  d e a l :  a  n e W  G l o b a l  a P P r o a C h  f o r  s y r i a 
Syria is the most complex and massive humanitarian emer-
gency facing the world today. The human suffering is enor-
mous and visible. The threats to global peace and security 
are obvious. World leaders must summon the political will 
to come up with solutions in a context where solutions are 
not obvious. The challenge is a global one, facing countries 
in different parts of the world and multilateral institutions. 
If ever the world community could come together in new 
ways to tackle a major humanitarian crisis, Syria would be 
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the case. And if a new “grand experiment” on Syrian dis-
placement were to succeed, it might offer new possibilities 
for joint action in other humanitarian crises.
Negotiating a New Global Approach for Syria for Syrian 
refugees would be a complex undertaking in which: 
 ■ Middle East regional organizations would be chal-
lenged to be more assertive and more successful than they 
have been in the past. They would have to take risks in 
working together and put aside major political differences 
to focus on humanitarian needs and the common regional 
good. In light of recent intraregional conflicts, this is a tall 
order. But it also is an opportunity for Middle Eastern orga-
nizations to develop a stronger impetus and adopt a more 
effective role. By demonstrating their ability to work to-
gether for a common humanitarian cause, this may serve 
as a confidence-building measure, leading to cooperation in 
other areas.
 ■ International humanitarian and development actors 
finally would have to emerge from their silos and work 
together in a more coherent way. This, too, is a tall order, 
and yet there are signs from both operational humanitar-
ian agencies and from development actors of a new willing-
ness to work together. Humanitarian agencies can’t handle 
the burdens alone, particularly as displacement drags on for 
years. If they were to step back from being in the driver’s seat 
in protracted situations —and if development actors stepped 
up to the longer-term challenge —they could concentrate 
on improving their emergency response. Multilateral de-
velopment banks, which traditionally have kept humani-
tarian issues at arm’s length, and which are threatened by 
new competitors, need a new mission. They have expertise 
in working with failed and fragile states. What better case 
to address than the needs of one-half of Syria’s population? 
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If they can build on their expertise and contribute funds, 
skills, and human resources to finding solutions for Syria’s 
displaced population, they can have the opportunity to 
demonstrate their continued relevance by helping resolve 
the most pressing crisis facing the world today.
 ■ Host governments would have to take the political and 
economic risks of opening up their labor markets to refu-
gees and making difficult decisions to give refugees a more 
secure legal status than they presently have. The trade-off for 
taking these risks would be increased security at home and 
more stable financial assistance not only in support of their 
refugee programs but also for their own development goals.
 ■ Donor governments —and not just the traditional 
roster of mostly Western governments —would have to re-
commit to the principle that the protection of refugees is 
indeed an international responsibility and then take con-
crete actions to demonstrate their solidarity with host 
countries on the front line. Western governments would 
have to be more open to leadership and ideas coming from 
emerging donor countries such as China and Turkey; this 
is a necessary trade-off for those countries’ commitment to 
participate in international burden sharing.
 ■ Governments outside of the region would need to con-
sider new commitments for resettlement, and new thinking 
will be needed on reshaping resettlement to meet the needs 
of future refugee emergencies.
 ■ International nongovernmental organizations, which 
have played positive and constructive roles by supporting 
both refugees and IDPs, would be challenged to consider 
new ways of working with local nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and diaspora groups that offer unique re-
sources for aiding Syria’s displaced but often are not at the 
table in coordination mechanisms. The Syrian crisis offers 
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an opportunity to find more creative ways of overcoming 
the divide between international and national actors. Such 
a synergy would be especially useful for a comprehensive 
needs assessment exercise that would be critical to the New 
Global Approach for Syria.
None of these actors is likely to be able to take the po-
litical risks associated with these actions alone. But if all of 
them were to indicate a willingness to make painful choices, 
there is a chance that a new bargain can be struck. And 
while all of these actions are politically painful, they all 
have the potential of providing long-term payoffs. Most of 
all they offer the possibility of addressing the serious threat 
to international peace and security that the Syrian refugee 
situation now poses. And if this “grand experiment” works 
for Syria, it can serve as a precedent for common action on 
other burning humanitarian issues. The UN has organized 
a full agenda of high-level meetings in 2016 where momen-
tum could be built around this area, including the World 
Humanitarian Summit and the High-Level Plenary orga-
nized by the UN secretary general on Large Movements of 
Refugees and Migrants in September 2016. Both of these 
global meetings, as well as other Syria-specific initiatives, 
will search for new ways of responding to Syrian refugees 
and other population movements. 
Not Starting from Scratch
There are precedents for regional efforts to resolve pro-
tracted refugee/IDP situations. In particular, two success-
ful examples stand out: the Comprehensive Plan of Action 
for Indochinese Refugees between 1988 and 1996, and the 
International Conference on Central American Refugees 
between 1987 and 1994.29 The Indochina plan was adopted 
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in 1989 as hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees 
were seeking to escape by land and sea; neighboring coun-
tries, overwhelmed by the influx, were closing borders and 
deporting refugees. The plan, in essence, represented a new 
“bargain” in which large numbers of people were resettled 
in third countries, some refugees remained in their host 
countries, and some were returned to Vietnam. The Central 
America conference brought together governments, inter-
national actors, and civil society groups to find solutions for 
both refugees and IDPs in a highly charged political envi-
ronment. Among other things, it represented a particularly 
positive experience of collaboration between development 
and humanitarian actors. Neither of these was an easy pro-
cess, and both required substantial international commit-
ments of time, money, and national buy-in. But by and large, 
the participants resolved the large displacement crises of 
their times through different mechanisms. 
There already is a somewhat similar pattern of interna-
tional meetings on Syria, mostly to mobilize funding.30 Re-
gional efforts have been much more limited, however, and 
as noted above, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 
particular has failed to adopt a proactive role in responding 
to the refugee challenge. According to the UNHCR “Mid-
Year Trends 2015” report, six Muslim countries are among 
both the top ten refugee-sending countries as well as the top 
refugee-receiving countries.31 With the exception of Eritrea, 
all of these countries are members of the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation. The overwhelming majority of the 
Syrian refugees are from member countries, and the seat of 
the organization is in Saudi Arabia, which is a leading donor 
to the Syrian humanitarian cause. Yet, strikingly, so far that 
organization has failed to coordinate the efforts of its mem-
bership in addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. 
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In the earlier stages of the Syrian displacement crisis 
there was an initial effort to coordinate efforts among the 
major Syrian refugee–receiving countries of Jordan, Leba-
non, Iraq, and Turkey together with UNHCR. The so called 
“Ministerial Meeting of Syria Bordering Countries” held 
three rounds of meetings in September 2013 and then in 
January and May 2014 to draw attention to the situation 
of Syrian refugees and coordinate calls for international 
burden sharing.32 However, these meetings subsequently 
appear to have been discontinued. Ideally, countries border-
ing Syria together with the Organization of Islamic Cooper-
ation should play a central role in the New Global Approach 
for Syria. 
Other initiatives indicate a movement by disparate 
actors in different forums in the same direction. The UN’s 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan embodies both a 
robust regional approach and a commitment to support-
ing resilience and increased engagement by development 
actors. The World Bank has adopted a New Strategy for the 
Middle East and North Africa, which includes as central pil-
lars increasing the resilience of host societies to deal with 
refugees and IDPs and creating the conditions for long-term 
recovery.33 We have already referred to the G-20 communi-
que in November 2015. The Solutions Alliance represents a 
new type of partnership between affected governments and 
development and humanitarian actors to find solutions for 
displacement.34 Numerous international nongovernmental 
organizations have worked on the idea of achieving better 
interaction between relief and developmental assistance. 
This seems to be a time when many initiatives are bub-
bling up and different actors are reaching the same con-
clusion that a fundamentally new approach is needed for 
dealing with refugee and migration influxes. While the 
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Syrian situation is certainly not the only case in need of such 
a fresh start, it is unique in the scale of displacement, the 
global impact, and the apparent existence of strong political 
will to do things differently. If ever there was a time ripe for 
new and innovative action, that time is now.
What Would a New Global Approach for Syria Do?
A New Global Approach for Syria could build on the ex-
periences of the Indochina and Central America initiatives 
in the 1990s by tying together a commitment to maintain-
ing open borders to refugees in the region, increased sup-
port for resilience among refugees, development of ways to 
support eventual solutions for refugees, the strategic use of 
resettlement, and increased support for host governments —
particularly in opening up livelihood opportunities to refu-
gees. All of these are difficult and costly undertakings, but if 
taken collectively could be more politically palatable than if 
undertaken individually. 
Elements of the New Global Approach for Syria
The New Global Approach for Syria could include at least six 
essential elements:
 ■ Reaffirming international responsibility for refugees;
 ■ Supporting common legal and policy approaches to 
Syrian refugees in the region;
 ■ Retooling elements of resettlement policy to meet the 
needs;
 ■ Engaging development actors more smoothly;
 ■ Providing a forum for developing responses to IDPs; 
and
 ■ Preparing for future recovery and reconstruction
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To begin with, our suggested approach should recom-
mit to the principle that the protection of refugees is indeed 
an international responsibility. However, this responsibility 
will need to be a truly global one and not shouldered just 
by traditional donor countries, most of them in the West. 
Emerging powers, especially Brazil, China, India, and 
others, will need to extend support, too. In that sense the 
recent G-20 summit decision to include in the communiqué 
a commitment to help with refugee issues around the world 
was a good step in the right direction. It will be important 
that China, as the host of the next G-20 summit, keeps this 
issue on the agenda and pursues efforts toward its imple-
mentation. This could also be an occasion to strengthen the 
1951 Refugee Convention and UNHCR Executive Com-
mittee decisions, especially those pertaining to mass influx 
situations.
A New Global Approach for Syria should provide coun-
tries in the region hosting Syrian refugees with the space to 
develop common legal and policy approaches to those refu-
gees. Ideally, the host governments would ratify the 1951 
Refugee Convention and put refugee determination proce-
dures in place. However, since under current circumstances 
this seems politically impossible and in any event would be 
a long-term process, the countries could at least agree on 
common legal approaches to forms of temporary protec-
tion, perhaps modeled on Turkey’s policies. This is where a 
regional deal resembling the one between Turkey and the 
EU could provide the capacity-building means for the host 
countries. A regional forum could provide the opportunity 
to develop regional standards for treatment of refugees.35 
Resettlement needs to be reaffirmed as a core component 
of refugee protection and assistance. As noted above, reset-
tlement has played a very small role thus far in providing 
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solutions to Syrian refugees, and it needs to be strengthened, 
reinvigorated, and developed into an important strategic 
tool as part of the New Global Approach for Syria. This will 
require significant rethinking —not only by UNHCR and 
the traditional resettlement countries but also by countries 
that have not yet played a role in resettling refugees. 
More countries should be encouraged to offer resettle-
ment slots, and they should be recognized for doing so. Cana-
dian prime minister Justin Trudeau’s decision to reverse the 
previous government’s more restrictive policy and instead 
take an initial 25,000 Syrian refugees was a commendable 
development.36 The decision by Australia to receive 12,000 
Syrian refugees is also a positive development.37 However, a 
much greater effort will be needed to respond to the scale of 
the crisis. It will be important to find ways of encouraging 
a wider range of countries to join the ranks of traditional 
resettlement countries. As of mid-December 2015, out of 
the thirty countries that made 125,600 places available to 
the UNHCR for the resettlement of Syrian refugees, only 
Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, and Uruguay were from outside 
the list of traditional resettlement countries: the United 
States, EU, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.38 Other 
countries —for example in Latin America, Asia, and the Per-
sian Gulf —should be encouraged to do their part in receiv-
ing Syrian refugees for resettlement. In particular, countries 
such as Iran and Russia could begin to accept Syrian refu-
gees for resettlement. Armenia, for example, has opened its 
doors to Syrian refugees of Armenian descent but could be 
encouraged and supported to receive Yazidi refugees, even 
if in modest numbers given the small size of the country 
and the economic difficulties it faces. Finally, wealthy Gulf 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, have not been particu-
larly forthcoming in receiving Syrian refugees.39 They have 
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indeed contributed generous funds for humanitarian assis-
tance and also host expatriate Syrian communities, but they 
have been reluctant to receive Syrian refugees, so far.40 The 
New Global Approach for Syria might borrow a page from 
the climate change negotiations and suggest that countries 
unwilling to resettle refugees provide more generous finan-
cial contributions for countries on the front line. 
More thought is needed about more robust and creative 
ways of increased engagement of the private sector, with 
consideration given to family and community sponsor-
ship opportunities. There are clear disadvantages to having 
some refugees funded privately while others are funded by 
a government, but perhaps it is time to take another look 
at alternative ways of funding resettlement. Could more be 
done, for example, to strengthen diaspora networks and 
bring them into the international system? Perhaps they can 
be considered as potential developmental actors for the re-
construction of their home country when the day comes. Fi-
nally, could resettlement to third countries be used for those 
displaced inside Syria? As noted throughout this report, so-
lutions for IDPs are much more difficult than for refugees. 
And while countries such as the United States have used in-
country processing before, there have been major problems 
with at least some of these programs (such as in the cases of 
Haiti and Central America). But in other cases, such as the 
Orderly Departure Program for Vietnamese in the 1980s, 
resettlement has saved lives. 
The New Global Approach for Syria should provide a 
new relationship between humanitarian and development 
actors. Refugees need more opportunities to access educa-
tion and livelihoods. This means appreciating their eco-
nomic contributions, and it will require host governments 
to make difficult decisions to allow them to access employ-
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ment opportunities. However, it also will be critical that the 
international community shift gears from an emphasis on 
short-term humanitarian assistance to long-term develop-
ment goals. Such a shift has never been done in the midst of 
ongoing conflict, but there are signs that this may be pos-
sible as evidenced by the UN’s Regional Refugee and Re-
silience Plan strategy, the World Bank’s new plan for the 
Middle East and North Africa, and many other initiatives. 
It also is important that traditional developmental agen-
cies, led by the World Bank, revise their procedures and 
make middle-income countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Turkey eligible for grants and other support programs. 
Increasing coordination between these agencies and hu-
manitarian relief agencies will also be critical. These ideas—
especially to increase refugees’ and their host communities’ 
resilience, and to encourage cooperation with a wider range 
of stake holders—have indeed been central to the World 
Bank’s new Middle East and North Africa strategy.41 This 
in turn could constitute a step in the direction of a Middle 
East Recovery Plan, a sort of Marshall Plan discussed ear-
lier in this chapter, toward the reconstruction of the region. 
As one World Bank official explained, it is important to 
build resilience to communities affected by mass popula-
tion movements “by supporting the displaced as well as host 
communities and preparing recovery and reconstruction 
wherever and whenever peace emerges. This harks back to 
our immediate post–World War II mission, when we were 
first established as the IBRD —the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.”42 Furthermore, going 
beyond just relief assistance and moving into the develop-
mental aspect of the challenges ahead would also fall in line 
with the World Bank’s recently adopted Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals.
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Indeed, there are a few encouraging signs that develop-
ment actors, such as the World Bank, are taking steps to play 
a role in both protracted displacement situations and in sup-
porting solutions for displacement.43 However, this needs to 
be robustly supported by political leaders and by the donor 
community. International agencies beyond UNHCR, the 
World Food Program, the Office for Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs, and UNICEF will need to become more 
active, especially the World Bank Group and agencies such 
as Islamic Development Bank, the European Bank of Re-
construction and Development, and the China-led Asian 
Infrastructure and Investment Bank. The New Global Ap-
proach for Syria should make the engagement of both hu-
manitarian and development actors central.
The New Global Approach for Syria should also offer a 
forum for creative thinking on solutions for internally dis-
placed people. As this study has shown, internal displace-
ment is directly related to refugee movements; when people 
cannot find protection within the borders of their own 
country, they move elsewhere. Protection, assistance, and 
solutions for IDPs are much more difficult and more contro-
versial than for refugees, and the way forward is much less 
clear. First and foremost, greater diplomatic efforts should 
go into strengthening the implementation of earlier UN 
Security Council resolutions, especially on provision of as-
sistance in rebel-controlled areas. Second, perhaps there are 
opportunities for engaging the Syrian government around 
protection of people in besieged areas or in negotiating 
access. These options should be tried. The “Whole of Syria” 
approach adopted by the UN in late 2014 offers some im-
portant precedents for this. Third, as discussed in chapter 3, 
challenges and difficulties are associated with “no-fly” and 
“safe” zones. But these options require further discussion 
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and the elaboration of alternative models for how they can 
be implemented. 
The engagement of different kinds of actors —from ex-
perts in peacekeeping to diaspora groups to Gulf charities —
may enable more realistic assessments of their possibilities 
to protect civilians. The New Global Approach for Syria 
could set up multi-stakeholder working groups that could 
look at the feasibility of safe zones, no-fly areas, humani-
tarian corridors, and humanitarian cease-fires. It might be 
that, as certain parts of Syria achieve relative calm, the idea 
of extending humanitarian corridors from less secure areas 
could be considered. In the present political context, there 
are no good options for responding to IDPs inside Syria or, 
indeed, to those who are trapped and unable to move. But 
the New Global Approach for Syria could offer a new space 
for developing such options and a better forum for coordi-
nating cross-border operations. 
The New Global Approach for Syria can include an es-
sential component of preparing the recovery by laying the 
groundwork for longer-term reconstruction and recovery 
efforts. Much of this will depend on the political negotia-
tions and the “shape” of a postwar Syria, with the distinct 
possibility that the contours of the present nation-state of 
Syria may not remain. But efforts are already under way to 
think about the transition.44 These efforts, and many others, 
could be brought together under the New Global Approach 
for Syria. Doing so might ensure that humanitarian and 
development efforts are tailored in such a way to support 
eventual recovery.
Bringing an end to the conflict in Syria and developing a 
long-term recovery strategy are clearly the most desired so-
lutions for displacement. Although this ideal appears a dis-
tant possibility, it is likely that the eventual shape of postwar 
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Syria will be determined largely by the patterns of displace-
ment that already have occurred. In this vein, proposals to 
create safe zones, local cease-fires, and permanent restruc-
turing of the country usually build on the demographic re-
shaping that has resulted from displacement. A federal or 
confederal structure may well be the eventual political solu-
tion. Some analysts are making the point that it is unlikely 
Syria will even exist as a nation-state in five years.45
Getting to a New Global Approach for Syria
What would a new “Grand Bargain for Syrian Refugees” 
look like? It would bring together the governments of 
refugee- hosting countries, the UN and other intergovern-
mental agencies, regional bodies, international nongov-
ernmental organizations and local civil society actors, and 
donor governments to consider and adopt a new system of 
burden sharing. This system potentially would include com-
mitments to keep the borders open to Syrian refugees and to 
more fairly share the costs of assisting and protecting refu-
gees, along with an agreement to allow Syrian refugees to 
access education and livelihoods, including through legal 
employment opportunities. 
The process could be jointly organized by the UN secre-
tary general and the president of the World Bank and could 
culminate in a global meeting in March 2017. That meet-
ing would be intended to ratify the New Global Approach 
for Syria, which had been worked out through a consulta-
tive process with stakeholders over a six-to-twelve-month 
period. This is a short period of time for international actors 
to act. But now is not a time for business as usual. The needs 
are urgent, and with the strong political support of the 
world’s leaders, such a bargain could indeed be pulled off.
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We suggest that the UN secretary general and the presi-
dent of the World Bank announce the initiative at the Gen-
eral Assembly in September 2016 and ask for commitments 
from stakeholders to actively engage in it. At the same time, 
the two conveners should announce a list of “expectations,” 
to which relevant stakeholders should respond within a 
month. For example, one expectation could be that the Or-
ganization of Islamic Cooperation would take the lead in or-
ganizing a meeting of host-country governments to consider 
common approaches to the legal status of refugees in their 
countries and to come up with ways to prevent statelessness 
among Syrian refugees. Another “expectation” could be 
for the EU to come up with an implementable “relocation”’ 
policy for Syrian refugees arriving in EU countries. Still an-
other could be to ask the UN Development Program and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization to compile a list of 
feasible livelihood projects that could be carried out now in 
Syria, or to ask UNHCR to put together a concrete proposal 
to support resettlement of Syrian refugees in countries that 
have not traditionally resettled refugees.
At the same time as the conveners are launching the New 
Global Approach for Syria and announcing specific expec-
tations, they should take two additional actions. First, they 
should commission two definitive studies. One study would 
cover the positive and negative economic impacts of refu-
gees in host countries; perhaps it could be carried out by a 
consortium of academic institutions in the region coordi-
nated by the World Bank. The study would also discuss the 
possibilities in which the creation of livelihood opportuni-
ties would connect with an eventual rebuilding program for 
Syria. A second study should examine the security implica-
tions of Syrian refugees; perhaps it could be carried out in 
association with relevant police associations in the Middle 
Ferris-Kirişci_Consequences of Chaos_i-xx_1-202.indd   138 3/11/16   2:51 PM
T h e  C o n s e q u e n C e s  o f  C h a o s 139
East, Europe, and elsewhere under the coordination of a re-
spected research institution, perhaps the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute. Other studies may also 
be needed. 
In addition to commissioning studies, the conveners 
should issue a call to NGOs and civil society organizations, 
including Muslim charities, to make their contribution 
to this New Global Approach for Syria. For example, they 
could solicit the input of refugees and diaspora groups in 
coming up with less risky paths for Syrians traveling outside 
the region or in researching coping methods of refugees and 
identifying measures that could mitigate negative coping 
behavior, such as early marriage and transactional sex. The 
possibility of organizing inclusive civil society meetings in 
the regions, perhaps under the auspices of local universities 
or NGO platforms, should be considered. There are particu-
lar advantages to asking respected groups that are perceived 
as neutral to play such facilitating roles. The conveners 
could also set up a website where these contributions could 
be posted and where collaboration could be sought. Groups 
of all types —for example, the Intergovernmental Consulta-
tions on Migration, Asylum and Refugees; the Red Cross 
movement; and universities and defense departments —
should be encouraged to participate in the process of coming 
up with a new Grand Bargain for Syrian Refugees.
T h e  s y r i a n  d i s P l a C e m e n T  C r i s i s  a n d 
T h e  i n T e r n a T i o n a l  h u m a n i T a r i a n  s y s T e m 
 The international humanitarian system is under serious 
strain and, as a whole, is overstretched. António Guterres, 
who just stepped down as UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, noted: “If you look at those displaced by conflict per 
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day, in 2010 it was 11,000; last year there were 42,000. This 
means a dramatic increase in need, from shelter to water and 
sanitation, food, medical assistance, education.” He went 
on to remark: “The global humanitarian community is not 
broken —as a whole they are more effective than ever before. 
But we are financially broke.”46 However, we think that solu-
tions to the problem must involve more than just a simple 
infusion of funds and that there is a need for more funda-
mental change to fix the system. With the world’s attention 
now focused on refugees and the Syrian humanitarian crisis 
generally, this is a perhaps once-in-an-era opportunity to 
discuss —and implement —bold change to the humanitarian 
system. 
Some of the reflections and consultations in the lead-up 
to the World Humanitarian Summit offer good proposals 
for change; for example, the crucial need for more engage-
ment of local civil society actors since local and national 
humanitarian actors received only 0.2 percent of the over-
all direct global humanitarian response in 2013.47 However, 
these proposals do not go far enough. Bigger issues that need 
to be addressed include reforming the current Western- 
led humanitarian system to make sure scarce funds better 
serve the needy and looking for ways to better integrate the 
emerging humanitarian actors and donors into a reformed 
system.48 Mobilizing collective action on Syria and har-
nessing the creative energy could well serve as an impetus 
for more radical change in the international humanitarian 
system.
The scale of Syrian displacement, the difficulties of ac-
cessing people in need inside Syria, and the likelihood that 
Syrians will be displaced for years are now driving efforts to 
find political solutions to the conflict. There are risks that 
this pressure will lead to political agreements that do not 
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offer sufficient protection to those who have been displaced. 
There also are risks that, given the situation in the neighbor-
ing countries and in Europe, refugees will be encouraged 
or even forced to return home before it is safe for them to 
do so. Furthermore, as Syrian displacement becomes pro-
tracted there is an additional risk that the world’s attention 
will diminish and the crisis will be relegated to situation 
reports by humanitarian agencies that are read mainly by 
other humanitarian agencies. 
But there is also an opportunity to use this horrific 
human tragedy to introduce needed fundamental changes 
to our systems of global governance and humanitarian re-
sponse. It is an opportunity to bring order out of chaos and, 
it is hoped, ensure that the victims of the world’s next civil 
conflict will be treated better than the people of Syria have 
been.
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have been forced to leave their homes and communities because of the 
civil war consuming Syria. The displacement, internally and externally, 
of more than half of the country’s population—one of the largest forced 
movements of people since the end of World War II—has transformed the 
region. It has also triggered a wave of political turbulence in Europe as 
hundreds of thousands have fled across the Mediterranean to seek refuge.
The Consequences of Chaos details the plight of Syria’s uprooted citizens 
and examines the long-term economic, political, and social implications 
of this massive movement of people. The humanitarian crisis has been 
overwhelming for all actors involved. Neighboring countries host almost 
five million Syrian refugees with no end in sight. European institutions 
struggle to come up with a coherent approach to the crisis. The United 
Nations appeals for increasing levels of financial support to respond to 
the demands for food, shelter, and medical care. A New Global Approach 
for Syria is needed, the authors maintain, and they propose an innovative 
system of burden sharing to respond to the humanitarian crisis in 
both the short and longer term. 
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